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 ABSTRACT 
This thesis joins a lively dialogue in the technological arena on the issue of cybersecurity and 
specifically, the issue of infrastructure cybersecurity as related to Industrial Control Systems. 
Infrastructure cybersecurity is concerned with issues on the security of the critical 
infrastructure that have significant value to the physical infrastructure of a country, and 
infrastructure that is heavily reliant on IT and the security of such technology. It is an 
undeniable fact that key infrastructure such as the electricity grid, gas, air and rail transport 
control, and even water and sewerage services rely heavily on technology. Threats to such 
infrastructure have never been as serious as they are today. The most sensitive of them is the 
reliance on infrastructure that requires cybersecurity in the energy sector.  
The call to smart technology and automation is happening nowadays. The Internet is witnessing 
an increase number of connected industrial control system (ICS). Many of which don’t follow 
security guidelines. Privacy and sensitive data are also an issue. Sensitive leaked information 
is being manipulated by adversaries to accomplish certain agendas.   
Open Source intelligence (OSINT) is adopted by defenders to improve protection and 
safeguard data.  
This research presented in thesis, proposes “ICSrank” a novel security risk assessment for ICS 
devices based on OSINT.  
ICSrank ranks the risk level of online and offline ICS devices. This framework categorizes, 
assesses and ranks OSINT data using ICSrank framework. ICSrank provides an additional layer 
of defence and mitigation in ICS security, by identification of risky OSINT and devices. 
Security best practices always begin with identification of risk as a first step prior to security 
implementation.  
Risk is evaluated using mathematical algorithms to assess the OSINT data. The subsequent 
results achieved during the assessment and ranking process were informative and realistic. 
ICSrank framework proved that security and risk levels were more accurate and informative 
than traditional existing methods.    
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 GLOSSARY
ICS: 
 The term Industrial Control Systems is 
used to describe different types of control 
systems and associated industrial 
instruments, including devices, systems, 
networks used to operate and/or automate 
industrial processes. ICS are built to 
function electronically and manage tasks 
depending on industries’ different needs. 
Today ICS protocols are used in nearly 
every industrial sector and critical 
infrastructures such as the manufacturing, 
transportation, energy, and water treatment 
industries [176]. 
IoT:  
The internet of things, commonly 
abbreviated as IoT, refers to the connection 
of computing, digital and mechanical 
devices in a system providing a unique 
identifier to each device and the ability to 
transfer data over a network without human 
intervention [177]. 
OSINT:  
This acronym stands for Open Source 
Intelligence that is the insight gained from 
analysing and processing the publicly 
available media data sources like television, 
newspaper, radio, social media, and 
websites. These sources provide data in all 
its forms to be assessed and used by 
organizations. [178] 
SCADA: 
  is an acronym that refers to Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition. SCADA is a 
computer system that monitors industrial 
processes. The main task for this system is 
to monitor industrial electrical assets 
scattered over large geographic areas [179]. 
SSL: 
 this is an acronym for Secure Sockets 
Layer. It is a standard protocol used to 
secure documents transmitted over the 
network. A secure link is created between 
the browser and the webserver for private 
data transmission [181].  
TSL:  
this is an acronym for Transport Security 
Layer. The protocol ensures a secure 
communication link between server and 
client communicating over the internet. It 
protects the data and ensures its integrity 
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and privacy between the internet nodes 
[182].  
SQLi: 
This is an acronym for SQL injection. This 
is a type of malicious computer attack that 
is embedded in software that is poorly 
designed then transferred to the backend 
databases. It then produces queries that 
should not be executed [183]. 
XSS:  
This is an acronym for Cross-Site Scripting. 
It is a process where malicious code is 
added to a genuine website with the 
intention of gathering information from 
users. The attacks are also possible through 
vulnerabilities posed by web applications; 
they are commonly injected from the client-
side [184].  
CSRF:  
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is an 
exploitation of the website from a trusted 
user. It is done by issuing unauthorized 
commands from the user’s browser to the 
trust of the website [188].  
 
 
 
 
TCP:  
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is a 
network communication protocol designed 
to send data packets over the network. The 
protocol connects remote computers, then 
transmits and ensures that the messages are 
delivered [187].  
 
SMTP:  
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is 
the standard email transfer protocol on a 
TCP/IP network. It facilitates sending and 
receiving of email messages over the 
internet [186].  
UDP: 
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is a 
protocol used to send short messages called 
datagrams for programs that run on various 
computers on a network [185]. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 FOREWORD 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are critical infrastructures for many organizations and 
countries. ICS are responsible for operating and maintaining industrial factories that produce 
assets such as gas, nuclear power, and water. The security of these systems is critical since their 
continuous operation is crucial to the well-being of industries and countries. Energy security 
has always been a high priority worldwide since attacks on ICS security systems (or their lack 
of security) can result in disastrous implications, both in terms of physical and financial 
damage.   
In this chapter, ICS security methods are introduced, and security controls are discussed. This 
thesis also discusses research motivation and presents novel contributions to the field. Finally, 
the aims, objectives, methodology, and thesis layout are put forward. 
1.2 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS 
Critical Infrastructure Systems have grown to be one of the vital aspects of the operation of 
systems since they ensure security and reliability in operation. They are the key assets and 
systems (virtual or physical) of such importance to countries that their destruction or incapacity 
poses serious threats to security, the national public health and safety, the national economy or 
a sum of all of these issues. Therefore, systems are monitored and controlled to avoid disrupting 
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normal operations due to attacks, natural disasters or component faults. Such monitoring and 
control ensure continued operation after failure [189].  
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are heavily used in important 
national infrastructures such as oil, gas and energy production, to name but a few. The main 
role of a SCADA system is to organize and control traffic data to manage infrastructure 
operations. A SCADA system is mainly composed of Master Terminal Units (MTUs) 
(sometimes called the Human Machine Interface (HMI)) which read and control data coming 
from field devices like Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), Programmable Logic Controllers 
(PLCs) and Intelligent Electronic Commands (IEDs). RTUs, PLCs and IEDs obtain readings 
(data) from meters, sensors and valves. 
 
Figure 1:SCADA layout [1] 
 
SCADA components such as MTUs and RTUs communicate through channels and protocols 
such as DNP3 [2], International Electro-technical Commission (IEC60870-6) (sometimes 
called Inter-Control Centre Communications Protocol (ICCP) or TASE.2[3], Modbus [4], 
Tristation (source)and Profinet IO [5]  to name only some of the estimated 150-200 protocols 
identified by the American Gas Association[6]. SCADA protocols organize the interaction of 
SCADA components by issuing built-in functions designed specifically for each protocol. Most 
SCADA protocols were designed by proprietary vendors and are therefore considered closed-
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source products (which are difficult to study). Nevertheless, there are some widely used, open-
source protocols like Modbus and DNP3 that can be used to demonstrate SCADA protocol 
interactions (see Figure 2). Open-source software is a type of application, in which the source 
code is freely available to the public and hence modifiable; contrasting with a closed-source 
product where no source code is available. Open-source software benefits from mass 
cooperation by the open-source community, which enables the constant revision and 
improvement of code. This has a significant advantage over proprietary (closed) software as 
security and design errors could be fixed and improved faster (although clearly, open-source 
fixes are publicly visible). However, open-source protocols such as Modbus and DNP3 remain 
insecure and require a lot of improvement. Proprietary protocols such as Tristation also require 
security hardening In this thesis, the key focus is on the Tristation protocol security in chapter 
6. 
 
Figure 2: SCADA interactions using Modbus [7] 
SCADA protocols and systems were designed to be closed systems in private networks. After 
the emergence of open protocols and networks such as TCP/IP and the Internet, SCADA 
systems were interconnected with open protocols and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
software/hardware, thus becoming exposed to a variety of cyber risks and attacks. SCADA 
systems are especially vulnerable to cyber-attacks because security was not considered as an 
integral part of the original design of SCADA systems or open protocols and COTS systems. 
SCADA systems were designed principally for functionality purposes such as performance, 
reliability and availability. 
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  ICS Security Issues 
There have been many cyber-attacks on SCADA networks (Table 1). An example is the 
Australian sewage incident in Queensland's Maroochy district in the year 2000, during which 
an intruder had access to a weak SCADA network and released tons of sewage into the city 
[8]. The intruder was an employee for a company that installed the SCADA system for the 
council. He had applied for a job in the council but was rejected. Seeking revenge, he used his 
ex-employer’s software installed on his laptop and issued radio commands near the council 
sewage system, which eventually caused the disastrous event. Another example that 
demonstrates the real risk and consequences of neglecting SCADA security is the Slammer 
worm that crashed a nuclear plant network in Ohio in 2003[9]. The source of the attack was an 
insider who accidentally installed unpatched Microsoft SQL on his laptop, which subsequently 
allowed his laptop to be infected by the worm. The worm spread the instant he was connected 
to the company’s network reaching both corporate and control networks. Production was not 
affected.  However, the company lost some historical data stored on its server.  
Miller and Rowe [10] have listed 15 SCADA and control system incidents such as the Siberian 
Pipeline Explosion in 1982, caused by a Trojan implanted in the network. Another large Trojan 
incident was the 2010 Stuxnet attack against Iranian nuclear plants which aimed to disrupt and 
distort regular operations. The malware infected the control network through an employee’s 
computer. The Stuxnet attack allowed a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack to take place 
between the network’s PLC controllers. MITM is an eavesdropping attack that an attacker can 
monitor or modify communication between two nodes [190]. However, the exact target was 
not revealed by the Iranian authority and is still unknown. The alleged objective was to 
intercept packets and change them [11]. Miller and Rowe classified the main methods of attacks 
that targeted ICS systems during a 20-year period (1982 – 2012) as the following:  
• Misuse of operation [ Explored in this thesis] 
• User compromise. 
• Compromise of root or administrator credentials. [ Explored in this thesis] 
• Trojan: [ Explored in this thesis]. 
• Denial of service. 
 Page | 5  
 
• Virus. 
• Social engineering 
Two of the above attacks are explained in depth in chapter 6. Misuse of operation is 
demonstrated in case study 1, 2 and 3. Case studies are built on the concept of system 
manipulation. Trojan attack is also the core study in chapter 6, where Trisis malware is 
examined Chapter 4 identifies the credential attack as part of OSINT collection process.  
Their work has also explained the impact of SCADA attacks on targeted control systems and 
has provided a classification of targeted sectors into three types: government, commercial or 
international. 
Table 1: Top 10 most critical SCADA vulnerabilities [12] 
Vulnerability SCADA Impact 
Unpatched Published Vulnerabilities Most Likely Access Vector 
Web Human-machine Interface (HMI) Vulnerabilities Supervisory Control Access 
Use of Vulnerable Remote Display Protocols Supervisory Control Access 
Improper Access Control (Authorization) 
Access to SCADA 
Functionality 
Improper Authentication 
Access to SCADA 
Applications 
Buffer Overflows in SCADA Services SCADA Host Access 
SQL Injection Data Historian Access 
SCADA Data and Command Message Manipulation and 
Injection 
Supervisory Control Access 
Unprotected Transport of SCADA Application 
Credentials 
SCADA Credentials Gathering 
Use of Standard IT Protocols with Clear-text 
Authentication 
SCADA Credentials Gathering 
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Because of these safety risks, the demand to protect digital and physical assets under SCADA 
control from cyber-attacks is escalating. It is becoming a priority for most countries and 
organizations to act towards understanding and protecting SCADA systems to mitigate or 
prevent risks. One crucial step towards securing SCADA systems is to understand the 
vulnerabilities and subsequent cyber-attacks that target SCADA protocol vulnerabilities[1].  
 ICS Protocols 
1.2.2.1 MODBUS PROTOCOL 
Modbus is an old protocol, designed and developed by Modicon Industrial Automation 
Systems (currently Schneider Electric) in 1979. It is the standard amongst other protocols in 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS). It is the oldest and most widely used industrial protocol by 
automation systems around the world and as such, it is of primary concern in ICS research 
(especially ICS cybersecurity) [24]. 
The Modbus protocol is vulnerable by design and lacks critical security features such as 
authentication, availability, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation. Authentication is 
neglected in the design of ICS protocols: no passwords are required to control access to 
stations, substations and sensors. However, in DNP3 there is a feature that allows the “masters” 
to identify themselves by issuing a “SELECT” command.  
There are security features that must be available for every secure protocol: 
• Availability is a vital and critical feature in industrial control systems and thus means 
that processes must be available in real-time and functioning continuously as 
required by the nature of these industries.  
• Confidentiality is enhanced by ensuring that encryption is available to protect data 
flows in networks instead of a clear text format, thus preventing data sniffing.  
• The integrity of data and processes remains unchanged in their original form without 
any alteration or manipulation. 
• Finally, non-repudiation is a protection mechanism that aims at preventing attackers 
from manipulating packets between masters and slaves.  
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ICS protocols such as Modbus were designed for functionality and networking purposes such 
as performance, reliability and availability. These functionality features are important for 
industrial systems. However, they are not enough for the protocol to survive in the cyber age. 
Therefore, the demand to protect ICS systems from cyber-attacks and hence protect digital and 
physical assets is escalating. As such, it is becoming a priority for most countries and 
organizations nowadays to take action towards understanding and hardening ICS systems to 
mitigate or prevent risks. Securing ICS protocols is an important step to secure ICS’s internal 
and external communications. 
There has been a considerable amount of work done on Modbus security [15] – [31]. Huitsing 
has laid out a Modbus attack taxonomy [24], which extended the work done by 
DigitalBond[25] by identifying more attacks. However, his work (by his own admission) is 
incomplete as not all attacks that target Modbus are covered.  
Fovino and Masera also contributed work towards Modbus security by increasing the number 
of analysed attacks [27], compared to the aforementioned study. For example, malware attacks 
on Modbus were tested experimentally [27]. In the report, 11 attacks against Modbus were 
identified [28]. Further work by these authors discussed developing Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) that can detect malicious Modbus packets [29]. A platform was also developed 
for assessing SCADA vulnerabilities [26]. They also described a secure version of Modbus 
[31]. However, their secure Modbus was only a prototype and was only tested for performance 
and functionality (it was not tested for security issues). They admitted that the work did not 
demonstrate attack scenarios, which is essential for evaluating the effectiveness of a secure 
version. Furthermore, they have mentioned that their proposed protocol cannot protect the 
system if an intruder gains control over the master device (e.g. RTU or PLC). Our research 
considers this issue.  
1.2.2.2 DNP3 PROTOCOL 
DNP3 is a bidirectional protocol that allows devices to act as either master or slave (allowing 
the ability to change roles). DNP3 is very popular in SCADA networks [33]. With the advent 
of the internet, DNP3 was developed to support TCP connectivity to be able to connect with 
outstations at a distance. The complexity of DNP3 architecture introduces many vulnerabilities 
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[32] alongside a lack of main security features such as authentication and confidentiality, thus 
making DNP3 an insecure medium inside SCADA network. 
East et.al. developed an attack taxonomy related to the DNP3 protocol [33], their work is 
similar to Huitsing’s work on Modbus [24]. However, similar gaps to those of Huitsing’s work 
such as missing attacks still exist. Both works are theoretical developments and thus remain 
untested. Some authors have focused on examining basic security features such as access 
control by demonstrating how the design of DNP3 is weak when protecting devices in the 
network [34]. The authors proposed a solution that protects those devices if a master device 
becomes compromised or when intruders by-pass other security solutions.  
1.2.2.3 PROFIBUS I/O PROTOCOL 
Profibus IO or Profinet I/O is one of the most commonly used protocols in SCADA systems. 
Along with most SCADA protocols, Profibus I/O lacks basic security characteristics. It also 
presents weak access control features that allow for breaches by the initialization of illegal 
packets [32]. An attacker can manipulate packets by changing the data or instructions that each 
packet contains. 
Akerberg and Bjorkman demonstrated that physical nodes connected by Profinet I/O are 
vulnerable to attack without detection [35]. They have proposed a solution based on the concept 
of modules. The module is built on top of Profinet I/O protocol and thus provides basic security 
features such as integrity and confidentiality. They argue that the concept of modules is 
practical because it does not affect the transmissions inside the protocol. However, their 
proposal is still theoretical and has not been evaluated. In another work, Baud and Felser 
demonstrated a man-in-the-middle attack by emulating SCADA devices using Profinet I/O 
protocol as a medium [36]. The concept of emulation is adopted in our work. They proposed a 
guideline on how to develop emulated devices for security testing. For example, they show 
how to implement the behaviour of a PLC and demonstrate its vulnerability when targeted by 
a man-in-the-middle attack. This type of attack attempts to sniff or spy on communication 
channels. 
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 IoT and the new generation of Industrial devices 
Contemporary industrial control systems can now be integrated with smart devices such as 
sensors, meters, mobile phones and networks. This integration is called the Industrial Internet-
of-Things (iIoT), a Web of Things (WOT), Industry 4.0 or Internet-of-devices [37]. ICS 
devices are becoming more exposed to the internet than ever before. It is estimated that the 
number of iIoT devices will reach 50 billion by 2020 [38]. This growth is explained by the 
need for smarter and faster automation. The trade-off is a larger exposure to internet attacks. 
This is the trade-off when performance is prioritized. It is common for ICS systems to choose 
performance (availability) characteristics over security. This puts iIoT devices in jeopardy.  
Traditional ICS devices such as SCADA, PLC and HMI are the backbone of critical 
infrastructures. There is a need in this work to understand how these devices were designed 
and how they operate. This research also needs to understand the sequence of security feature 
priority for industrial devices. These devices are by no means like other traditional devices. 
Each device is composed of one or more software packages, they normally contain a firmware, 
application and a network protocol embedded in them. In brief, the more software used, the 
larger the chance for a vulnerability to exist. IIoT devices suffer from multiple weaknesses 
such as lack of physical protection, which leads to a physical attack. They are connected 
wirelessly which enables eavesdropping and makes it difficult to implement security solutions 
and other major security features such as authentication, data integrity [39], privacy, identity 
management, trust and resilience [40]. OWASP [41] has identified 10 major bugs for iIoT, 
which are analysed thoroughly in chapter two. Not all iIoT devices have the same level of 
security. The above factors contribute to the overall risk level. In chapter four an analysis of 
each device is demonstrated by considering every factor that affects its security.  
It is a general fact that cyber risk has been a recurring issue with ICS devices since the day they 
were introduced to the internet. What made matters worse is that public search engines have 
managed to identify, locate and archive those devices. Everyone, especially attackers, has eas 
y access to the wealth of information that search engines provide. In chapters three and four, 
this thesis shows the types of information that search engines can reveal. Also, an explanation 
of how to use that information to assess ICS devices is included. Such information can 
sometimes be critical.  
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Search engines are only a part of the general problem. There are other threats apart from 
attackers that can contribute to the insecurity of ICS devices. Free and public information and 
data about these devices are labelled as Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) [42]. Search engines 
are one source of OSINT. In chapter three, an outline of OSINT and its tools is presented in 
more depth. Attackers use this data to learn about a target and to spot weaknesses and thus 
prepare before attacking a target device. Therefore, knowing how attackers think is vital. 
Knowledge of critical information that an attacker can use is a major step to stop a threat and 
minimize risks. Our research takes this approach and proposes a framework that focuses on the 
security assessment of ICS devices using available information from OSINT resources (see 
below section 1.3). 
According to project Shodan Intelligence Extraction “Shine” [43], there were 1,000,000 ICS 
devices connected to the internet in 2014 [44]. Today, there are probably many more devices. 
ICS devices could be part of a network that belongs to many industries, such as oil, gas, 
electricity, water, nuclear, etc. This could indicate the possibility that these ICS devices are 
connected to real physical systems. In our research, it is assumed that the targeted physical 
system is a gas industry. Questions such as How to get access to that device and even to the 
gas network? What would be the impact and cascading effects? are discussed. This thesis 
adopts ethical rules (See Chapter 4) throughout research, which prevents access to ICS devices; 
this inspired the author to build a gas cylinder model. The model allows to experiment with 
various scenarios. The methodology in this research links cyber threats (that were collected 
using this research’s framework) with the gas model. To the best of author knowledge, this 
linkage is a new topic in this area. The relationship (cyber-physical) between iIoT security and 
a physical system is a new research area (see section 1.3 below). 
1.3 MOTIVATION 
Industrial control devices such as SCADA, PLC and RTU are heavily used in critical national 
infrastructures such as oil, gas and energy production, transmission and distribution, to name a 
few. ICS were designed to be closed systems in private networks. After the emergence of open 
protocols and networks such as TCP/IP and the Internet, ICS devices were interconnected with 
open protocols and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software/hardware, thus exposing them 
to a variety of cyber risks and attacks. ICS devices are specifically vulnerable to cyber-attacks 
because security was not considered as part of the design of ICS or open protocols and COTS 
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systems. ICS were designed principally for functionality purposes such as performance, 
reliability and availability.  
There have been many cyber-attacks on ICS networks, a few will be listed.  Some attacks 
originated from disgruntled insiders such as The Australian sewage incident in Queensland's 
Maroochy district in 2000 that was discussed earlier. Another example that demonstrates the 
real risk and consequences of neglecting ICS security is the Slammer worm that crashed a 
nuclear plant network in Ohio in 2003[9]. The attack source was from an insider who 
accidentally installed unpatched Microsoft SQL on his laptop that eventually became infected 
by the worm. The worm spread the moment the laptop was connected to the company’s 
network, reaching both corporate and control networks. Production was not affected; however, 
the company lost some history data inside its server.  
Miller and Rowe [10] listed 15 industrial control systems incidents, such as the Siberian 
Pipeline Explosion in 1982, caused by a Trojan implanted in the network. Another Trojan (the 
same as in the previous source) attack was the Stuxnet attack in 2010 against the Iranian nuclear 
plants to disrupt and distort normal operations. The malware infected the control network 
through an employee’s computer. The impact of the Stuxnet attack was to allow a man-in-the-
middle attack to take place between the network’s PLC controllers. However, the exact target 
was not revealed by the Iranian authorities and is still unknown. The goal apparently was to 
intercept packets and change them [11]. 
1.3.1  The Growing ICS exposure 
There has been a rapid growth in the number of ICS devices that need to be connected to the 
internet in order to be functional. This is especially true in the era of industry 4.0 and the 
emergence of the iIoT. A typical iIoT system is composed of ICS devices along with a cloud 
service and business applications [45]. Businesses are using IoT technology to help improve 
their day to day operations, cut costs, as well as to monitor, maintain and protect assets such as 
PLCs in real-time. Attack surfaces to ICS devices are increasing every day. Attack surfaces are 
different entry points of a system (e.g. device) which an attacker can use to get access or obtain 
data [191]. 
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The wealth of sensitive information about those devices, their organizations and staff that is 
publicly available on the internet is threatening. OSINT sources that are available to the public 
and the dark web have made matters worse. With a click of the mouse, one can find a target 
ICS device exposed online with an accompanying information pack about it. Specialized search 
engines such as Shodan, Zmap and Censys are hunting and classifying ICS devices for use by 
security researchers and practitioners. However, there is a misuse of these services by notorious 
threat actors. They contribute generously to the leakage of private information about ICS 
victims such as credentials, a method of attack and device network details. There is a loud call 
for action to help reduce this exposure and minimize attack surface for ICS devices and IoT 
systems. 
1.3.2  OSINT threats 
Nowadays, smart technologies such as IoT have been strongly linked to ICS. IoT technologies 
have contributed to the improvement of automation, performance and production of ICS. The 
integration of ICS and IoT has resulted in the birth of new systems of ICS. These systems are 
indeed smarter. However, IoT design and security suffer from many weaknesses. Issues such 
as weak web interface, lack of privacy and leakage of sensitive information are too risky for 
industrial entities to ignore. The impact is severe and costly. To show an example in the energy 
field, BlackEnergy [46] (a Trojan) hit many energy companies in Ukraine in 2014. The Trojan, 
implanted in a Microsoft Office document, was specifically made for SCADA systems and was 
spread by a simple spear-phishing email. Spear-phishing email is an email sent to a targeted 
group of people from trusted sources that are familiar and related to those groups [192].  Social 
engineering was part of this attack because the document asked the receiver to carry out certain 
steps. Based on some Black Energy analysis, it was revealed that this malware was using a 
common practice when it comes to hosting an infected domain [47]. The free availability of 
information has made OSINT a powerful toolkit for both white and black hats. Many entities 
are attacked often because they were not aware of these threats. This lack of awareness about 
system threats is dangerous. Social media has, in turn, accelerated the growth of OSINT 
sources. One needs to have skills and tools to collect and filter OSINT information and convert 
it into useful intelligence. Most importantly, many entities do not know how to use this 
intelligence in the assessment of ICS devices. To minimize threats coming from OSINT, one 
needs to trace the source of leakage of information and remove its trails. Doing that requires 
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studying ICS device security in depth. In addition, there is also a need to develop techniques 
for collection and analysis of OSINT information regarding those devices. 
1.3.3 Motivation Summary 
This research is motivated by the real risk associated with ICS devices. The threats, combined 
with OSINT data, are alarming. Our research focuses on digital risks and their impact on 
physical systems such as gas pipelines.  
The rising exposure of ICS devices on the internet brings many challenges to practitioners and 
academics. The mixture of IT and OT products has its benefits. However, the trade-off between 
benefits and security is steep. The leakage of digital data from ICS devices has recently 
accelerated the rate of cyber-attacks. This was due to the growth of social media services that 
made sharing information easy and increased the availability of tools that store ICS data such 
as search engines and databases.  
1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The following is a list of our aims: 
• The identification of critical data of ICS devices using OSINT sources: To use 
available public OSINT that is related to ICS devices. This includes collection, 
categorization and identification of OSINT data, that can affect the security of online 
and offline ICS devices  
• The analysis of OSINT data and its impact on ICS devices: Analysis of OSINT data 
categories based on this research framework. Furthermore, security assessment of 
this data to determine its security and relevance.  
• Ranking the risk level of ICS devices using ranking algorithms: Application of these 
algorithm on collected and assessed OSINT data to determine its risk value and level.  
Research Objectives 
• Research into ICS vulnerability and risk assessment, methodologies and metrics.  
 Page | 14  
 
• Investigating the impact of cyber threats on ICS devices 
• Research into related work about ICS security in general. 
• Research into IoT security. 
• Research into OSINT techniques. 
• Research into related work about industrial device security. 
• Evaluation of current methodologies in risk analysis of ICS devices. 
• Application of ICSrank framework on 3 case studies: 
o Case 1: Analysis of Triconex PLC using OSINT sources 
o Case 2: Analysis of Trisis malware using network data 
o Case 3: Analysis of research tools using “Gas cylinder filling “model 
• Interviewing engineers from a gas company and development of “Gas cylinder filling 
“simulation model 
• Evaluation of results. 
• Proposal for mitigation and defence techniques 
• Publication of research results. 
1.5 APPROACH 
Our aim is to develop a framework/methodology to assess ICS device security based on OSINT 
and to investigate the risk level of related OSINT information. To achieve this, the following 
is done: 
• Collect OSINT sources that offer data about ICS devices. 
• Collect filters and keywords that tell us about ICS devices, such as technology details 
including vendor and device name, type, version, etc. 
• Prepare search engine operators that use our filters to scan and find devices. 
• Gather all OSINT information and categorize it based on source and type. 
• Develop a gas cylinder filling simulation to conduct case studies.  
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• Analyse and assess OSINT categories. 
• Rank and evaluate OSINT categories using ICSrank algorithms. 
• Rank ICS devices using ICSrank algorithms 
Leverett [48] has investigated the presence of ICS devices on the internet. His goal was to 
debunk the myth that ICS devices are not connected to the internet. He has demonstrated 
techniques that help in assessing and visualizing ICS devices. However, his risk assessment 
technique depended on popular vulnerability databases. Current vulnerability databases use 
CVSS metric system to rank vulnerabilities. This thesis argues that CVSS has many weakness 
and inaccuracies [49][50], especially when it comes to ICS and IoT devices. It is important to 
consider other threats such as critical device information available in OSINT sources. In this 
research, a demonstration that OSINT can contribute to the cyber defence research for ICS 
devices and for ICS security in general is carried out. 
1.6 NOVEL CONTRIBUTIONS 
• Development of ICSrank a comprehensive security assessment framework- for 
industrial control systems based on OSINT. It’s a qualitative quantitative metric. 
ICSrank is applied to internet-connected ICS devices and non-connected ICS devices. 
ICSRank consists of 3 stages OSITN data collection, assessment and ranking.   
• Development of ranking algorithms that evaluates the risk level of ICS devices. The 
algorithms evaluate ICS devices using developed novel techniques that is based on 
OSINT categorization and assessment. The categorization and assessment of OSINT 
data that is based on type and security is unique.   
• The application of ICSrank framework on different types of OSINT is novel too. A 
demonstration of how to apply ICSrank on online devices and offline devices is 
explained. Online devices are those that are discovered in the Internet and tend to 
have higher surface attack vulnerabilities than offline devices and normally require 
lower skills level to be exploited. Offline devices require higher skills and more 
OSINT knowledge. This research digs deeper to look at existing OSINT information 
especially for offline ICS devices. There are 3 perspectives when it comes to analyse 
OSINT data that are applicable to offline devices specially and online devices as well. 
This way of looking at OSINT data is a novel contribution. The types that are 
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presented in this research are as follows: comprehensive view of OSINT data, partial 
view and research concepts. The comprehensive and partial OSINT are device 
specific information. It means that information was built for existing devices. The 
research OSINT are information that were developed to provide design and 
conceptual applications and were not targeting real devices. This technique of OSINT 
analysis is a novel way to view vulnerabilities in the area of ICS security.   
1.7 THESIS LAYOUT 
The research in this thesis is divided into 8 chapters. A description for each of the chapters is 
provided in this segment. 
CHAPTER 1 
This chapter consists of a brief 
introduction, a description of the research 
motivation, aims and approach.  
CHAPTER 2  
Chapter 2 stands as a literature review. This 
is mainly a discussion of ICS devices’ 
security. The second chapter discusses the 
vulnerabilities of and threats to ICS 
devices. This thesis mentions previous 
research that outlines threats and attacks 
that target ICS devices. It also provides a 
brief taxonomy of specific ICS targeted 
attacks as blueprinted in past studies. 
Related research topics such as ICS device 
metrics and assessments are scrutinized and 
explored in depth.  
CHAPTER 3  
The third chapter provides a comprehensive 
analysis of existed techniques of ICS/IoT 
vulnerability testing and evaluation. The 
goal in chapter 3 is to develop a ground for 
OSINT categories that would be used for 
the later chapters.  
CHAPTER 4  
In this chapter, a lay out of this thesis 
framework and methodology is discussed 
in depth. This thesis discusses how to use 
OSINT tools in vulnerability and risk 
assessments, how to categorize information 
gathered from OSINT, how to assess and 
quantify the risk level for collected 
information, and to demonstrate how to 
rank risk ICS devices based on ICSrank 
algorithms. This chapter also introduces a 
case study that serves as a proof of concept. 
CHAPTER 5  
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In this chapter, a development of a novel 
ICS attacks taxonomy based on safety PLC 
in gas systems is presented. This thesis 
discusses the security of cyber-physical 
systems by linking the framework 
presented in chapter 4 with the gas cylinder 
model. This thesis demonstrates a threat 
model of how to attack an online ICS 
device 
CHAPTER 6 
 The sixth chapter demonstrates an 
application of ICSrank on 3 ICS case 
studies that are related to Triconex PLC, 
Trisis malware and the gas cylinder model 
respectively. Chapter 6 provides A 
description of the gas cylinder model used 
in this research.  This chapter explains how 
to apply ICSrsnk on 3 case studies that are 
classified as different types of OSINT. The 
application process includes all the steps 
that ICSrank framework follows. 
CHAPTER 7  
Chapter 7 is the academic conclusion to this 
thesis, and it serves as a conclusory section 
to all of the above. General conclusion and 
future work are put forward. 
1.8 SUMMARY 
Today, ICS devices are more exposed online than ever before. ICS devices and protocols suffer 
critical security flaws. To make matters worse, the devices are exposed online in new trendy 
technologies such as IoT, iIoT and industry 4.0. Unfortunately, Industry 4.0 and IoT are still 
using the same security features as the old ICS. Information sharing and OSINT is enormous 
nowadays. Academics, security analysts and criminals use industrial OSINT too. It made 
security, attack techniques, and exploits harder for asset owners to identify and to keep up with.  
Motivated by those issues, this research took on the mission to research new ICS security ways 
and concepts that can contribute to the ICS community. This thesis argues that in order to 
secure ICS, it is important to study the security of ICS from a new perspective. This research 
considers new metrics to assess ICS security and takes careful consideration of OSINT. To 
sum up, this chapter is this research map and guide that lays out the aims, research approach 
and ideas.  In the next chapter, it examines the core literature of ICS and IoT security in more 
depth. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 LITERATUR REVIEW I 
2.1 ICS AND IIOT DEVICE SECURITY 
2.1.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the literature review of general vulnerabilities that are inherent to ICS and IOT 
as well as their role in some well-known attacks are discussed. Indeed, both ICS and IOT share 
common characteristics, and these characteristics lead to possible exploitation. Many industrial 
systems have their own bugs and limitations; however, with new technology and the expansion 
of IoT devices, many ICS devices were converted and integrated with the web and smart 
devices (IOT), functionally making them iIoT themselves (see introduction). Thus, even these 
upgraded devices still have certain issues. This chapter will discuss these issues in light of how 
they have resulted in attacks in the past. 
To appropriately assess the risk level of an iIoT device, a need to build an understanding of 
these devices and what they do (see Chapter 3 for a list of common ICS devices). For the 
present discussion, it is important to know the design and security features of ICS and IoT 
devices generally. Given the breadth of previous research that has discussed these devices and 
their inherent security shortcomings, here this research presents a brief list of the commonest 
and severest security issues of ICS and iIoT devices. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to present 
these issues and how they have resulted in previous attacks so that the general level of risk of 
a device can be better understood and assessed.  
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2.1.2 Common ICS security Problems and Issues: 
ICS systems, such as those commonly used in gas and oil systems, have many vulnerabilities. 
In Chapter 6, possible countermeasures and solutions that affect ICS security are discussed and 
proposed [51] [52]: 
A major reason that ICS security is fragile is human ignorance. Most people who work in the 
industry and are most likely to use these devices lack security awareness. For example, the core 
focus of many industrial organizations is production and safety. However, cybersecurity is 
generally not presented as important and is almost certainly not a priority for the individuals 
most likely to interact with the ICS devices regularly. Unfortunately, this is a risky approach 
because the ICS devices are directly related to the core intentions of production and safety. The 
risk is too high to ignore these technological security issues. Indeed, managers and the 
individuals who are most likely to use the ICS devices need to be informed about these looming 
issues. Knowledge and awareness about how to secure ICS and cyber threats should be 
addressed for all members of an organization, not just for the individuals at higher levels of 
management [1]. Indeed, these individuals should know the limitations of ICS, the appropriate 
default configurations, and the risk of online exposure prior to having direct access to these 
devices. Active preparation is always more effective and will keep production and safety at the 
forefront of an organization’s mission.  
The second issue that many industrial companies face is remote working. Either a contractor 
or direct employees working remotely either on a temporary or a permanent basis could do this. 
A contractor might need to access ICS for regular maintenance or for specific patching of issues 
that arise. In this process of regular remote access, malicious threats (e.g. malware) might be 
brought inside the ICS network if the employee’s computer is infected or their network is not 
secure from eavesdropping. An insider or direct employee, on the other hand, might experience 
the same issues as a contractor, but with far more severe consequences because normally 
insiders can access more critical locations within the network than a contractor. So, the same 
malicious threats can be presented to the organization’s network and because of the deeper 
access allowed to the insider, have a far greater effect over time. 
The third issue is using open source IT products or those made by 3rd parties. There are two 
specific issues with these products. Many IT products are not patched immediately following 
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a known issue and many have vulnerabilities that are incapable of being patched. The other 
issue is with open-source software. If the open-source product does not come with a large and 
active community, then it would be risky as it is highly unlikely that the software is regularly 
inspected for bugs or that known issues are patched competently or quickly. Another issue with 
open source software is the availability of source code. Having open-source code is often 
advantageous because it allows you to inspect it, fix it and improve it for your specific 
application over time. However, some attackers study such open-source code in order to write 
exploits that were not previously discovered by that software’s community. 
The fourth reason is the lack of security culture between partners. Partners should agree on 
security practices, and they should exchange information with each other regarding their 
products. They should cooperate to share known vulnerability disclosures, patching and 
security hardening. For example, if a vendor sells products to an industrial company, the vendor 
must inform the company about default configurations and credentials so that they can be 
changed and not let customers discover them after what would likely be a devastating attack. 
The fifth reason is that data networks are not well separated. There are normally two networks 
in most companies: information technology and operational technology. There is a business 
network, sometimes called the information technology (IT) network. That network is where 
business tasks take place. The IT network is connected directly to the internet. The other 
network is called the operation technology (OT) network. This network is where industrial 
processes and production occurs, and which is supposed to be isolated from the IT network and 
the internet. This isolation is intended to protect the OT network, and thus by proxy the IT 
network, from malicious packets and cyber threats. Unfortunately, most companies do not 
follow these standard security practices, and thus have problems separating their information 
architectures. 
The six and seventh reasons are the use of mobile devices and cloud storage. Specifically, it 
involves the data sharing between on and offshore or off-site facilities. In modern technologies, 
there is an increasing dependence on cloud services and cloud storage. This technology is 
advantageous because of the cheap cost of storage and the relative convenience of maintenance, 
updates, etc. However, when an ICS company saves data in a third-party location, then this can 
be a significant disadvantage. Cloud services suffer from many security issues such as loss of 
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device control, data integrity and encryption issues for both communication and files [193]. 
Together, these risks are simply too great for any ICS company to sustain. 
The eighth reason is that many ICS devices suffer from weak physical security. Access to 
insecure physical hardware allows an intruder to insert removable media, such as flash drive, 
to the actual devices. This mobile media could be used to extract and steal data or to load 
malware or other malicious software onto the physical systems. In addition, although rare, an 
intruder could also damage the devices physically and thus render them inoperable.  
The ninth reason is that many ICS companies use old and outdated systems. Many of those 
systems use software and hardware that is no longer patched or maintained by the original 
producer. These systems generally have limited computer resources and specifications. Thus, 
even if a company is still releasing patches when appropriate, these systems cannot handle the 
released patches without experiencing a performance decrease, which would then decrease the 
productivity of the overall system. It is a current fact that many industrial organizations prefer 
availability over security and choose productivity over adaptation [1]. 
Other reasons, such as the availability of a web interface for ICS devices, and relatively weak 
security support also affect ICS devices. Many ICS devices ship with a default web access. 
Unfortunately, many of these web interfaces contain many security flaws such as default 
configurations and credentials (see Chapter Four), lack of network encryption, and general 
susceptibility to other cyber-attacks. 
2.2.2.1  CAUSES OF VULNERABILITIES: 
According to [2], the main causes of these vulnerabilities in ICS devices are due to isolation. 
ICS devices are typically built and designed for the purpose of isolation. Typically, An ICS 
network is isolated from a business network or has little connectivity to it [1]. Security is not 
generally considered in the design process because the designers assume that the system will 
exist separately from any other systems. Indeed, the main concerns of the designers are safety 
and availability during production. However, when the connection to the internet became 
prominent, problems started to arise in these systems as the internet reduced the ability for 
isolation [1]. There is nothing necessarily wrong with connecting to the internet, but when the 
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default configuration and security mechanisms are weak, ICS devices are likely to be exposed 
to serious risks.  
Another factor is the heterogeneity. Many ICS devices are really a mixture of different 
components; Commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS), third party and proprietary software. This 
could lead to serious issues as many COTS have bugs and their vulnerabilities to exploitation 
are available publicly on the internet. Individuals seeking to patch the issue typically describe 
these exploitations, but other communities also post the exploitations for nefarious reasons. 
The other issue is the mixing of different systems because these systems were not designed to 
work together securely. This could lead to leaks and the absence of any security mechanisms 
in software design, such as security and privacy configuration. The mixture of systems must 
work as one unit in order to be resistant to common threats. However, many systems are made 
up of many sub-systems that each have their own patches, work rounds, and other issues [1]. 
2.2.2.2 EXAMPLES OF FAMOUS INCIDENTS: 
In the following table [53], a list of famous and registered incidents occurring in industrial 
systems is presented. The list spans more than 30 years and lists the impacts resulting from the 
incidents based on standard security metrics such as confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
In the ICS domain, availability is ranked as number one in priority as it directly affects 
functionality and production [1]. However, other IT systems place different emphasis on 
security principles. 
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Table 2: Famous ICS Incidents [53][ 213] 
Year Attack Description Location 
1982 Trans-Siberian Gas Pipeline Russia 
1994 Salt River Project USA 
2000 Maroochy Shire Sewage Plant AUS 
2000 Russian Gazprom Russia 
2001 Electricity Transmission Control System USA 
2003 SQL-Slammer Worm USA 
2003 Houston Ferry System USA 
2005 Zotob Worm USA 
2006 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant USA 
2006 Harrisburg Sewage Treatment Plant USA 
2007 Canadian Water System Can 
2008 Suburban Railway System Pol 
2009 USA Power Grid invasion USA 
2010 Stuxnet, Iranian Nuclear System Iran 
2011 Water Supply ICS USA 
2011 Duqu Global Virus International 
2011 Night Dragon International 
2012 Flame Virus Middle East 
2012 Qatar-based Ras Gas Virus Qatar 
2012 Saudi Aramco Oil Company Middle East 
2014 Norway Oil Company Phishing Norway 
2014 Sony Pictures International 
2014 South Korea, Wolseong Nuclear Plant South Korea 
2014 Sandworm Ukraine 
2014 German Steel Mill Germany 
2014 Black Energy Ukraine 
2014 Dragonfly/Energetic Bear No. 1 Ukraine 
2015 Ukraine Power Grid attack No. 1 Ukraine 
2016 “Kemuri” water company USA 
2016 Return of Shamoon Saudi Arabia 
2016 Ukraine Power Grid attack No. 2 Ukraine 
2017 CrashOverDrive Ukraine 
2017 APT33 Middle East 
2017 NotPetya Ukarine 
2017 Dragonfly/Energetic No. 2 Ukraine 
2017 TRITON/Trisis/HatMan Saudi Arabia 
2018 Raspite Kuwait 
2019 Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant India 
2019 Norsk Hydro Norway 
2020 Wind turbines scada system Azerbaijan 
2020 Water treatment plants Israel 
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2.1.3  Common iIOT security problems and issues: 
 Chapter One explained that modern internet-connected ICS is classified as iIoT [196][37]. 
This research found that the OWASP classification of IoT is comprehensive and also applies 
to ICS devices (see below 2.1.4). Therefore, it will be considered as a benchmark to assess and 
analyse the security of iIoT devices. This section is similar to section 2.1.2, in that the common 
characteristics of iIoT are presented in light of ICS devices. The aim here is to show the 
similarities between the two with specific emphasis on what existing research has demonstrated 
about the security of these IoT devices and about the similarities and differences between these 
technologies.  
OWASP has classified IoT issues into a Top 10 list [54].  
• The first issue that IoT devices have is weak interface security. Most come with 
default credentials and weak password systems, and many users do not change these.  
• Second, many of these devices lack strong authentication systems, such as two-factor 
authentication. Two-Factor authentication requires two methods of authentication for 
extra security, where a user has to provide his/her credentials and another method 
like a pin code or an id [196]. Indeed, many IoT devices do not have a proper access 
control mechanism.  
• Third, most if not all, IoT devices do not have encryption in their network 
communications or applied to any produced data.  
• Fourth, many IoT devices have network service issues such as unnecessary open ports 
and susceptibility to cyber-attacks.  
• Fifth, IoT devices, due to the security issues discussed above can result in the leakage 
and collection of personal information. This is a major privacy issue.  
• Sixth, many IoT devices integrate with cloud storage and processing. As discussed in 
section 2.1.2, cloud computing has many issues.  
• Seventh, many IoT devices lack logging, monitoring and access control mechanisms.  
• Eighth, many IoT devices lack regular updates to firmware and software without the 
user specifically instigating the update within the software.  
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• Also, the poor update mechanisms typically lack verification and encryption and thus 
are capable of being duped by malware.  
• Lastly, susceptibility to physical threats and issues (similar to those identified for ICS 
in section 2.1.2) are an issue for IoT devices. 
However, there are other issues that could affect iIoT devices and these make such devices 
weak and vulnerable. The largest of these are related to design issues [55][56]. If exploited, 
these issues could lead to potential threats. In addition, IoT devices have limited energy. Energy 
is the amount of battery or power an IoT has. Knowing that could lead an attacker to use 
methods that exploit it. Also, IoT devices are sensitive to time factors such as latency, and an 
exploitation of this could lead to an overall malfunction. Typically, IoT devices, especially 
industrial type, work on low latency, which means they respond in real-time with no delay. An 
attacker can exploit that sensitivity and cause delay by blocking IoT devices and causing a 
delay [55] [56] [57]. IoT devices have limited capabilities and resources and are not intended 
to handle large amounts of data or large packets. This exploitation is particularly true of IoT 
devices because their memory and CPU resources are limited. Lastly, most IoT devices are 
designed to exist in the same network with a multitude of other IoT devices. The combined 
vulnerabilities and behaviour of these devices can become risky over time (See section 2.2.1 
for more information about COTS).  
2.1.4 Commonalities between modern ICS and IoT: 
From the above points (2.1.3), it can be concluded that IoT and ICS devices share common 
characteristics and issues. In general, they both suffer from design, privacy and security issues 
that make them very vulnerable when exposed to the internet. In Chapter 7, we discuss what 
should be done to address the above vulnerabilities based on best practices and standards.  
However, these devices also share similar features [57] and drawbacks (e.g. poor updating 
standards and practices). Eventually, this could lead to vulnerable devices rooted inside 
networks. 
Device communication with one another is dynamic and explicit, making it hard to predict their 
behaviour if it becomes abnormal or risky. They cannot adapt to new security solutions because 
of poor and limited specs and resources. ICS may differ from IoT in that ICS devices have a 
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long lifespan. They can function for a long time without patching. Many ICS devices are old 
legacy devices. 
Both ICS and IoT devices have physical security issues. They both have web-based access to 
their devices and have limited resources and computing abilities. Both are connected to the 
internet and to cloud services. Both have communications issues such as lack of encryption: 
weak security default configuration and credentials. Both suffer from weak, or lack of, 
authentication systems such as two-factor authentication. Both systems use COTS and 
heterogeneous software. Both lack security features such as logging and monitoring [56] [57]. 
2.1.5 How criminals gain access: 
In Chapter 4, the various methods that can be used to gain access to ICS devices are discussed. 
However, attackers commonly use a few general approaches: 
• IP exposure allows intruders to access the device through an IP/port [58]. 
• Connected to IoT devices makes attacking OT devices possible [59]. 
• Contractor: normally they could jeopardize the network if they carry infected 
machines or misconfigure the network. 
• Remote working: remote connection could open the exposure to risks such as 
infection by malware or interception of connection. 
• Backdoors (malware) through email fishing or employee devices, flash drives 
2.1.6 Cyber attacks: 
 Based on reviewed literature, the common attacks that target ICS and iIOT devices are varied 
[60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66].This research uses (T4),  (T11) , (T12),(T15) and (T20) in 
chapter 6 to demonstrate the Trisis case study and the gas model. The two case studies are an 
example of unauthorized access to an ICS network, exploitation of software and packet 
modification to affect system status.  Data leak also happens the Crisis incident. Chapter 4 uses 
(T4), (T12) and (T20). In that case study, the attacker uses default credentials and leaked data 
to access the network and then exploit vulnerabilities. 
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Table 3: Common attacks that target ICS and iIOT 
Attack Type Description 
Data impairment (T1) Affecting signals through attenuation, noise and distortion  
Data drop (T2) 
The attacker can drop the exchanged data between network 
devices 
Data counterfeit (T3) 
An attacker can inject a malicious content inside the 
network through a compromised node 
Data disclosure (T4) 
The device could leak data or data could be leaked by an 
insider or outsider accidently or intentionally, like theft 
Frequency jamming (T5) The use of interference to cause network blockage. 
Data collision (T6) 
Collision raises errors leading to the stopping of receiving 
data. 
Router Data Compromise (T7) 
Attacking router vulnerabilities to open the door for other 
attacks such as (Sybil, wormholes and router spoofing) 
Data flooding (T8) 
Most IoT devices have low memory, therefore an attacker 
can flood the device with many data or requests, causing the 
device to stop functioning as intended. 
Data eavesdropping and 
interception (T9) 
Ease to read data through, affecting the privacy. Block and 
delay data/information. Keylogging is common here. 
Denial of Service (DoS) (T10) 
Similar to Data Flooding: the aim is to affect the 
availability of resources. 
Data tempering (T11) 
The modification of intercepted data. Or modification of 
memory, configuration, firmware. Deleting files, loss and 
removal 
Unauthorised access (T12) 
Having unauthorized access to the device, either through 
brute force, guessing or default credentials.  
Data spoofing (T13) 
Sending a corrupted data or false information from a fake 
source. Falsification of information. 
Rouge Access point (T14) 
An attacker plants a rogue node, in order to hunt other 
devices 
Man in-the-middle (T15) 
Spying on data exchanged between components with the 
ability to exploit vulnerabilities or data.  
Data scrambling (T16) Radio jamming, congesting and crashing 
Removable media threat (T17) They can be used to propagate viruses or steal information.  
Physical security (T18) Physical access to a device or destruction 
Social engineering (T19) 
Obtaining data about personnel using social skills or social 
media.  
Software attacks (T20) 
The exploitation of malware and virus on devices’ systems 
vulnerabilities. 
Faulty hardware (T21) 
This could lead to cause physical issues and impact on 
dependable components. 
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2.1.7 Threat agents and goals/motives: 
There are many different individuals who could, whether purposely or inadvertently, become 
an attacker on a system: [3] [67] 
Insider: 
 A person who works in a plant or factory. This is the most dangerous threat because he has 
access to both the network and sensitive data. 
Hacker:  
An individual with computer hacking skills, their motives can vary from criminal to curiosity 
or fame.  
Extremist group:  
A gang of people with political or religious agendas. Their motives could be any of the five 
motives listed below 
Terrorist group: 
This group seeks to do espionage and cause chaos.  
National level: 
This level is composed mostly of serious, skilful and professional personnel. Their motive 
could be political or spying or cyber warfare.  
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2.1.7.1 MOTIVES OF ATTACKERS: 
There are four major motives in cybercrime that can be categorized as the following [2]:  
Criminal:  
The main goal in this category is to cause damage and losses.  
Political espionage: 
The gathering of intelligence in conventional ways as happens between intelligence 
organizations for reasons such as reconnaissance of critical infrastructure.  
Political cyber warfare:  
Cyberwars between political powers or nations. 
Financial:  
It could be to cause financial gains or to cause losses for other entities. 
2.1.8 Cyber Physical incidents and Impact: 
In this section, a list of cyber impacts is shown that could result from previous vulnerabilities 
and attacks. In Chapter 5, these impacts are examined and translated into cyber-physical terms. 
The table below (Table 4) is an example that shows the cyber impact of attacks on ICS that 
have already taken place. The table was adapted from [68]. The term ‘Int’l’ means international 
and outside of USA. ‘Comm’ means commercial. ‘Gov’ means government. User means an 
individual user. In Chapter 5 and 6, the physical impact of these security vulnerabilities and 
resulting attacks are discussed in depth. 
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Table 4: Potential Cyber Incidents and Impacts [68] 
Year 
Attack 
Description 
Source 
Sector 
Target 
Sector 
Motive Impact 
1982 
Trans-Siberian 
Gas Pipeline 
Unknown Int’l Trojan Distort 
1992 
Chevron 
Emergency Alert 
System 
User Comm 
Misuse of Resources, 
Compromise of User 
Disrupt 
1994 Salt River Project User Gov 
Compromise of Root, 
Trojan 
Disclosure 
1997 
Worcester, MA 
Airport 
User Gov 
Compromise of Root, 
Denial of Service 
Disrupt 
1999 
Bellingham, WA 
Gas Pipeline 
User Comm Misuse of Resources Disrupt 
2000 Russian Gazprom Int’l Int’l 
Compromise of User, 
Trojan 
Disrupt 
2000 
Maroochy Shire 
Sewage Plant 
Int’l Int’l 
Misuse of Resources, 
Compromise of User 
Disrupt 
2001 
California 
Electricity 
Transmission 
Control System 
Int’l Gov Compromise of Root Unknown 
2003 
Davis-Besse 
Nuclear Power 
Plant 
Unknown Comm Worm Disrupt 
2003 CSX Corporation Unknown Comm Virus Disrupt 
2007 
Tehama Colusa 
Canal Authority 
User Gov Misuse of Resources Unknown 
2010 
Stuxnet, Iranian 
Nuclear System 
Int’l Int’l 
Worm, Root 
Compromise, Trojan 
Disrupt, 
Distort 
2011 Night Dragon Int’l Int’l 
Social Engineering, 
Compromise of User 
and Root 
Disclosure 
2011 Duqu Global Virus Int’l Int’l Virus Disclosure 
2012 Flame Virus Unknown Int’l Worm 
Disclosure, 
Destruction 
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2.2 ICS DEVICES’ SECURITY: 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The emergence of specialized search engines such as Censys [69], Masscan [70], Shodan [71] 
and Zmap [72], and their speciality in finding online devices, including ICS devices, has 
simplified the task of finding a target device enormously for an attacker. Matters are made 
worse by the fact that those search engines give so much information about devices. This has 
become a major issue for industrial organizations and academics.  
The relationship between the above-mentioned search engines and the security of online 
devices has been the subject of much recent research [73] [74] [75] [76] [77]. In this section, 
existing research in this domain is summarised, as a foundation for this research. 
2.2.1.1 FINDING ICS DEVICES ONLINE 
There are works that focus on the ability to find ICS devices through search engines. This 
research [73] developed a tool to scan for industrial devices using a modified version of the 
Zmap search engine. The tool name is WiScan, a low foot-printing scanner which does not 
affect the ICS device. A low footprint scanner collects little or passive information about a 
device, unlike active scanners where they can sometimes cause flooding by probing those 
devices with excess information. This tool targets SCADA ports. Their finding confirms the 
existence of SCADA systems online and that they can be discovered. 
This paper [74] evaluated the functionality of Shodan on the listing, finding, querying and 
indexing a set of deployed PLCs. Their findings confirmed that their devices were positively 
found and identified.  
This research published a methodology [75] to distinguish ICS devices from other devices in 
Shodan using PLC information; They managed to extract ICS devices that are connected to 
physical systems and classify them into what function they do and to what industry sector they 
belong to. This was achieved by extracting PLC code from those devices.  
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This paper [76] deployed honeypots and listed in Shodan to evaluate the impact of banners on 
devices. A honeypot is a decoy computer system that is connected to the internet for identifying 
hackers, methods and techniques [195]. They concluded that by manipulating banners, they 
could lower the exposure of ICS devices, thus lowering the impact of them.  A banner usually 
has information about a computer or a network such as a port number or an operating system 
version.  
Some researchers attempted to gather filters that could be used in a search engine to find online 
ICS devices. The filters are typically information about a vendor name, software version, file 
extension names and other configurations that are specific to these devices [77]. 
 
Figure 3: SCADA Detection Cheat Sheet [194] 
Based on the previous works in this section, one can see that ICS devices are present online 
and there are many tools, techniques and search engines and methods that help in the task of 
ICS discovery. This is contrary to the common belief that ICS systems are hidden and isolated 
from the internet. This kind of research helps to determine the direction of ICS security. 
However, it is only the beginning. There are plenty of other devices that come from other 
vendors. Many of them are present online, but there is a little or no work to detail how they can 
be explored. This is an open window for research in this area to cover as many vendors as 
possible. For example, one could discover those devices’ signatures and network details such 
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as device name, version, network port and many other filters, by using methods that we 
highlight later. 
2.2.1.2 ICS DEVICE SECURITY METRICS AND ASSESSMENTS 
There are many metrics systems [78] to evaluate and measure the security of software and 
hardware in computers. There are metrics that measure vulnerabilities, defences, threats and 
situations. In this research, the author is interested in vulnerabilities metrics based on threat 
intelligence such as OSINT. Shodan and ICS-CERT are linked to the Exploit Database [79] 
and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [80] respectively. Both databases depend on 
the CVSS metric system, as discussed below. 
 
Figure 4: The CVSS metric Groups [197] 
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is a security metric that measures the 
severity of a vulnerability. It helps organizations manage their vulnerabilities [197]. There are 
two versions of CVSS: CVSS version 2 and CVSS version 3. CVSS v2 measures the criticality 
of a vulnerability based on three metrics: Base, temporal and environmental. The base is the 
constant characteristics of a vulnerability. Temporal is the changing characteristics of 
vulnerability not including the environment. Environmental are characteristics of a 
vulnerability that are unique and relevant to a particular user. However, the environmental 
metric has been removed in CVSS v3. The base and temporal have many sub-metrics. The 
environmental metric uses the base and temporal metrics by adjusting them to an organization 
or a situation. The image below shows how CVSS is used to assess vulnerability. We can see 
only the base metric is used, the temporal and environmental are left to the organization’s risk 
assessment context. 
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Figure 5: An example of an ICS device CVSS [198] 
Most vulnerability databases, such as the NVD and Exploit databases, use a CVSS score 
assigned with vulnerabilities. Therefore, we use a similar scoring values range as CVSS. We 
do not intend to compare or replace CVSS. It is purely subjective to choose metrics that work 
for an organization. To the contrary, our research is an early contribution to developing a 
metrication system for ICS and iIoT devices.  
CVSS versions 2 and 3 suffered criticism and dissatisfaction in the security community. Risk-
Based Security [81] criticized CVSS V2 for its inability to distinguish between vulnerabilities 
with different risks and profiles. It also requires too much knowledge about a vulnerability 
impact., e.g. how a vulnerability can affect a physical system. Both CVSS v3 & v2 were also 
criticized for their limitations in assessing ICS and IoT devices (see two reasons below) [82]. 
The common practice nowadays is to patch a vulnerability based on its CVSS score. This is 
considered both risky and ineffective for two reasons [78]. One, it is risky because low score 
vulnerabilities can lead to a high severity threat [83]. Second, it is ineffective because it is a 
random practice, which means it patches vulnerabilities randomly and not based on what really 
impacts the organization [83].  
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In considering existing work for ICS devices’ security, it is worth mentioning that there two 
types of methodologies in security assessment: active and passive. Active assessment is data 
collection about a target system by actively engaging with it through port scanning while 
passive assessment is data collection about a system without active engagement [199]. This 
work [84] proposes a similar work to the Shodan search engine bug feature. The work is useful 
for device vulnerability assessment and is called the “Shodan-based Vulnerability Assessment 
Tool” (ShoVAT) [44]. It is a passive vulnerability assessment tool based on the linkage 
between the Shodan search engine and the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The tool 
matches results with their corresponding vulnerability.  This paper researched on SCADA 
components such as PLC and HMI in Shodan, such as Siemens and Rockwell components, and 
their vulnerabilities using passive and active assessment [85]. Their active technique uses the 
Nessus vulnerability assessment tool and the passive techniques use the NVD. Both techniques 
are used to assess the vulnerability of the collected ICS devices. The devices are well-known 
and trusted brands such as Rockwell, Siemens and Schneider. The vulnerabilities range from 
default credentials, man-in-the-middle and other exploits This thesis [86], proposes a 
methodology for finding ICS devices in the Shodan search engine and their corresponding 
vulnerabilities from databases. The author has collected and analysed data about industrial 
devices. The data is found in banners that are retrieved by Shodan, such as vendor name, 
operating system, country, geolocation and other information. A methodology and 
visualization techniques are proposed to view collected data in webpages using open source 
technologies. 
This research observed that the work of [84], [85] and [86] focus on vulnerability assessment 
of ICS devices. They depend on the popular vulnerability databases mentioned above. All those 
databases depend on the widely used CVSS metrics system. However, there are technical issues 
that depend solely on the CVSS metric system as we explained earlier in this section. For that 
reason, in our framework, we consider the CVSS as only a factor and as one of many factors 
that could contribute to the security of ICS devices (See Chapter 4). In addition, the three papers 
discussed earlier lay the foundations to hunt and analyse ICS devices, one may wonder what 
to do with all this information and more interestingly, what would be the impact? Finding an 
answer to this requires an active role from nations, academics and industrial organizations to 
answer this question before motivated malicious actors do. This challenge is the motivation to 
explore these two questions in this thesis. 
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Another approach in the area of ICS security assessment is shown in this paper [87], where the 
authors proposed a cyber-threat inspection framework for ICS based on OSINT. Their 
framework collected and analysed OSINT data. The aim of their research is to inspect possible 
threats related to ICS devices. The concept of OSINT is explained in more depth in Chapters 3 
and 4. OSINT is a part of threat intelligence used heavily in cybersecurity practices. The idea 
of threat intelligence is to gather as much information as possible about a threat or a 
vulnerability that could have an impact on a target. The benefit of threat intelligence is that it 
acts as a real-time monitor of what is going on in the cyber world from a security perspective 
and offers the possibility of updating us with relative knowledge. It is already applied in 
cybersecurity in general, but it is very helpful to see it in the ICS area as applied to vulnerability 
and threat assessment. For that reason, this work [87] is applied in our framework as only a 
part of the equation to study the possible risks that could target online ICS devices (See Chapter 
4).  
Concerning ICS metrics, our research found an ICS metric called Industry Vulnerability 
Scoring System “IVSS” [200] [201]. Clint Bodungen developed it [208]. Our framework 
ICSrank shares the same goal with IVSS, which is to develop an ICS methodology to rank ICS 
vulnerabilities and security. IVSS is a static or non-transparent metric. A static metric means it 
is only used by one organization to quantify its risks, or it means it is published to the public 
via such as CVSS without transparency on how risk was calculated and what are the decision 
processes were. Public static metrics can cause problems if it lacks important details about a 
vulnerability or has wrong information, such as an inaccurate risk score. In order to achieve 
accuracy in ICS device security, comprehensive knowledge about an ICS device is required 
such as network, system processes, threat event, industry and impact (see chapter 4 & chapter 
6). Knowing about this information is beneficial for establishing defensive strategies and in 
assessing potential risks (32). IVSS is a good start in the direction of ICS security metrics. 
IVSS has an advantage over traditional CVSS metric systems in being more specific about ICS. 
However, there are challenging issues for IVSS: it relies on unjustified mathematical equations 
just like CVSS [202]. The other issue is lack of transparency, i.e. the process of mapping a 
score or getting a score value should be open to the public to avoid old mistakes in CVSS [202].  
Another ICS metric is called “TEMSL” which focuses on five metrics: threat, exposure, 
mission, safety and loss. It ranks vulnerabilities as none, some and significant [200] [201]. 
TEMSL does not use any mathematical equations and it uses decision trees to specify the type 
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of prioritization (e.g. Patching): never, next and now.  Both IVSS and TEMSL are not 
standardised yet and are still work in progress [200] [201]. 
2.3 SUMMARY 
In Section 1, the general concepts of ICS security such as the main vulnerabilities and their 
causes were examined in depth, common cyber-attacks that target ICS systems were listed with 
famous incidents and descriptions of threat actors: who they are, why and how they do it and 
what is their goal. A literature review of general security characteristics of ICS and iIoT devices 
was also presented. ICS devices suffer from many types of vulnerabilities and the various 
reasons for these issues were explained. Despite being more modern than ICS devices and 
designed to be integrated online from the beginning, iIoT devices share many weaknesses with 
ICS devices as explained above. Many times, these issues arise because manufacturers do not 
take security and privacy into consideration in the design phase. This research argues that 
understanding the general characteristics of ICS and iIOT devices is vital to understand why 
they are insecure and why they are attacked. It is important to take proactive steps to assess the 
risk and propose necessary countermeasures or solutions.  
In Section 2, research areas such as vulnerability assessment techniques and the use of security 
metrics to assess vulnerabilities in the ICS security domain were explored. Firstly, section 2 
showed different techniques for exploring and finding ICS devices online.  It explained how 
existing search signatures, filters and operators need to be researched further to cover as many 
vendors as possible.  Secondly, the current vulnerability assessment methods were discussed. 
Furthermore, it was argued that vulnerability assessments that depend on CVSS would be 
improved by incorporating threat intelligence.  It also explained why CVSS metrics are not 
always effective when it comes to the protection stage such as patching.  
Related literature to this thesis is classified into 3 types.  Type 1 is concerned about bug hunting 
and ICS indexing by using search engines and vulnerability databases. Type 2 uses existing but 
limited OSINT resources. Type 3 relies on mathematical equations to rank ICS vulnerabilities. 
This thesis is a hybrid model of the 3 types. It’s the attempt of this research to come up with an 
approach to solve the limitations of the 3 types. In the next chapter, existing surface attack 
vulnerabilities of ICS and IoT are discussed.
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CHAPTER 3 
 LITERATURE REVIEW II 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
The internet of things refers to the interconnection of electronic and computing devices as well 
as other devices, whereby they communicate through unique identifier codes. These codes 
allow communication (transmission of data) over the network without the need for human-
computer interaction or human-human intervention [163]. The interconnection of the devices 
needs to be secure lest malicious actors penetrate the system and pose potentially severe 
security threats. To understand the security measures that ought to be implemented, security 
loopholes need to be studied so that effective control measures can be implemented [165] 
This chapter discusses existed literature about common issues and attack techniques that target 
online devices. Chapter 1 and 2 already covered most of those briefly, however this chapter is 
reviewing current guidelines that categorize vulnerabilities into types. The source that this 
study is using is OWASP Top 10 guideline [source]. Each category includes detailed 
information and descriptions about vulnerabilities, attack types and mitigation methods. This 
type of categorization inspires this research to implement a category and a framework that 
could be applied to ICS devices. OWASP list consists of essential labels that are applicable to 
ICS devices.  OWASP provides information that can be transformed into a critical knowledge 
for ICS devices security. ICSrank contributes to knowledge by building novel OSINT 
categorization framework, that utilizes OSINT with existed cybersecurity frameworks such as 
OWASP top 10.  Below is a list of common ICS and IoT issues and what information are 
applicable in the research in this thesis.  
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3.2 TOP 10 IOT/ICS VULNERABILITIES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
As of 2014, the top 10 vulnerabilities were insecure interface of the web, lack of sufficient 
authorization and authentication, and insecure network service, lack of encryption during 
transport, privacy issues, insecurity in the cloud interface, insecurity in the mobile interface, 
lack of sufficient configuration of the security, insecure firmware/software, and poor physical 
security [162].  Many ICS devices share the above vulnerabilities (see chapter 2). In this 
chapter, we discuss common IoT/ICS vulnerabilities in more details.  The impact of the 
vulnerability to the business is discussed. Finally, the criteria to determine whether the web 
interface is secure is checked and the procedure to make the interface secure discussed. 
3.2.1 An Insecure Web Interface 
Insecure web interfaces present a security risk when working on a particular web page. Hackers 
and the like in accessing the page may affect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
the information [166]. If the web interface is not well maintained, the website of the company 
will be quite vulnerable and insecure. A discussion of the various sections is outlined below: 
The threat agents: These are agents that have access to the web interface. They may either be 
external or internal users. The users that interact with the devices or the web may have 
unauthorized access to the devices interconnected in the IoT. This is feared because accessing 
the devices means one can manipulate them to show potentially harmful inconsistencies. 
The Attack vectors: The web interface is insecure therefore it is easily exploited. The attacker 
understands that the security measures in the interface can be easily manipulated, hence they 
use the weak credentials, through enumerating the accounts and plain-text credentials to access 
the interface. The sources of the weak interface are, for example, the weak account lock-out 
settings, and lack of session management. In session management secure websites 
automatically logout individuals after a period of inactivity.  This prevents unauthorized access 
from those that could take advantage of the long period of inactivity especially when a 
legitimate user forgets to logout. The other issue is SQL-injection and cross-site scripting 
(CSS). SQL injection means the attacker executes suspicious SQL statements to interfere with 
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the server and database of the applications. Cross-site scripting means the attacker injects 
malicious JavaScript code into the browser of the victim. The other source of vulnerability is 
the exposure of the credentials in the network traffic [166]. This is true when the details in the 
traffic are not encrypted and can be tapped by attackers. Weak default credentials are the other 
vulnerabilities. The default credentials should use passwords and usernames that are difficult 
to crack. In addition, the first-time passwords should be changed upon login. 
The security weakness is prevalent because the intention of the attackers is to expose the 
vulnerabilities of the web interfaces. The threats from external and internal environments are 
of equal magnitude and should not be underestimated. They are easily detectable when the web 
interface is manually examined and through the use of automated testing to discover the issues. 
The technical impacts of an insecure web interface are quite severe. They result in either the 
corruption of data or its loss. Other consequences are unaccountability, denial of service and 
the attacker taking full control of the network’s devices. In the case of a business specific IoT, 
the impacts could mean harm to the customers thereby compromising the entity’s devices and 
the customer devices [172]. 
However, the determination of the security of the web interface depends on a number of 
considerations. The web interface should be checked to ensure that the default passwords and 
usernames are changed during the initial set-ups. Most initial passwords are computer-
generated; hence, the customer should be guided to set up strong passwords after the initial set-
up before using the web interfaces. This is because the initial credentials can be tapped in the 
databases. The passwords created should be strong to lockout any probability of being cracked. 
The other test for a secure web interface is the ability to lock out the user/attacker after three 
failed attempts. This helps to prevent password guessing and forceful access. The other method 
of checking a secure interface is through password recovery mechanisms. Currently,the user 
phone (through call or text of codes), the email addresses and other crucial details are used to 
recover the passwords. If this fails then customer care has to be contacted. Lack of effective 
password recovery schemes means that anyone can successfully seek access to accounts. The 
sites should also be assessed for threats such as SQLi, XSS, and CSRF among others. 
The web interface can be made secure by changing the default usernames and passwords after 
the initial set-up, locking out accounts after a number of failed attempted logins, ensuring that 
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weak passwords are not allowed. The password recovery should be robust to ensure that 
information is not available to attackers allowing wrongful validation of the account. Other 
precautions include encrypting the credentials so that they are not exposed to the network 
traffic. The web interface should not be susceptible to CSRF, SQLi, or XSS [170]. 
3.2.2 Insufficient authorization/authentication 
Insufficient authorization/authentication means that account access is not fully authorized. 
User accounts, in most cases, are checked for authenticity and authorization by the user. In 
organizations, the authorization schemes used include biometric systems such as voice, face 
and eye recognition, or fingerprints. When checking different interfaces (web, the cloud or the 
mobile interfaces), there should be authentication measures to prevent unauthorized access. 
Some authentication schemes are one-time codes and passwords that expire within a few 
minutes so that the attacker is not allowed to interfere if they do not receive and input the codes 
immediately [169]. 
The threat agents are users that access the network through the cloud interface, the mobile 
interface or the web interface. They could either be the external or the internal users of the 
system. The attack vectors are averagely exploited. This is by the use of weak passwords and 
other access information. If the password recovery mechanisms are wanting, they also pose a 
security threat to the system. Other attack sources/vectors include lack of role-based access 
control, credentials which are poorly protected and the escalation of the privilege of certain 
users. Role-based access control means that there will be different sets of information that can 
be accessed by both external and internal users. For internal users, information accessed by 
junior management and staff will be quite different from that accessed by the senior employees. 
Therefore, to access different sets of information, one has to have more passwords and access 
credentials based on his or her role in the organization or system [8]. 
The prevalence of security weakness is rather common and easily detected. The discovery is 
through manual inspection of web interfaces or through automated systems that send reports 
of the accessed sites to the relevant personnel or authorities. Common sources of security 
weaknesses are weak passwords and poorly protected hardware or access points. The other 
mistake is assuming that internal information cannot be accessed by external users on different 
networks. 
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The technical implications are denied access, compromise of the devices and network in the 
IoT, lack of accountability, loss of data and its subsequent corruption. The business impacts 
are that crucial data for different clients and customers have been compromised, modified or 
stolen. Other than the business being harmed, customers could be harmed as well. 
Some measures should be checked to determine the ease of authorization and authentication of 
the interfaces. To check for authentication, simple passwords may be used to determine the 
sufficiency of the password policy. The network traffic also has to be reviewed to check 
whether credentials are encrypted or transmitted in cleartext. The password control schemes 
also ought to be checked, for example, checking the complexity of passwords, password 
expiration, and resets just to mention a few. Finally, the re-authentication schemes should be 
checked for sensitive features. To check for authorization, access controls can be examined for 
privilege escalation, and also checking interfaces for separation of roles like the amount of 
information accessible to administrators and normal users. 
The countermeasures to ensure authorization are strong passwords, granular access control, 
protecting the credentials, using two-factor authentication schemes, secure password recovery 
schemes, and requiring authentication for sensitive features. Both mobile and computer app 
authentication should be necessary as well as revoking fake credentials, requiring 
authentication of the server, and ensuring that the system generates a session key to the client 
when they need access. The session key should be random and vary [162]. 
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3.2.3 Insecure network services 
Problems arise from vulnerabilities in the network service that is employed in accessing IoT 
services. Network faults allow intruders to have unauthorized rights to use data and devices. 
The threat agents may be from internal and external users that manipulate the network to access 
the flow of data and control of the devices. The network vulnerabilities are exploited in IoT. 
The attacks on devices can be major causing them to perform unprecedented actions. Although 
such attacks are uncommon, the detectability is obvious Some of the points of susceptibility 
arise from buffer overflow and denial of service that render the devices out of reach of the user. 
Another network issue is network fuzzing. Network fuzzing is a technique that is used to 
discover security issues by inputting random and massive amounts of data [162]. It usually 
creates a denial of service, UDP services that are easily exploited, open ports through UPnP 
and other vulnerable services [165]. 
The technical impacts of the insecure network are loss of data, denial of service, corruption of 
data and making other devices on the same network vulnerable. The business impacts are 
rendering the network useless due to denial of service, or the affected device facilitating attacks 
on the other devices in the network. Once again, this could harm the customers as well as other 
extended stakeholders. 
To check whether the network is insecure, the open ports of the devices are reviewed using 
port scanners, identified open ports are checked for any vulnerabilities to DoS, UDP related 
vulnerabilities, fuzzing and buffer overflow attacks. Other measures are to check whether the 
open ports are really necessary, or they may be the sources of UPnP attacks. 
Four measures should be taken to ensure that the network is shielded from the insecure network 
services. The first is ensuring only the required ports are open and available when the need 
arises. This will prevent unnecessarily exposing ports that are not being used. The network 
should be shielded from fuzzing and buffer overflow attacks and DoS attacks. These often 
affect the particular device and other devices that are connected to the network. Guarding the 
ports exposed to the internet through UPnP also serves as an excellent security measure. 
Finally, any abnormal traffic request should be detected and blocked in the gateway layer of 
the service [164]. 
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3.2.4 Lack of Transport Encryption 
Lack of transport encryption refers to the fact that data being transported across the network is 
not coded in a manner so that it can only be accessed by authorized users. Therefore, attackers 
in the network can access it and understand the contents. The threat agents are the people 
whether insiders or outsiders that can access the network. The attack vectors are normally 
exploited. The attackers utilize the lack of data encryption over the network. The issue is 
common and can be easily detected. For wired networks, it can be assumed that the information 
will only be available to the devices or people on the network. However, for a wireless network, 
anyone within the range of the wireless network can view the data if there is misconfiguration 
[164]. To check the network for lack of encryption, readable files and data are checked for the 
presence of threats. Automation can also be used to check for lack of effective encryption so 
that adequate measures can be taken. 
Exposure of data in transit is dangerous and other than the loss of data, it may become 
corrupted; hence, the attacker may manipulate user accounts and compromise the system. They 
may even gain control of it at the expense of the owner. The business is therefore automatically 
affected especially when customer data is misused for unauthorized reasons. Transport 
encryption is checked over the network by determining whether the data is in plain text or not. 
It can also be determined if SSL or TSL is used or ignored and checking the recommended 
encryption protocols used [163]. Transport encryption is ensured by using protocols like TSL 
and SSL for data crossing the networks. The industry-standard encryption methods should be 
used; these methods would protect data from being misused while transiting the network. The 
received data should be subjected to integrity checking to assess its validity. Other encryption 
methods are ensuring the secure encryption key, making sure there is message payload 
encryption, and using only the accepted encryption standards to avoid proprietary encryption 
protocols. 
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3.2.5 Privacy Concerns 
Privacy concerns are issues related to the exposure of personal data such that there is no 
confidentiality. In this case, data is not protected and is easily discovered by attackers who gain 
access to the IoT system. Privacy concerns may arise from access to physical devices, access 
to data over the network, accessing information in the cloud or personal information in mobile 
applications. Common sources of privacy concerns are lack of authorization and authentication, 
lack of data encryption over the network, and insecure network services. When personal data 
is not adequately protected an attack may come from either inside or outside an organisation. 
Privacy concerns are usually caused by a lack of proper protection against the collection of 
personal data. The discovery of this vulnerability is simple and may be done by checking how 
the user sets up and activates devices. Automated devices also check for any consistencies in 
data collection faults and also loss of other sensitive data [171].  The technical impacts of the 
collection of personal data for misuse may be quite severe because the effects may go beyond 
the IoT systems. For instance, sometimes personal data such as bank registration and other 
national bodies expose the data of the users, which can then be manipulated and used 
maliciously. This is a far-reaching example of the customer being negatively affected when 
private confidential information is misused. 
To check whether there are privacy concerns for the systems connected to the IoT, all of the 
data types collected by devices, mobile applications and the cloud interfaces are identified. 
Before transmission over the network, personal identification data should be checked for 
encryption. This will prevent its exposure over the network. There should also be granulated 
access to the personal data; access to personal data should be limited to those authorized to 
handle it. 
There are various steps in ensuring that privacy concerns are addressed in an IoT. Data critical 
to the functionality of the working of the systems should be collected and any other should be 
left out. This prevents collecting sensitive data. Making the data anonymous is a good step in 
ensuring privacy and the data should then be encrypted. Another step is ensuring that only 
authorized personnel have access to the data, more important is the role-based granulated 
access to the personal information [169]. Finally, retention limits should be set so that clients 
are aware of such limits. 
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3.2.6 An Insecure Cloud Interface 
Cloud computing has continually offered solutions to the various storage needs of different 
clients. However, public cloud computing services have been a source of trouble for 
unsuspecting clients who store their data in them. The source of the threat is from anyone who 
can access the internet and search for the keywords contained in these cloud databases. The 
attacker often exploits the lack of sufficient authentication, the lack of data encryption during 
transport and unauthorized access [167]. Insecurity in the cloud can result from the use of poor 
account access credentials that are easy to guess. To detect an insecure cloud, the connection 
is identified, and the SSL checked if it is in use. The password reset mechanism can also be 
used to check how easy it is for enumeration of the accounts. The technical impacts are severe 
because the user data may be compromised, and the user may lose control of the interconnected 
devices. Likewise, the business impacts are severe as data could be stolen and modified so that 
the attacker gains control of the interconnected devices. 
To check for an insecure cloud, login credentials are checked for the ease of change during 
initial set-up. It could be checked for account locking after a specified number of failed login 
attempts. It could also be checked for valid password recovery schemes. The API interfaces 
and the cloud interfaces should also be checked for vulnerability [167]. 
The suggested methods of securing a cloud interface are changing the default names and 
passwords after the initial set-up. This will eliminate the use of system-generated passwords. 
User accounts should be protected from enumeration by simple mechanisms like password 
reset schemes. There should also be an account log out after a specified number of failed logins. 
The other security measure is ensuring that data is encrypted online to prevent exposure of 
credentials; the web interface should be free from XSS, SQLi and CRSF. There should be a 
two-factor authentication system to prevent any malicious access attempts. Finally, the system 
should be able to detect and block abnormal requests. 
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3.2.7 An Insecure Mobile Interface 
Most of the applications on mobile phones are connected to the internet. These do not promise 
absolute security when working online. The applications that control the devices on the IoT are 
no exception as these may be subjected to malicious attacks if they are not properly guarded or 
secured. The threat agents are specifically those who can access the mobile application. This 
is normally exploited where attackers target devices that do not have sufficient authentication 
features [170]. The other simple method that makes devices susceptible is account enumeration 
where one attempts to access the IoT with easy-to-guess credentials. Lack of encryption in the 
transport of the data also poses a security challenge to mobile applications. 
The security weakness in mobile applications is generally from credentials that can be easily 
guessed. It is also possible if the accounts can be retrieved by fake credentials. This discovery 
can only be made if the connection to the wireless networks is checked for active SSL and the 
password reset mechanisms are reviewed. Insecurity in mobile networks means that the 
personal data of the user could be compromised resulting in loss of control of the devices to 
the attacker [162]. Such stolen, modified or compromised data could result in adverse effects 
to the customers or clients of the system. 
Every interface has to be checked for security, and the methods used in the previous discussions 
are quite similar. It has to be checked to determine whether default passwords and usernames 
can be changed after the initial set-up. It should also be primed for the account to lock after a 
certain number of failed login attempts. The password recovery schemes should also be tested 
to determine if they assure security and authentication or authorization schemes, for example, 
through the use of one-time codes that can be verified by the user alone. Two-factor 
authentication schemes can also be tested to check the exposure of the data over the wireless 
networks due to the lack of encryption. 
To secure mobile interfaces, the default credentials must always be changed after initial set-up 
to prevent the probability of attackers using the computer-generated default login credentials. 
Accounts should be protected from enumeration especially by passwords and usernames that 
can be easily guessed. The third step is ensuring account lock-out after a certain number of 
failed login attempts. Encryption of the details over the networks prevents their exposure. Two-
factor authentication is vital to prevent unauthorized access to applications [165]. In addition, 
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the mobile application should be coded with an anti-tampering system, and even restrict that 
app’s execution on a tampered operating system. 
3.2.8 Insufficient Security Configurability 
Insufficient security configurability implies that users are not able to change the security 
controls in user accounts. It is not possible for the web interface to make use of granulated 
access or enforcing strong passwords. The major threat agents are from anyone who can access 
the accounts. Apart from granular permission to access and control the accounts, lack of 
encryption also poses a major attack vector. Other issues may be the lack of passwords when 
performing certain operations that compromise the various applications and data. The attack 
may be accidental or intentional [163]. 
The major security weakness stems from the inability to alter security controls in the network. 
This means that the attacker can easily access and alter accounts as the user will not be able to 
change any controls to lock the attacker out. An example of such situations is where the user 
is not able to change a password even when it has been cracked by an attacker. 
Devices are always compromised in this attack and lead either to the loss of data or its 
corruption. If the attacker gains control of the devices, they can manipulate accounts and other 
items for selfish reasons. This may harm the clients and customers adversely. To check whether 
the systems in place are sufficient, the following should be done: the options for strengthening 
passwords are checked, checking the separation of administrator and normal user accounts, 
checking for data encryption, checking security logins, and checking whether the system alerts 
the administrators to security issues.  
These security measures ensure that normal user and administrator accounts are separated. This 
will prevent the attacker from easily bypassing the administrator controls to affect the 
confidential information. Data should be encrypted while in transit to ensure that it is not 
exposed to hackers who could tap it to pose a security threat. The use of strong passwords 
should be enabled to prevent account enumeration [171]. The system should also keep a log of 
security events and send notifications to administrators of any security issues detected. 
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3.2.9 Insecure Firmware/Software 
Any software used in systems should have the capability to be updated to ensure that security 
definitions are updated to block security threats. Failure to update system firmware will always 
give rise to issues like slowed connection, lack of updated encryption systems and being prone 
to attacks. The threat agents will be anyone who has access to the network, the devices or the 
update servers. Some of the common attack vectors are the capture of update files in 
unencrypted connections. In such cases, attackers are able to update the firmware to fit their 
malicious intentions. Such attacks may be localized or over the internet [166]. 
The weakness of the firmware is often seen when the system is not updated, and the 
vulnerabilities are discovered. Another security weakness is the network through which the 
updates are made, or an insecure network where the updated files are tapped by the attacker 
and the security definitions are compromised thereby enabling attacks to be planned. Therefore, 
network traffic must be checked for encryption and hex editors used to check the update files 
for any interference.  
Insecurity in the firmware is a major issue for users. It means that confidential user data may 
be compromised and potentially corrupted. Total system failure and loss of control are some 
of the technical hitches that one may suffer too. Stolen and modified data would mean harm to 
the clients, attack on the other devices, and loss of total control to the system. 
To check for software security, one should check the update file itself for exposure of its crucial 
information. The production file should also be checked for encryption and proper signing. The 
transmission mode of the update should be reviewed, checking the update servers, and finally 
check for validation of the updates. Some of the security measures to be taken include ensuring 
that the devices are able to perform the desired updates to define the new security measures 
and reduce susceptibility to the attacks [169]. In the update system, the update files should be 
encrypted to prevent exposure. The channel of transmission of the update should be protected 
and encrypted too. The update files should ensure that the confidential data is not exposed. The 
updates should be signed to verify their source so that any alterations will be detected, and 
proper security actions are taken. Finally, the update server should be secure with the 
implementation of a secure boot. 
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3.2.10 Poor Physical Security 
Lack of physical security implies that there is physical access to the devices and storage so that 
an attacker is able to tamper with the storage system. Access may also be through external ports 
or USB which s/he uses to access vital ports. Lack of physical security means that sensitive 
data can be accessed as well as the servers [168]. 
The major threat agents are those with physical access to the devices. Access may be through 
USB ports, flash drives, SD cards or other storage methods. It is therefore easy to access data, 
operating system and other vital information. Physical security in systems is often evident 
where the attacker can easily access, disassemble, and transfer data to their devices from the 
main devices. The most common physical access and data transfer mechanism is the use of 
USB ports/flash drives. This often targets the features intended for maintenance, update and 
configuration. The technical impact is severe because it leads to compromise, corruption, and 
loss of data stored in the devices. The stolen data could be modified, and the attacker could 
take control of the devices and cause further interference with the whole system. 
To check for the probability of physical access breaches, administrators should check for the 
ease of disassembling the devices and how easily storage media can be accessed. The other 
method is to check access control through USB ports and other external ports. The system 
should be checked for any administrative interfaces that can be deactivated and any controls 
that can diminish the administrator’s access capability [171].  
The security measure taken to control these issues is to ensure that physical access to the 
devices is restricted only to those authorized. The data storage mediums should also be 
safeguarded from easy dismantling and removal. This prevents those that access them from 
readily performing their actions without being noticed. USB ports should be secured and any 
access through such ports should be authorized and receive authentication. If there is no 
authorization, the system should send security messages to the owner and lockout the intruder 
and limit access to the rightful administrators. Additionally, the data in storage media should 
be encrypted to prevent exposure even after being accessed. 
The table below shows the relationship between the OWASP vulnerabilities top ten 2014 and 
the OSINT information types. The recommendation is also included [162]: 
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Table 5: OWASP top 10 and OSINT information types and recommendations: 
OWASP 
Vulnerabilities 
Recommendations 
An Insecure Web 
Interface 
 
• Change Default credentials after initial set up. 
• Error messages in case there are failed login attempts. 
• Check directory listings to track and trace the source of attacks. 
Insufficient 
authorization/ 
authentication 
 
• Password reset pages to be enabled with authentication. 
• Default credentials: changed after initial set-up 
• Server status pages: for active users 
• Client-side code files for encryption and authentication. 
• Check the file extension to track what can be installed on the IoT system 
Insecure network 
services 
• Password reset pages for authentication of the right users. 
• Default credentials to be changed after initial set-up. 
• Protocol ports: to secure the network from attackers who would use freely 
available ports. 
Lack of Transport 
Encryption 
• Server status pages to be encrypted, any interference to be revealed in error 
messages. 
• Network and Physical Location; the data in the network should be 
encrypted, including encryption at the source. 
• Protocol ports; only engaged protocols should be open to avoid intrusion 
from free protocols. 
• Vulnerabilities and data advisories protected 
Privacy Concerns 
• Password reset pages; should allow for authentication and set strong 
passwords. 
• Default credentials should be changed after the initial set-up. 
• Vulnerabilities and data advisories protected. 
• Protect the metadata 
• Keep log files to track the users 
An Insecure Cloud 
Interface 
• Password reset pages should allow for authentication, setting of strong 
passwords and encryption. 
• Backup files to shield from complete data loss after corruption. 
• Default credentials should be changed after the initial set-up. 
• Protect the metadata 
An Insecure Mobile 
Interface 
• Default credentials should be changed after the initial set-up. 
• Password reset pages to allow for secure authentication, username and 
password changes and allow setting of strong passwords. 
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OWASP 
Vulnerabilities 
Recommendations 
• Error messages should be sent in case there is any intrusion of failed login 
attempts. 
• Client-side code files should be encrypted to prevent the attacker from 
accessing vital information. 
Insufficient Security 
Configurability 
 
• Configurations file should be encrypted to ensure the attackers do not easily 
read it. It is not an easy read by the attackers. It should also be signed from 
the source. 
• Error messages sent to the administrator in case of any suspicious activity. 
Insecure Firmware/ 
Software 
• Design issues should be considered to allow for updates and embedded 
system security. 
Poor Physical 
Security 
• Network and Physical Location should be secured to prevent unauthorized 
physical access and disassembly of the devices. 
• Backup files should also be secured from unauthorized personnel. 
• Keep log files to track the system users. 
• Database dump files should be secured from unauthorized access 
 
3.3 APPLICATION OF OWASP IN ICSRANK 
CATEGORIZATION 
1. From the above discussion and table 22, one can observe that there is a repeated set of 
vulnerabilities, attacks and concepts which is applicable to IoT and ICS as discussed in 
chapter 2 have. This kind information can be classified into the following categories: 
2. System or device details: The above information represents ICS/IoT devices They are 
viewed as the targets of attackers and defenders. Identification of targets is the first step 
in security. Therefore, it is classified as the main category in ICSrank categories.  
3. Default Credentials: There is a repetition of this issue in 6 out of 10 categories. This 
shows that this issue is very common in many security levels.  It is important not to 
ignore this issue and include it as part of critical OSITN information for ICS devices 
security. Therefore, it is considered as category in ICSrank.  
4. Network details: The theme of the above information reflect information about the 
device network such as server, client, protocol ports, protocols, encryption and network 
location This information shows that network details have issues and create 
vulnerabilities. Therefore, this category is included in ICSrank.  
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5. Configurations details: This issue is also a major issue as demonstrated above. This 
issue is reflected in what is seen in Internet from access control issues, sensitive data 
leakage (explored in depth in chapter 4) and availability of administrative configuration 
links for everyone.  This is seen often in online search engines such as Shodan. This 
category is added to ICSrank. 
6. Vulnerability details: The list above mentions many vulnerabilities in each category, 
such as design issues, weak authorization mechanisms and every issue above is a 
vulnerability for an attack. This broad category is also included in ICSrank. 
7. Patching details: Many ICS suffer from design issues or other security vulnerabilities. 
This often is solved by vendors through patching. Patching is essential in cyber security 
and therefore is included in ICSrank.   
8. Defense details: As seen above, every issue has a cause and a remedy. Cyber security 
is about offering security solutions and protection. This information provides an 
important role for organizations. Lack of security solutions is problematic and cannot 
be ignored in ICSrank categories.  
9. Attack techniques: Most of the issues listed above have a list of possible cyber-attacks 
that could happen. The offensive techniques are discussed thoroughly above. 
Knowledge of these techniques is the foundation of cyber security and is considered in 
ICSrank as well.  
3.4  SUMMARY 
The interconnection of devices needs to be secure to prevent attackers from intruding and 
posing security threats. Establishing security controls is essentials. This cannot be achieved 
unless, knowledge of critical information is available. OSINT and information are huge in the 
Internet and it is difficult to find security without direction. The development of ICSrank 
categories provides an important security checklist of information that are applicable to ICS 
devices. This categorization paves the way towards an efficient security assessment of 
information. The following chapter explains more in depth about ICSrank framework and the 
use of OSINT categorization.  
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We propose a new mitigation methodology by linking OSINT with current security best 
practices of security IoT devices. We explained in chapter 2 that ICS and IoT share many 
security issues for their attack surfaces. OWASP has recommended a list of protections that 
could be applied to IoT and to ICS as well. The ten OWASP vulnerabilities were explained in 
detail and linked with OSINT information types. This was to help to understand the security 
measures that ought to be implemented to maintain a safe IoT/ICS system. Each vulnerability 
had its threat agents and security weakness discussed. The proposed solution was then made to 
prevent attacks. Implementing security measures mitigates widespread threats. In the next and 
last chapter of this thesis, we lay out our final summaries, limitation and future research 
directions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 ICS RANK FRAMEWORK 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, there will be a demonstration on how to use OSINT as a tool to search for 
information that could give hints regarding the weakness and vulnerabilities of an ICS device. 
Going forward, we will call this framework the ICSrank framework. The availability of OSINT 
information and other common vulnerabilities for ICS devices (as discussed in Chapter 2) can 
make a huge difference to the security of a device. It is important to know where to look to find 
threats by preparing a list of resources. It is also vital to lay the groundwork on how a search 
will be conducted, which will be by establishing a search methodology and plan. Finally, it will 
be as crucial to know what to look for by establishing a knowledge base of ICS security in 
general. ICSrank will address the previous issues in depth as the chapter proceeds. Chapter 
Four will include the rules of engagement as well as an in-depth explanation of our framework 
methodology. A case study will also be introduced to support our data and findings. 
4.2 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
The  rules of engagements (ROE) that are used in this research were inspired by 
[213][214][123]: 
1. Interaction with devices only through available web interfaces. Banner information 
available in the web interface is analysed.  
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2. No attempt to login into devices’ login portals and rejection of any request to enter a 
password. 
3. No active scanning – passive scanning is only undertaken through Shodan or Google 
dorks. 
4. Use OSINT sources such as Exploit database, to find related vulnerabilities and their 
exploits in order to use them.  
5. Organization name, IP and location addresses etc. are not revealed here. 
4.3 ICS RANK FRAMEWORK 
An exposed online device is likely to be connected to an ICS network. The device has an IP, 
possibly a web interface and running services etc. (see section 4.8. for a list of possible device 
information). An attacker can take advantage of OISNT in order to establish an attack campaign 
for various motives. There are normally two attack stages for ICS (See Chapter 5 for more 
description). Stage 1 is called the IT (Information technology) stage where the goal is to get 
access to an IT network part of the ICS organization.  Stage 2 is called OT (Operation 
technology) and is usually the most difficult stage because it requires special knowledge and 
skills about ICS manipulations and access to its network. Both stages are explained in depth in 
chapter two and five where we discuss different types of attacks, techniques, motives and 
impacts. For this reason, this research has divided the  framework ICSrank into 3 stages: 
1. OSINT Collection and categorization: Collection of related information and 
categorizing it into 7 categories: System details (S), Network details (N), Configuration 
(C), Defence (D), Techniques (T), vulnerabilities (O) and credentials. See the next 
sections for more details. 
2. Assessment: This stage is responsible for assessing security of an ICS device – before 
getting into the system. The assessment is based on available OSINT data about a given 
ICS device that may or may not leave an impact This stage can be viewed as special 
ICS knowledge that an attacker can take advantage of. (See below sections). 
3. Scoring: This stage is responsible for application of ranking algorithms on an ICS 
device. The aim is to qualitatively and quantitively assign a risk value for ICS devices 
based on OSINT assessments. The scoring represents a new way to look at security 
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level of online (in this chapter) and offline ICS devices (in chapter 6) and their level 
of attractiveness.  
The idea of having 3 stages within ICSrank is to assess each type of OSINT individually and 
to measure risk for OSINT groups or categories. Each group/category can be assessed by 
looking at relevant and particular OSINT data as it will be explained later in this chapter and 
chapter 6. Each stage’s OSINT data will be collected and assessed. The logic of separating or 
categorising the OSINT types is in order to make this OSINT categories, it is essential to know 
what information to look for.  In order to achieve this, one should think like an attacker. A 
typical attack can be explained by developing a threat event model. A typical threat event model 
has the following elements [32] [208]: 
• Target: An ICS device.  
• Vulnerability: A list of potential vulnerabilities  
• Attack: method of attack 
• Threat vector: The angle/means that the attacker will use to execute the attack. 
• Threat source: Type of threat actor: insider, outsider, malware  
• Case objective: what is the motive/goal of the attack 
• Potential consequences: The resulting impact 
 
The above elements are taken into consideration while developing ICSrank assessment 
methodology . Those kinds of elements are what most attackers are looking for. Therefore, it 
is vital to have familiarity with those elements and the associated targeted ICS devices to be 
able to develop the necessary defense mechanisms and countermeasures.  
 
Based on the discussion above, there 2 stages of ICS attacks, “IT” targets and “ICS” targets, it 
is assumed that there two types of knowledge that need to be addressed. There is the type of 
knowledge that is related to IT security and thus can be called OSINT-IT. This type of 
knowledge is what traditional cyber security research is about and is not covered in this 
research extensively, because this research aims at assessing ICS devices only. There is the 
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also the ICS security knowledge and is called OSINT-OT. This type of knowledge is the 
foundation of this research and is covered in depth in the following sections and chapters. The 
following is a brief explanation of the differences between OSINT-IT and OSINT-OT: 
• OSINT -IT in general has information that benefits an attacker to find ICS targets, 
discover vulnerabilities, learn about access points and launch an attack to get inside the 
ICS network (see below sections). This type of information is like a footprint and is 
essential to be analysed separately. 
• OSINT- OT is the type of OSINT data that an attacker needs to proceed with attack 
stage 2. This information is specific knowledge about ICS system, network and 
architecture. This type of information requires time and special skills. (See chapter 6). 
• Both OSINT data types have different impacts on ICS devices. For example, OSINT- 
IT can help an attacker get inside a business network or an industrial organization but 
is unable to cause harm to its ICS operations. On the other hand, OISNT-OT can help 
an attacker do harm to an ICS device, after he succeeds with stage 1 (see below and 
chapter 6). 
• Separation of data enables more accurate assessment and evaluation.  This enables 
organizations to learn about direct root sources of risks (insider or external) and threats.  
Knowledge about existing threats (OSINT- IT) that only target IT assets requires a 
different security preparations plan. 
• Knowledge about relative OSINT type can give a better picture of an organization’s 
level of security. This would be beneficial to establish defence strategies that are 
suitable for IT assets and OT assets individually. 
• OSINT data related to IT or OT speciality for each stage requires different skills and 
expertise.  It is easier to separate IT knowledge from the OT domain; this can also 
provide opportunity for specializing.  Many times, analysis is inaccurate when it is done 
by IT persons or journalists about ICS incidents because they lack expertise about ICS 
and vice versa.  
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4.4   EVALUATION OF ICSRANK FRAMEWORK 
The approach in this thesis with regard to ICSrank depends heavily on the quality of OSINT 
information. A list of factors that could affect the quality of the OSINT information that can be 
obtained has been suggested. These factors can be used to give an overall evaluation of the 
OSINT methodology previously discussed in Chapter 4 and 6. There are two main factors, 
namely the nature and relevance of the gathered information and the reliability of the sources 
to hand. 
The nature and relevance of the information is temporal. This means that it is only effective for 
a period of time before becoming obsolete. For example, if a vulnerability is discovered and 
then turns out to be outdated due to system patching, then the related information will also be 
outdated. The same factor applies if a certain vulnerability is not related in nature to a particular 
device or a system [180].  
The second factor will be the reliability of the information sources. It is important to pay 
attention to the sources where the information is obtained and proceed accordingly. Some 
sources are formal such as established vulnerability databases. Others are informal and can be 
found on social media pages or forums. There is always a possibility of error and inaccuracy. 
In either case, cautious gathering, as well as the sceptical implementation of information, is 
needed at every stage to guarantee the reliability of the intelligence. 
OSINT categories is part of ICSrank.  It is based on basic OSINT information that affect ICS 
devices. As mentioned previously in chapter 3, OSINT categories were inspired from OWASP 
Top 10 list.  In addition to OWASP list, threat modelling techniques is also a source for OSINT 
categories. The range of ICSrank categories were divided and named according to critical 
factors that were discussed in chapter 3 and in this chapter. In the following sections, an 
explanation of how these categories were extracted and developed. 
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4.5  HOW ICSRANK WORKS 
 
Figure 6 
The flowchart (figure 6) explains how ICSrank works in general. The ICSrank is composed of 
3 stages: OSINT collection, security assessment and scoring. The first stage: OSINT collection 
and categorization were explained in previous sections. The data can be collected either 
manually or automatically using scripts and APIs. The collected data is then classified into its 
matching categories: system (S), network (N), configuration (C), defense (D), techniques (T), 
vulnerabilities (O) and credentials (P). The classified data is stored in a list or a database for 
further analysis.  
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The second stage is security assessment of the collected and classified data. At this stage the 
data is analyzed and labeled as either “secure” or “insecure”. The criteria for this labeling is 
based on the first stage- categorization. As discussed in the previous section, the category exists 
if main subcategories are matched with existing and related information. So, if a category is 
satisfied with essential information, its labeled as insecure. However, if not information is 
available in a category, its labeled as secure. Security mainly depends on the amount of 
available information in OSINT. More information means less security and privacy. The output 
of this stage is fed to the next stage for risk analysis. 
The third stage is ranking and scoring OSINT data to determine the risk. This process is 
composed of 4 algorithms. The data is fed first to the first 3 algorithms to determine its risk 
value. The risk value is determined based on the security level, category type and number of 
OSINT categories. Algorithm 1 is for ranking critical and high risk. Algorithm 2 is for medium 
risk. Algorithm 3 is for low or nil risk.  The following sections explains these algorithms in 
depth. The fourth algorithm is used to calculate the number of insecure optional categories for 
a given OSINT. Finally, the risk value is determined based on the number of main categories 
and/or optional categories.  
4.6  ICSRANK CATEGORIES 
This research uses OSINT to evaluate the security of an ICS device in the first stage of attacks 
that could allow an attacker to discover ICS devices and/or gain access to its network (see 
chapter 5 for details about first stage attack campaign and chapter 6 about second attack 
campaign). In this section, the objective is to list and explain the critical information of a 
device. This information is related to online ICS device that are connected to the internet and 
the ICS devices that are not. This research classifies critical OSINT into categories that could 
lead to developing a threat risk. This type of information is called “ICS OSINT” because that 
information is available in public and is related to external details of an ICS environment such 
as online exposure, attack surfaces, access points, fingerprints etc. 
In this research, ICSrank categories and types that are labeled “main” and “optional”. The main 
categories are system (S) and network (N). The other 5 categories: configuration (C), defense 
(D), techniques (T), online surface attack (O) and credentials (P). The main categories are 
important in terms of usability for an attacker. These types of information are essential. If they 
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are available in public OSINT, chances that an attacker has strong ground about the targeted 
ICS device. The optional ones are good bonus to make the target more vulnerable and exposed. 
Each main category has minimum set of main sub-categories. The reason of labeling 
subcategories that way is based on concepts of threat modeling discussed later.  
The philosophy of labeling main or optional is that main information is critical, which can 
make the device insecure. Its level of security depends on available OSINT knowledge to the 
attacker. The amount of knowledge available can help to predict attacker skills level and 
resources required to perform this attack. The more knowledge available, the easier the attack 
as this can be demonstrated later in this thesis. Also, each main category S and N or optional 
category C, D, T, O and P should have its main sub-categories in case of main categories 
checked and its optional sub-categories in case of optional categories checked. The meaning of 
“checked” is the availability of information for this sub-category. See below categorizations 
for an illustration of these concepts. 
Furthermore, the main categories are labeled this way in this framework, because of two 
reasons:  Navigation and development. Navigation means ability to choose a target through a 
number of options. Those options are what is known about a target. If an attacker is attacking 
a particular organization, he/she has to identify its assets. Those main categories can open a 
door to other sub-categories and also to other major categories such as network details using 
further research and OSINT investigation. Development means, when certain information is 
available about a device, the attacker can use this information to develop further steps and 
goals.  
The ration of OSINT categorizations is based on common threat modelling components [32] 
and on OSINT sources such as OWASP Top 10 list in chapter 3. Below is a summary of threat 
components that helped developing ICSrank categories: 
• Target: System (S), Network (N).  
• Vulnerability: System (S), Network (N), Configuration (C), default credentials (P), 
Online surface attack (O),  
• Attack:  Technique (T), Online surface attack,  
• Threat vector: System (S), Network (N) 
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• Threat source: insider, outsider, malware 
It is important for an attacker to do his/her due diligence about his/her target – an ICS device 
in this case. Collecting as much information is vital and important. It’s always the first step for 
an attacker to obtain this knowledge. Once the target is identified, he/she proceeds to look for 
other vital information as we cover in later categories. The threat modeling components are 
expressed in ICSrank OSINT 7 categories which are broken into main and optional 
subcategories. 
The information below is a list of ICSrank categorises that is related to the external and internal 
details of an ICS environment: 
1. System details (S):  
• This category is about the system and the ICS device that is targeted or assessed. 
System information are: 
- Product name (main) 
- Product version (main) 
- Functionality, specification and process (main) 
- Firmware version (main) 
- Product type (optional) 
- Vendor name (optional) 
- Industry domain (optional) 
- Documentation (optional) 
- Processor name (optional) 
- Software name (optional) 
- Serial number (optional) 
- Design issues (optional) 
-  
2. Network details(N): This category covers internal network (LAN or WAN) details only 
not the internet. Information that we are looking for in this category: 
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- Protocol name (main) 
- Protocol port. (main) 
- Documentation (Optional) 
- IP address (main) 
- Network layout (main) 
3. Techniques and tools (T): This category cover information about existing tools and 
technology that could be beneficial to an attacker and harmful to the targeted ICS 
device. The following is the list: 
- Exploits available online (Optional) 
- Malware available in public (Optional) 
- Proof of concepts (Optional) 
- Security Tools (Optional) 
- Research Tools (Optional) 
4. Configuration (C): This property is very powerful if it exists in OSINT. Most of ICS 
devices suffer from misconfigurations that could affect their security such as access 
control configuration. This thesis explores more in depth how this can affect the 
security of a device. Following sections and chapters (list) also show some real-world 
incidents that resulted in unwanted impacts.  
5. Default credentials (P): Many ICS device come with default credentials and some are 
hardcoded – embedded in the hardware.  
6. Online status (O): This category applies mostly to online ICS devices. It is very 
powerful category to consider when conducting risk assessment. The following 
information list applies: 
- Internet presence: ICS device is exposed in the internet or not. (Optional) 
- Available vulnerability:  See extensive list of common surface attack issues (see 
section) (Optional) 
7. Defense and mitigation (D): This category is normally disclosed by vendors when a 
vulnerability comes such as patching and mitigation techniques. However, there are 
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times when they don’t. This is critical factor to consider for the device security. The 
following list is what we look for: 
- Patching information: ICS device has a security patch or not. (Optional) 
- Mitigation: Some vendors publish mitigation information about a security issue 
which might be useful for further security hardening. (Optional) 
4.7  SENSITIVE OSINT INFORMATION 
Sensitive information about an ICS device is a useful resource for attackers [124]. Normally, 
this information is only unnecessarily exposed because of an error made by administrators or 
users such as maintaining default settings, credentials, or configurations. It can also be a design 
fault by vendors such as hardcoded credentials. In this framework, sensitive information is 
classified into 18 types (see the table below for details). This categorization was chosen to 
allow us to distinguish between the types of information acquired. Most of the items on the list 
below were borrowed from Google Dorks [124]. These items are commonly used in passive 
penetration and reconnaissance [125]. 
Table 6: OSINT Information types 
File extensions (V1) 
Directory listings (V2) 
Configurations file (V3) 
Logs files (V4) 
Backup files (V5) 
Database dump files (V6) 
Client-side code files (V7) 
Password reset pages (V8) 
Server status pages (V9) 
Other meta data (V10) 
Technology details (V11) 
Images (V12) 
Network and Physical Location (V13) 
Protocol ports (V14) 
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Vulnerability data and advisories (v15) 
Error messages (V16) 
Default credentials (V17) 
Design issues (V18) 
 
The above table (Table 6) lists examples of sensitive information sources, types, and usage. 
For example, log files can be a source of information with a type logging and can be used to 
find credentials, network, technology, and general device information. This table provides a 
classification of sources that yield OSINT information about a device. Each source is labelled 
with a letter “V” and a number that follows. The labelling system classifies that information as 
a form of potential source of a vulnerability and that’s the reason it’s labelled as a letter “V”.  
File extensions are used to indicate the type of file; for example, .txt is a text document, .doc 
is a word document, .pdf is a pdf document. Directory listing is a web server function that 
displays all the web-server files when the index file is not present and the default.asp in the 
particular website. The configurations files are files used in configuring parameters and initial 
settings for the computer programs. They are used in operating system settings, server process 
and other user applications. Log files record the events that happen when software is running. 
It also records communication between communicating users of the message relaying software. 
A backup file is an archive of the folders and other files in use so that they can be restored if 
there is loss of data. Similarly, database dump files are used to archive the data in the database 
so that they could be restored if there is loss of data [161]. 
Password reset pages are used to reset the usernames and passwords if the client forgets the 
password or a different password has to be used for security purposes. The password reset 
pages have to be authenticated through the authorised means like email links and one-time 
codes to verify the user. The client-side code files are files sent from the web server to the end-
user’s computer via the browser to run the specific scripts. A server status page informs the 
client when there is downtime or if the server is not functioning properly. This is especially the 
case when the server is under maintenance or when there is a security breach that has to be 
resolved before any access can proceed. Other metadata are used to provide information about 
the other data stored in the database. Technology details give the information about the systems 
in use, for example the security features, the operating systems etc. The images in the ICS 
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system may just be used to identify the devices in the network. An image is a better expression 
of the device rather than writing the device’s name, for example, an image of a bulb is better 
than the name ‘bulb’ for the lighting in the IoT. 
Network and physical location give the addresses of the network and the geographical address 
to make it easy to trace the source. Protocol ports in computer networks are the endpoints in 
communication in either wireless communication devices, or wired devices. They define the 
logical channels used e.g. TCP, SMTP, UDP among others. Vulnerabilities data and advisories 
are weaknesses in the system that can be easily exploited by the threat actors. Error messages 
are the notifications sent to the relevant people on the errors in the system due to things that 
may not be functioning in the proper manner. They include security warnings about data 
transfer, failed login attempts and other errors. Default credentials are the computer-generated 
details given to the first-time user of the system [166]. These default details are often changed 
by the user to customize it to their specifications, provided they meet the security restrictions. 
Finally, the design issues are the inherent features or characteristics of the operating systems 
or the hardware components. 
4.8   TAXONOMY OF OSINT THREATS 
We have developed a taxonomy of OSINT threats based on OSINT information types in table 
8. Possible threats are inspired from our “attack” section 2.6 in Chapter 2 and are associated 
with that information to demonstrate how an attacker could manipulate this kind of 
information. The association between OSINT types and the corresponding threats are based on 
the MITRE ATT&CK for ICS Matrix [5]. That matrix is a collaborative research project that 
addresses common tactics and techniques used by ICS attackers. It is also based on OWSP Top 
10 discussed in chapter 3.  
The list of attacks is not exhaustive; not all of the attacks discussed in Chapter 2 are listed and 
some of them are for demonstration purposes only (See list in Table 7). An extensive list of 
threats and scenarios will be considered for future academic work. 
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Table 7: List of Cyber Threats 
Data impairment (T1) 
Data drop (T2) 
Data counterfeit (T3) 
Data disclosure (T4) 
Frequency jamming (T5) 
Data collision (T6) 
Router Data Compromise (T7) 
Data flooding (T8) 
Data eavesdropping and interception (T9) 
Denial of Service (DoS) (T10) 
Data tempering (T11) 
Unauthorised access (T12) 
Data spoofing (T13) 
Rouge Access point (T14) 
Man-in-the-middle (T15) 
Data scrambling (T16) 
Removable media threat (T17) 
Physical security (T18) 
Social engineering (T19) 
Software attacks (T20) 
Faulty hardware (T21) 
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Table 8: Taxonomy of OSINT Threats 
Type of Information 
Possible Threats *[5] 
[54] 
 Note ** 
File extensions [V1] T4, T3, T11, T12 
Attacker can target sensitive files 
knowing their extensions 
Directory Listings [V2] T4, T3, T11, T12 
It could lead to an administrator 
folder and sensitive information 
Configuration file [V3] T4, T3, T11, T12 
Extensions: .config, .conf, .cgf, .ini. 
It is source of sensitive information 
such as credentials, location of 
directories, device details, etc. 
Logs Files [V4] T4, T3, T11, T12 
It reveals: Passwords, IP address, 
usernames, etc. 
Backup files [V5] T4, T3, T11, T12 Extension: .bak, .old, .zip 
Database dump files [V6] T4, T3, T11 , t12 
It contains:Usernames, passwords, 
emails, etc. 
Client-side code files [V7] T4, T3, T11, T12 
It reveals info about server, hidden 
credentials or technology 
Password reset pages [V8] T4, T12 See description of T4 & T12 
      
Server status pages [V9] T4 See T4 
Other Meta Data [V10] T4 See T4 
Technology details [V11] T4, T20 
Examples: Hardware, software, 
vendor, version, etc. 
Images [V12] T4 
Example: Images of a plant through a 
webcam or location map or network 
diagram 
Network and Physical 
Location [V13] 
T1, T4, T17, T18, T20, 
T16, T5, T10, T2 
See Threats description 
Protocol ports [V14] T4, T4, T8, T10, T2 See Threat description 
Vulnerability data and 
advisories [V15] 
Based on vulnerability  Depends on vulnerability type 
Error messages [V16] Based on Error Type It reveals:  
    
Sensitive information, information 
about server, technology, software 
bug, vulnerabilities, directory paths, 
files 
 Default credentials [V17] T12 See T12 
 Design issues [V18] T21, T8, T10 See Threat description 
* Section 2.1.6 in Chapter 2 
** “Reveals” is used in a context of probability not one of certainty. 
 
 Page | 71  
 
4.9  ICSRANK ALGORITHMS 
4.9.1 Introduction: 
ICSrank is composed of 4 algorithms for scoring risk of ICS devices and their OSINT. The 
goal here is to evaluate OSINT categories that were collected and make a decision to determine 
their risk level. The higher the number of insecure OSINT information the riskier the device. 
The higher the severity, the more critical the potential vulnerability is. Below are the ICSrank 
algorithms that are developed in this research and are used for ranking. 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Algorithm 1: Both System (S) and Network (N) details are insecure 
1 List = S, N, C, D, T, O, P 
2 input: List 
3 initialize: Status, List 
4 loops inside List 
5   If S and N = no and C and/or D and/or T and/or O and/or P = no then 
             Status = critical 
       else Status = high         
      endif 
   endloop 
6 return Status 
   output Status 
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Critical risk:  
An ICS device is labeled as critical risk when both its system (S) and network (N) details are 
insecure, known and available in public OSINT. In addition, it has at least one or more optional 
insecure categories.  
High risk:  
An ICS device is labeled as high risk is when both its system (S) and network (N) details are 
insecure, known and available in public OSINT. 
Algorithm 1 is applied when both the system (S) and network (N) details of an ICS device are 
known. In this case its risk label would be “high”. The reason is because if these information 
about the target is available to an adversary, there is a big chance that he/she can exploit this 
device.  
However, if other optional categories are known to that device, the risk will increase because 
there is other valuable information available in OSINT that would make the target even more 
attractive and thus easier to conduct an attack. In that case, the device is labeled as “critical”.  
This algorithm works by 6 stages. The First, second and third lines reads the list of categories 
available about the target. Normally this list is supplied manually or by a database. This list is 
assessed and updated regularly and fed to ICSrank algorithm.  Then it loops insides the list and 
tests if there are insecure categories. That conditional loop and if-statement will filter the 
categories to either “critical” if it finds insecure optional features or “high” as default value. 
The quantitative scoring method of ICSrank is really simple, flexible and adjustable. If a device 
is “high” risk, meaning that both system (S) and network (N) details are insecure, the score will 
be 100%. So, if to choose a score of 10, the risk value will be 10. If a high-risk device is 
discovered with extra optional insecure features, it would be labeled as” Critical”. Meaning its 
score will be higher than 100%, thus requires immediate attention. The higher the number of 
optional categories a device has, the riskier the device.  
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For example; 
Suppose a “high” risk device X is scored 10/10  
If ICSrank adds one more optional feature, it would be scored as 11 
If device X has 5 insecure optional features, it would be scores as 10*5 
If ICSrank removes 1 insecure feature from device X, the score will be 10*4. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Algorithm 2: System (S) details or Network (N) details are insecure 
1 List = S, N, C, D, T, O, P 
2 input: List 
3 initialize: List, Status 
4 loops inside List 
 5 If S or N = no then 
             Status = medium 
    Endif 
    Endloop 
6 return Status 
   output Status 
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Medium risk: An ICS device is labeled as medium risk is when either its system (S) or network 
(N) details are insecure, known and available in OSINT. 
The second case to apply algorithm 2, is when either the system (S) or network (N) details of 
an ICS device is known. It is labeled in this case as “medium”. That’s mainly because there is 
a 50% chance that the attacker would be able to attack an ICS system. A successful attack must 
contain knowledge about both the system and its network details such as device name, IP 
address, port number etc. Knowledge about a system alone means nothing if an attacker can’t 
reach and allocate the targeted device through the internet. Vice versa is also correct if you 
know everything about the network details and knows nothing or little about the system, 
chances the attack would fail and would not be risky or less risky.  
Even if optional insecure categories are known, still the attacker has to learn about the system 
or network, which might take time, resources and effort. Attacking Medium risk devices 
require medium to advanced attack skills, because of the lack of knowledge of one of the main 
categories. There might be knowledge about techniques and tools (T) - optional here - about 
the target, still there must be an effort to collect the other half of main categories.  
This algorithm works by 6 stages. The First, second and third lines reads the list of categories 
available about the target. Normally this list is supplied manually or a database. This list is 
updated and assessed regularly and fed to ICSrank algorithm.  Then it loops insides the list and 
tests if there are insecure main categories. That conditional loop and if-statement will filter the 
risk level of a device to “medium” if it finds one of the main features insecure. 
This thesis argues as stated above that a main category shapes 50% of risk value of a device. 
Therefore, if a proposed measurement for risk scoring is given 10, a risk value for a given 
device here is always “5”. However, like the previous algorithm, if optional categories are 
added to a device its value would increase up but not reach value 10. Value 10 is reserved for 
high and critical risk devices only. However, if a medium risk device is ranked 9, it’s still more 
risky and attractive than a device with score 5.  Vice versa is also correct, removing insecure 
features of a device would lower its score. 
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For example; 
Suppose a medium risk device X is scored 5/10  
If ICSrank adds one more insecure optional feature, it would be scored as 6 
If ICSrank removes 1 insecure feature from device X, the score will be 5  
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Algorithm 3: System (S) details and Network (N) details are secure 
1 List = S, N, C, D, T, O, P 
2 input: List 
3 initialize: List, Status 
4 loops inside List 
 5 If S and N = yes and C and/or D and/or T and/or O and/or P = yes then 
             Status = none 
      else 
             Status = low 
    endif 
6 return Status 
   output Status 
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Low or none risk: An ICS device is labeled as low or none risk is when both its system (S) and 
network (N) details are secure, unknown and unavailable in OSINT. 
The third algorithm is applied when both the system (S) and network (N) details of an ICS 
device are unknown and secure. It is labeled in this case as “low” or “none”. That’s mainly, if 
a device is unknown nor its network addresses, chances it won’t be targeted by intruders.  
If all OSINT categories both main and optional for a particular device are secure, unavailable 
and unknown in public, the device is labeled as “none” risky. However, if certain optional 
categories or partial main features are insecure and known, that would make that device a low 
risk. The difference between low and none risk is the former, there are hints of insecure features 
that are available in OSINT, that could encourage an attacker to dig for further information. 
While the later means that there no traces of main or optional information about a device, thus 
no hints or clues. Low risk devices require advanced skills in order to launch an attack, because 
an attacker has to apply effort and resources which be costly in terms of time, money and 
expertise.  
This algorithm works by 6 stages. The First, second and third lines reads the list of categories 
available about the target. Normally this list is supplied manually or by a database. This list is 
assessed and updated regularly and fed to ICSrank algorithm.  Then it loops insides the list and 
tests if there are insecure categories. That conditional loop and if-statement will filter the risk 
level of a device to “none” if it finds all the main and optional features secure. Otherwise it 
would label it as “low” risk if only system (S) and network (N) details are secure.  
The risk quantified in this case is estimated below 50%. So “none” risky devices are zero when 
all device features are secure, and risk is built up as soon there are insecure optional features 
are discovered. If an insecure main category such as system (S) or network (N) is discovered, 
the device is not low anymore and it would be promoted to medium risk in case 2. 
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For example: 
Suppose a “none” risk device X is scored 0/10  
If ICSrank adds one more optional insecure feature, it would be scored as 1. This is labeled as 
“low” risk. 
If ICSrank removes 1 optional insecure feature from device X, the score will be 0. This is 
labeled as “none” risk. 
If ICSrank adds one main insecure feature, it would be scored as 5. This is labeled as “medium” 
risk. 
Algorithm 4: Update insecure optional categories 
1 device 
2 List_size = number of insecure optional elements 
3 input: device, list_size, risk_value 
4 initialize: device, list_size, risk_value 
5 if status = critical 
     print * for each optional element in the list 
     print insecure optional elements in list 
print risk_score + “*” 
  else print number of insecure optional elements in list and print the insecure elements 
          print risk_value + number of insecure optional elements 
          
 endif 
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 Update algorithms are responsible to update the status of insecure optional features for a given 
risk label. The extra insecure optional features could be expressed as stars “*”. More stars mean 
more criticality and risk. Vice versa is correct too. In a nutshell, the device can become 
more/less risky depending on number of insecure optional features. As demonstrated in 
algorithm 1, high risk label becomes “critical” if it has one or more insecure optional categories. 
The stars are applied to high risk labels only. In Medium, low and none labels, optional 
categories are represented as a number. 
Algorithm 4 is also applied to other risk labels: medium, low and none. None risk devices can 
be upgraded to low risk, if it has insecure optional categories. A low risk device with stars is 
riskier than device with no insecure optional. The same is also applied to medium risk devices, 
one with optional is riskier than no optional. This goes on to all risk levels. One important 
point, algorithm 4 don’t upgrade risk – except none risky – to another level. The only categories 
that raise a level are the main categories system (S) and network (N) details. This is explained 
separately under each algorithm. 
4.10 ONLINE SIEMENS S7 PLC 
The information detailed below was gathered from the following sources (see Chapter Three 
for more information): 
Device hunting and Exploring: Shodan [129] and Google  
Default credentials:  SCADAPASS [130] 
Filters and Cheat sheets: Google Hacking Database (GHDB) [124] and OWASP SCADA 
security [131] 
Advisories: ICS-CERT [132] + Shodan Exploits [133] 
Sample Name: Siemens Simatic S7 PLC 
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4.10.1  Shodan 
Shodan’s industrial systems section [134] was used and Siemens was selected. The search 
operator was port=”102”. Different PLC brands were returned, but we chose Siemens as a 
demonstration. Some administrators change the default port for Siemens, and port 102 is 
sometimes used for many purposes and not just for ICS. Siemens devices are identified by 
looking at the banner’s information. 
 
Figure 7:Shodan analysis results of a Siemens equipment device 
4.10.1.1 THE GATHERED INFORMATION: 
In this section, we list the information (based on Table 10) that we managed to acquire for 
Siemens PLC. Each item of information is labelled based on the level of risk (see section 4.9), 
here a risk value for illustration purposes. It is subjectively based on an organization’s 
priorities. 
1. Port number (V14): The default port for Siemens PLC is 102. The port number risk 
level depends on many factors.  If a port is open and leads to unauthorized access to an 
ICS device, then it will be labelled as insecure. However, if the port number is closed 
and secured then it is assumed to be low risk secure. The port number is part of the 
network details (N) category and is an essential for this category to classify N as 
insecure. 
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2. Device specification (V11): Device type, version, modules, firmware and serial 
number. [This is a main part of the system category (S). This OSINT can lead to further 
research in behalf of the attacker because its identified almost comprehensively. S is 
marked as insecure in this case. This information can be escalated, by (for example) 
combining it with other Vs and attack tools (T), such as searching for existing 
vulnerabilities (O), exploits (T) or even reverse engineering (T), which can make the 
PLC riskier, thus this feature is marked as insecure. Administrators can hide details 
about the system, so hackers do not take advantage.  
3. Location (V13): Physical and IP addresses available (this is not shown for ethical 
reasons. However, this information was available online and its nor mentioned here for 
privacy and ethical reasons. This information is categorized under the Network (N) and 
Online (O) categories. This qualify N to be labelled as insecure. 
4. Configuration and server status (V3) (V9): Web access to a configuration wizard via an 
open http port 80 (see Figure 8). The HTTP status code is 200, which means it allows 
communication without authentication with the server. That value is a default return 
value for HTTP servers [135]. This is risky and default configurations must be changed. 
The green arrow opens a link to the configuration page. This information is part of the 
configuration (C) category and thus its labelled here as insecure. 
 
Figure 8:Shodan analysis results of the device’s connection and server status 
5. Other Meta data (V10): Information such as ISP name, organization name, last update 
time and other services ports. This information is classified as network system (S), (N) 
and Online (O). This information increases the risk of a device. Its labelled as insecure. 
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4.10.2  Google Dorks 
Using Google Dorks, many results that contain login portals to Siemens PLC web interface can 
be obtained that show many configuration and information clues. The login portal, which 
requires credentials, can either be accessed by knowing default credentials (V17) part of 
credentials category(P), or through a vulnerability (V15) an online category(O) that could lead 
to other Vs such as configurations (V3) a configuration category(C), log files (V4) another 
configuration category(C), server status (V9) a network category(N), technology details (V11) 
and possibly other sensitive data. The above categories are insecure. The filter used here for 
Siemens Simatic S7 is inurl:/Portal/Portal.mwsl (See figure 9): 
 
Figure 9: Google Dorks Results 
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4.10.3 Miscellaneous OSINT 
Default credentials: The passwords list was taken from the SCADA Strange Love project [130]. 
 
Figure 10: Default ICS devices login credentials 
The above diagram shows us a list of default ICS devices logins and passwords [130]. For 
example, many use the following credentials: “admin. admin” or “admin”/” root” + 
“password”. [V17]. This is an insecure credentials category.  
4.10.4  Databases 
We arrived at vulnerabilities (V15) information about our sample from the following 
vulnerability advisories database: 
4.10.5 ICS CERT 
Table 9: Siemens device vulnerability information [136] 
Siemens  SIMATIC S7-1200 
Bug CROSS-SITE REQUEST FORGERY 
CVSS CVE-2015- 5698    :6.8 
Attack/Impact Attack PLC from its web server, if the victim is active 
Port Remote, Port 80/TCP and Port 443/TCP 
Difficulty Medium Skill 
Industry 
Chemical, Critical Manufacturing, and Food and 
Agriculture 
Year 2015 
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As can be observed from the table, the vulnerability of Siemens PLC has a CVSS score of 6.8 
considering information such as port numbers (N), model (S), attack methodology (T), sector 
(S) and bug type (O). This will be ranked as 6.8 if it passes ICSrank risk criteria. This 
information is considered to be very important and dangerous for an attacker to learn about a 
device, especially if they find it online. There is a larger problem is if the device is not patched 
and up to date. This information is really valuable as it provides insecure features such as 
system (S), network (N), online (o) and techniques (T). 
4.10.5.1 SHODAN EXPLOITS 
Considering Shodan’s Exploit section, more examples of vulnerabilities regarding Siemens 
PLC can be seen. They are listed in the figure below: 
 
Figure 11: Shodan’s Siemens PLC exploit findings 
Figure 10 above is a snapshot of Shodan’s detected exploit. It allows users to search for devices 
and their vulnerabilities. If vulnerabilities exist, we will not take its CVSS score for granted 
unless it passes the framework test. This information is about system details (S), techniques 
(T) and online (O), which all are insecure. 
4.11 RESULT REPORT FOR THE SIEMENS PLC 
To conclude the framework, we move on to the final stage by calculating the level of a device 
risk (see section 4.4.1). This allows an ICS device to be ranked. 
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4.11.1  PLC OSINT assessment 
We arrive at the following vulnerabilities and their security level: 
Table 10:: Vulnerabilities and their corresponding security level 
OSINT 
Bug 
Symbol 
Category Secure? 
Port Number V14 N No 
Device specification V11 S No 
Location V13 N No 
Configuration and server 
status 
V9 C No 
Other Meta data V10 N No 
CVE V15 O No 
Default credentials V17 P No 
Configuration V3 C No 
Techniques V15 T No 
 
This case study shows how to apply ICSrank for online and internet-connected ICS device, 
which is the Siemens PLC. The device was discovered randomly in Shodan search engine. That 
lead to further research exploring this source and other OSINT sources as explained above, 
Based on ICSrank OSINT categories, plenty of categories were found insecure and available 
in public OSINT.  
ICS-CERT database and Shodan could be considered the first sources to be utilized by 
researchers and attackers. They are rich of many ICS devices with plenty of information and 
updated regularly. For example, Shodan gave extensive system details (S) about Siemens PLC. 
Interestingly, it gave critical and insecure network (N) and configuration (C) details. There 
were hundreds of Siemens PLCs online (O)with so many open ports.  Many have a link to a 
configuration portal (C) which if exploited, it could be a main access to an ICS network. ICS-
Cert is really critical for the security of ICS devices. A rich information of vulnerabilities 
exploits and tools (T) are discussed about many types of ICS devices including our case study.  
Google is also valuable to find online ICS devices as well default configuration files (C) by 
using special filters. GitHub has exploits (T), proof of concept (T) and password databases (P) 
for ICS devices. It seems that the collaboration of security community has exposed so much 
critical security information about ICS devices. Our research has observed that many exposed 
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ICS devices are still not secured and using old insecure firmware versions, insecure websites 
and default credentials. 
ICSrank assessment of system details (S) has obtained its data from Shodan, ICS-CERT, 
Google and GitHub. Most of system details sub-categories are checked as “insecure” thus the 
assessment of S is insecure. The same sources have aided this research to get network details 
(N) about this target. Most of its sub-categories are insecure, except the network layer category. 
the network layer is about the internal network of this ICS device which can be obtained if an 
initial access was established using the current gathered intelligence. Online ICS devices still 
be ranked as insecure even if this information is unavailable because of the availability of 
critical information in this case study such as default credentials (P), online presence (O), 
existence of vulnerabilities (O) , configuration link (C) and exploits (T). However, non-internet 
connected ICS is a different matter when it comes to knowledge of network layer, because they 
are not present online and it’s hard to know how to connect to the target. Other optional 
categories such as credentials (P), techniques (T), configuration (C) are available in OSINT for 
Siemens PLC discussed here. 
It’s worth to mention that, online Siemens PLC are riskier than non-online devices, even though 
they share many of insecure features. The difference is Siemens PLC that are insecure and 
available in Shodan are already exposed (O). All it takes is to use one of the open source 
exploits and techniques (T). It does not require advanced skills in that case. However, Siemens 
PLC that are hidden inside local network (N) and are not exposed online (O) require more 
advanced skills to acquire deep network details to reach this PLC. It evens require knowledge 
of other access methods through other threat vectors such as gaining access to an IT network 
or through other online devices, which again is a lot of work and research.  
So far, this chapter has covered comprehensively how to apply ICSrank framework on an 
online ICS device from identifying, gathering information, to assessment and finally scoring. 
In chapter 6, this thesis discusses non-online ICS devices and how to apply ICSrank framework 
on such devices.  
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4.11.2 OSINT scoring 
Looking at the assessment results in Table 15, The Siemens PLC has the following categories: 
system (S), network (N), configuration (C), online (O), technique (T) and credentials (P) 
labelled as insecure. In this case study, Siemens PLC is ranked by using algorithm 1, because 
both system (S) and network (N) details are insecure. In addition, all the rest optional categories 
are insecure too.  The qualifying score for this device is critical.   
This device is scored 10/10 *4. The 10/10 is for the reason that both system (S) and network 
(N) are insecure. The extra 4 stars means the PLC has 4 extra insecure features. As explained 
above in the algorithm section that having extra optional insecure features for a high-risk device 
makes it critically risky.  
4.11.3  ICSrank vs CVSS for online ICS devices 
At this stage, a comparison between   ICSrank metric of Siemens PLC with its current CVSS 
score is conducted.  
CVSS score for SIMATIC S7-1200: 6.8 = 1 available software vulnerability 
ICSrank score for SIMATIC S7-1200: 10 *4 = 2 major insecure features plus 4 insecure 
optional features  
It can conclude that CVSS has identified only 1 software vulnerability for this PLC which is 
cross-site request forgery.  This bug can be exploited online through the device’s configuration 
portal by injecting malicious code. CVSS has missed plenty of other insecure features that are 
available in OSINT, which ICSrank managed to identify and assess. Also, the identified bug 
by CVSS is ranked 6.8 which is not high risk at all. That would mislead organizations who 
assess their ICS devices following CVSS, by ignoring it or not classy it as important.  
The context of following advisories by CVSS is not complete and comprehensive. It is 
important to understand the whole threat system which was explained in section 4.8 in order to 
construct better threat scenarios and be able to decide the required defences. Therefore, 
ICSrank is built on this threat system to make it more practical in ICS security. CVSS is 
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developed under the traditional IT security mentality which treats vulnerabilities individually. 
This is not recommended in ICS security.  
Another concept is missing in CVSS system, is ranking the vulnerability individually. This 
method is flawed, for the above reasons and also for the reason it neglected the differences 
between online and offline device (non-internet devices). It makes a big difference between the 
formers. An online device with that CVSS score, according to ICS rank is considered critical. 
However, a similar device model is hidden in a network and is not connected to the internet 
might require a different score especially if that configuration portal is only accessed locally.  
4.12 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, a methodology and framework ICSrank for assessing the risk of an online ICS 
device have been demonstrated. Chapter 6 utilizes this framework for non-online ICS devices. 
This research has also provided qualitative and quantitative analysis and explained our rules of 
engagement with all ICS devices. In addition, it has provided a case study for PLC that is 
believed to be linked to a control system. This chapter has also proposed a new taxonomy based 
on OSINT and argues that it is not possible to find them all for one target. 
It was also developed a taxonomy of OSINT threats that are associated with attack stages. The 
taxonomy is based on OSINT information that is available in table 11. Unfortunately, this 
research has not covered or extracted other OSINT information as proposed in Section 4.8. The 
list in section 4.8 is a benchmark list that is used to assess an ICS device. This research argues 
that passive information gathering is a good start to give a roadmap for the organization to 
assess what security aspects need to be taken as priorities. It was demonstrated that the risk 
level of a device does not depend exclusively on the number of vulnerabilities but also on the 
severity of them. However, if two devices have a similar risk level, the quantity based on 
ICSrank algorithms will be of importance. It shows that there is more than one scenario that 
could be exploited. This thesis argued that CVSS (See Chapter 2) is not enough to estimate the 
risk of vulnerabilities. It is out of this research scope to analyse and discuss all factors that 
affect the security of a device, our study is a step in that direction. OSINT and threat 
intelligence can greatly influence the security of ICS devices. In the following chapter, it lays 
out a cyber-physical threat model. It explains the two stages of ICS attacks: stage one IT-attacks 
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and stage two OT attacks. The next chapter identifies threat actors, vectors, capabilities and 
consequential impacts. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
  
  ICS THREAT ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this digital era, cyber presence and the use of digital service tools have practically become 
necessities for business organizations of all types. With such prominent use of digital 
technology within the business context, there is also a notable rise in the number of cyber-
attacks taking place against businesses and individuals. The precise mechanisms and the 
impacts of such cyber-attacks can vary significantly depending on the skill and objectives of 
the attacker [150]. Once successfully implemented, impacts may range from the simple, passive 
stealing of confidential information to the complete sabotage of the equipment and systems. 
In this chapter, this research discusses the security of cyber-physical systems by linking cyber 
threat operations with this research’s physical model “Gas Cylinder filing”. This research, 
therefore, explains vulnerabilities, attack methodologies, goals and objectives, and the possible 
impacts on physical systems. It also demonstrates ICS specific actions as responses to the 
penetration of a cyber-domain, as well as an ICS threat model with a corresponding cyber-
attack. The case study is built around a safety PLC in a gas system. Consequently, this research 
illustrates the connection between cyber-attacks and ICS attacks. 
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5.2 WHO ARE THE ATTACKERS? 
Cyber-attackers targeting ICS and online servers can be broadly categorized into the following 
two groups. 
• Insiders:  
These are employees, who according to research [148] represent the riskiest threats to 
security breaches either intentionally or accidentally. They have direct access to the 
system, or the ability to deploy convenient measures allowing them to physically access 
the system and attack it. A cyber-attack by such persons is therefore very different from 
the way an outsider would attack the system due to their having direct access such as 
login credentials, or physical access to the hardware components of the system [148]. 
• Outsiders 
Outside attackers on ICS systems include people who are not directly affiliated with 
the business and system owner. They have no direct access to the system, software 
networking or hardware. There are many types of outside attackers ranging from 
hobbyists to professional hackers, and government agents [146]. See Chapter 2 for more 
description of their general motivation. These attacks require knowledge of computers 
and networking technologies as such information has become essential when hacking 
and attacking a system. In some cases, amateur cyber-attackers do not actually hack the 
system; rather they deploy DDoS (distributed denial of services) attacks. These disrupt 
the service facilities without actually getting into the system through hacking the 
system. 
5.3 TARGETED DEVICES 
The targeted ICS devices assumed in our study are: 
• Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC): 
 PLC is a computer system that is specifically designed for use in industrial scenarios; 
they are also well adapted for the control of manufacturing processes. This can be 
highlighted by the use of PLCs to control assembly lines in manufacturing and for 
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robotic instruments. This is possible as they are actually designed for such industries 
with the following in mind: an automated fault diagnosis, easier programming, and 
performance reliability [144]. Modern-day PLCs also include the functionalities of 
networking, distributed control systems, process control, motion control, and relay 
control. 
• Remote Terminal Units (RTU): 
 RTU refers to a microprocessor device that is used for the purpose of creating an 
interface to an ICS through telemetry data transmission. This unit receives instructions 
from the connected devices and transmits it to the master system.  
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA): 
SCADA is an architecture of control systems used for the purpose of supervisory 
management of ICS. SCADA connects with other devices in a system to gather data 
using PLCs and RTUs while making use of networking and GUI for data collection.  
• Human Machine Interface (HMI): 
HMI refers to the specific user interface used in industrial machinery and computing 
systems that allow a human operator to control the controller of the system. A typical 
HMI includes components of both controlling automation and signalling.  
• Master Terminal Units (MTU's): 
MTUs are in fairly common use in SCADA systems. MTUs are the devices that provide 
instructions and commands to the RTU, which can be located remotely in different 
places. The MTU has control over RTUs, collects data from these units, keeps the 
information stored, and processes the data to show it to the operator using the HMI user 
interface [147]. 
• Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED'S): 
IED is a term that is commonly used in the electronics industry for microprocessor 
controller devices that are used as controllers for various types of energy management 
equipment like capacitors and circuit breakers.  
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5.4 ATTACK GOALS AND MOTIVES 
Chapter 2 listed common attack methods on ICS assets. In this chapter, research continues what 
was discussed earlier in chapter 2 that an attack on ICS is normally performed in 2 stages.  
However, not all attacks have similar motives and goals after they succeed with stage 1, which 
is to get inside the ICS network. Therefore, it is important to understand the motives of attacks 
pre-stage one. The end goals of the cyber-attacks and breaking into an ICS network are shown 
below [32]: 
• To change system/device/network configuration and behaviour. 
• To make inaccurate changes to system/network information sent to operators. 
• To tamper with safety systems. 
• To inject malicious software such as malware. 
• To steal information and carry out espionage. 
• To alter sensitive information. 
• To get inside an ICS device/system: 
Previous chapters discussed the type of information that an attacker can use to gain access to 
ICS devices. However, there is a need to learn the methodology that most attackers follow to 
gain control over a system. The following figure (Figure 12) is an illustration of attack 
methodology “Kill Chain stage 1” for the cyber stage. The “Kill Chain” is a model developed 
by Assante and Lee. It is based on the “Cyber Kill Chain” developed by Lockheed Martin 
analysts [206]. Stage 1 models a campaign that attackers follow against IT or a business 
network. They also developed “Kill Chain Stage 2” (see Figure 13) [206].  Stage 2 is a model 
that explains the campaign that attackers follow against ICS. 
 Page | 93  
 
 
Figure 12: Cyber-attack stage by Assante and Lee [206] 
In previous chapters, this research focused specifically on the “Reconnaissance” phase. This is 
the phase where OSINT gathering takes place. It is a stage where an attacker gathers 
information about a target system. The following stages: weaponization, delivery, exploitation 
and gaining command and control are discussed in brief in chapter 2. There are plenty of attack 
methods to exploit a system. It is out of this research scope to discuss them all in depth. This 
research illustrates a few of them for the sake of threat modelling of our case study. 
5.5 ICS ATTACKS 
In previous chapters, this thesis established the OSINT information that an attacker can use to 
gain access to ICS devices/network. However, gaining entry into an ICS network is not the 
same as an IT network. IT networks normally share commonalities in assets, design and 
architecture. There are plenty of guides and resources publicly about IT assets that make it easy 
for an attacker to gain entry. However, the ICS network is composed of many engineering and 
mechanical processes that require different skills and expertise and most importantly 
knowledge about its architecture which are not available in public. Industrial organizations 
have different ICS architectures that require an attacker to learn each individually if he/she 
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wants to learn an attack. The attack cannot be copied with other entities. Another difference 
between IT and OT is depending on the type of compromised device that an attacker has gained 
control over, that makes the scenario to be different. For example, if a PLC device is connected 
to the internet, an attacker might or might not be able to cause an impact. It all depends on the 
administrative security role that he has established when he compromised that device and 
whether or not that PLC is crucial to the production. The level of ICS network security is not 
the same for most organizations. Some are weak, while others are secure. Poor ICS networks 
might expose ICS devices directly to the internet as we saw in Shodan in chapter 4, making it 
easy for an attacker to make an impact. On the other hand, other ICS networks have a more 
complex architecture that requires long, deep planning and research.  
This research applies some of SANS model concepts [206] to understand how an ICS attack is 
conducted after a successful cyber-attack. The model shows that an attacker applies some of 
ICSrank concepts. For example, OSINT collection is similar to stage 1 planning and targeting. 
As disused in chapter 4, attackers do their homework when choosing a target. They gather 
related OSINT, and this includes techniques and exploits as mentioned in the SANS model.  
As for SANS stage 2, development and testing are also based on gathered OSINT information 
about the internal ICS structure. ICSrank discussed these concepts in detail in chapter 4 & 6. 
Once inside an ICS network, an attacker normally follows these steps (Figure 13) 
• Develop a tool or methodology to achieve attack goal, let’s assume it’s a malware and 
the target is a PLC.  
• Test the malware that was developed for validation purpose. 
• Deliver the malware to the PLC device. 
• Install/Modify malware files inside the PLC software. 
• Execute ICS attack by making the PLC act abnormally for instance. 
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Figure 13:: ICS network Stage by Assante and Lee [206] 
ICS attacks are common in industrial systems which would include harmful unauthorized 
actions that have been committed by insiders either willingly or by mistake [142]. Figure 17 
above shows the sequence of actions that commonly are part of ICS attacks on the cyber 
systems. 
5.5.1 ICS attacks on industrial systems 
An attacker who is attempting to perform physical attacks after gaining the capability and 
access to affect an ICS device has the ability to perform the following actions [137][138]: 
• Change Input/output values: This affects ladder logic, valves (closing and opening), 
connected equipment, motors (turning on and off), product quality, and power 
disruption. Making such changes in the input/output values can, therefore, lead to 
financial and environmental issues. This method can also be used in order to spoof 
administrators about system status by feeding falsified data and information to the 
administrator [148]. 
• Infected firmware: This has the capability to do just about anything that is possible 
using a software firmware upgrade on a system, including disrupting the machine and 
changing its whole operation procedure [147]. Common impacts of an infected 
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firmware would include the following: alteration of existing configurations, installing 
backdoors, installing new features, and functionalities. 
• Change read-write access: Making these changes in the system can lead to 
catastrophic results as the attacker has the option to overhaul the way machines 
operate in the ICS by changing the read-write access. For instance, an attacker can 
change the read access of RTUs in a way that data is not readable by the MTU. This 
makes it impossible for the MTU to collect any data from connected RTU [145]. 
Similarly, write access can also be changed making it difficult to store the data for 
backup purposes. 
• Stop PLC: This can disable a system or certain components or alter production. 
Stopping the device is a fully accomplished goal because it stops ladder logic from 
functioning and entering a safe mode for instance. This affects the availability of the 
device and causes a denial of action. 
• Reprogram control devices’ instructions: Changing the instruction set for the control 
devices can result in reprogramming or altering the way controllers behave in 
response to the instruction commands sent by the operator and controller [143]. This 
kind of attack would make it very difficult for the operator to use the ICS in an 
effective manner with reprogrammed instructions. 
• Change control software configuration: Making changes in the control software alters 
the way the system is controlled by the controller logic in a way that makes it difficult 
for the operator to control the system, or issue instructions. 
• Safety system modified: An ICS would typically include safety measures and systems 
such as automatic settings backup, firewall, and storage of the information. If the 
attacker who has gained access to the system can change the safety systems, it can 
lead to a disaster in terms of both harming the hardware equipment or disrupting the 
software by corrupting it. An example would be when an attacker can remove or 
disrupt the cooling system that keeps ICS from getting overheated. 
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5.5.2 Impact 
Computer systems have become ubiquitous in the industrial world to remain competitive and 
productive. This high degree of dependence of business companies on computer systems and 
ICS is very prominent and makes the impact of cyber-attacks very significant. Cyber-attacks 
on ICS devices in an industrial plant can have the following impacts [140] [139]: 
• A threat to security: A successful cyber-attack can significantly reduce the safety and 
security measures deployed by the manufacturing company to keep its confidential 
data and industrial processes secure, rendering the business operations insecure. The 
impact can reach to the level of a disaster as any other malicious entity can also attack 
the system while the security measures are lowered. As a result, the business might 
need to suspend its operations [146]. 
• Competitive sabotage: A cyber-attack can also be viewed as an act of sabotage in the 
corporate world as a successful attack can undermine the reputation, production 
capacity, and quality of business operations. A competitor in the industry can take 
advantage of this attack to gain a competitive advantage. In some cases, a competitor 
can even gather confidential strategic business data of a competitor to gain a 
competitive edge and steal business secrets. 
• Economic disaster: A cyber-attack can lead to reduced production and then to a 
temporary complete shut-down of production capacity, both of which can completely 
disrupt sales and money-making opportunities available for the company [143]. For 
instance, the business may be unable to meet project and supply deadlines resulting 
in the cancellation of contracts and financial loss. 
• Reduction in production capacity: An attacker can use cyber-attacks to render the 
production capacity of an industrial plant handicapped in a number of ways. Some 
examples include tampering with the machinery equipment, reprogramming the 
controller logic, and disabling the firmware security. Such actions would cause the 
production capacity of the plant to go down to a potentially significant level. 
• Equipment damage: In the case of a successful cyber-attack the attacker has the 
ability to completely alter the system and have a significant degree of control over 
the software and hardware. Accordingly, many safety attributes and measures of the 
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system can also be changed in such a way that the equipment is damaged thereby 
requiring either repair or replacement [142]. Therefore, the business would endure 
financial loss along with the reduction in production as the equipment is damaged. 
• Injury or death of personnel: With the safety measures of the industrial equipment 
disabled or potentially changed, the equipment can fail or malfunction. Such 
abnormalities can occur at any random point in time without prior indications or 
alerts. Serious events can follow including floor personnel being injured due to 
machine malfunction resulting from the changes made during the attack. 
• Release of hazardous materials: Within different types of industrial plants the use of 
hazardous materials is a common occurrence. These hazardous materials are 
generally kept safeguarded using cautionary systems. In an attack, the safety 
measures can be disabled and as a result, hazardous material can be released and 
cause different kinds of accidents such as fire, poisonous gas leaks and environmental 
damage. 
• Environmental damage: As noted in the previous point, a cyber-attack can potentially 
result in the release of hazardous materials into the environment. Leakage of such 
substances can be very harmful to the environment. 
• Damage to brand image: Facing a cyber-attack makes it very difficult for a business 
to keep up with its demand-supply cycle if the production capacity is harmed. In such 
cases, the business might not be able to fulfil its supply contracts or have the 
production of faulty products, all of which can cause the reputation of the company 
to be significantly damaged. 
5.6 CASE STUDY: GAS CYLINDER FILLING SYSTEM 
5.6.1 Gas Cylinder Safety System security: 
Safety systems in gas and other industrial systems are meant to keep physical processes safe. 
They are the typical ICS devices such as PLCs, sensors, actuators and so on. The difference 
between regular operation devices and safety devices is safety devices have logical codes built 
into them [appendix] [32]. Logical codes such as AND, OR, NAND aid a device to make 
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decisions. While operation devices use these codes: ON, OFF to follow orders from control 
centres. There are abnormal events and hazards such as fire, explosions and release of 
poisonous gas that could result from errors and malfunctions in industrial systems. Sometimes 
safety systems are considered as the last security defence in the face of an attacker [32]. For 
instance, an attacker might be able to attack a device and bypass all cybersecurity measures, 
but they cannot cause an impact. The reason is simply most ICS have safety systems. However, 
this research proposes the following questions: 
• What if a safety system doesn’t function as intended? 
• How could this happen? 
• What are the consequences?  
• What can we do to prevent the failure of a safety system? 
This research focuses on “Safety PLC” as an example of a safety system in ICS. This research 
is motivated by the TRISIS incident [207] that targeted a PLC controller.  Safety PLC takes 
orders from control centers, and then it directs those orders to other types of components. 
Normally as mentioned in this research’s interview, there are two types of PLCs for every 
network. There are safety PLCs and operational PLCs. The operational PLC task is to 
communicate with field devices. However, it cannot send orders to field components without 
the approval of a safety PLC.  
The safety system cannot face cyber-attacks directly [207]. There is an obvious risk in the 
safety system. For example, if a safety PLC is taken over like in the TRISIS incident [32], it is 
a game over, because safety PLC is responsible for all main operations [see appendix]. An 
attacker can make the safety PLC behave in an abnormal way, which can go undetected and, if 
it succeeds, can cause an impact.  
5.6.2 ICS attack taxonomy   
Based on the interview with gas company personnel, this research has developed a novel ICS 
attack/impact taxonomy (Table 11) based on Safety PLC in the gas industry. To this research 
knowledge, this taxonomy is novel, because its model is based on a real gas cylinder filling 
system. That model is developed by this research and is validated by engineers in that gas 
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company. This research argues that this taxonomy is a crucial step towards ICS security. There 
is a big gap in knowledge between IT and OT. This taxonomy can contribute the following 
benefits: 
• Fill the gap between IT and OT departments. IT people can learn about the ICS 
process and about ICS assets. 
• Develop technologies that use this kind of information. Many IT security 
technologies do not support or understand internal ICS network packets. 
• Ability to perform a risk assessment of the ICS system/network and to analyse 
potential risk/impact. 
• Understanding ICS system/network operations and security could help prioritize 
patching and other security procedures. 
• Development of Threat models of possible scenarios to attack an ICS in the gas 
industry. 
• Sharing of ICS knowledge in public such as an OSINT database. (See details in 
chapter 8) 
• Study attackers’ techniques similar to TRSIS incident and prepare for new 
attacks/techniques 
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Table 11:A novel Safety PLC attack taxonomy 
Action 
Action 
Specific 
Physical 
Property 
Action 
symbol 
Impact 
Modify 
Flow 
Increase  Flow (Q) 
  
MQ1 Gas cylinder overfill, rapture 
Decrease  MQ2 Gas cylinder half fill 
Modify 
Time 
Increase  Time (T) 
  
MT1 Gas cylinder overfill, rapture 
Decrease MT2 Gas cylinder half fill 
Modify 
Air 
pressure 
Increase Air Pressure 
(AP) 
  
MAP1 Destroy air-based devices 
from high pressure 
Decrease MAP2 Air-based devices don’t 
operate, due to low pressure 
Modify 
Gas mass 
Increase Gas Mass (GM) 
  
MGM1 Gas cylinder overfill, rapture 
Decrease MGM2 Gas cylinder half fill 
Modify 
Air 
supply 
Close Air Pressure 
(AP) 
MAP3 No airflow, operations stop 
Modify 
Sequence 
Values 
Modify Process Control 
(PS) 
PS1 Affect the entire process. 
e.g. If the order of operation 
is affected, the entire filling 
process fails  
Modify 
Gas tank 
Level 
Increase Gas Tank Level 
(GTL) 
MGTL1 Overfilled Tanks 
 
5.7 DISCUSSION 
This chapter analyzed and outlined the cyber-physical relationship. The general theme of how 
an attacker can attack an online ICS device was demonstrated. The aim was not to cover all 
possible attacks, but on building a framework of how to link cyber-attacks with physical 
attacks. General objectives and physical impacts were briefly introduced. As such, a detailed 
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discussion of physical attacks is included in the chapters that follow.  Our research has 
introduced a framework (see Chapter 4) that helps to identify threats and vulnerabilities from 
OSINT. This framework was used in this chapter and extended to incorporate the physical 
domain. This research further demonstrated this framework’s applicability by showing how a 
piece of public information about a particular device can be turned into an existing 
vulnerability; thus, possibly launching a threat attack that can impact that device leading to 
physical and financial repercussions for the business. 
This research developed an ICS attacks taxonomy based on safety PLC. The information 
conveyed in this research established an understanding of the way that physical attacks on 
online ICS work, and the link between ICS attacks and cyber-attacks. With this information, a 
reader can understand the extent to which ICS attacks can render an online ICS system useless. 
Once the attacker intends to disrupt the services and destroy the service provision, they can do 
so by corrupting the firmware, damaging the hardware components, or by completely 
overhauling the instruction set. For these reasons, ICS security of the online ICS is arguably 
just as important as protection against remote attacks. This research takes into consideration 
that the extent of damage is somewhat similar for both or even higher in some cases of ICS 
attacks where the actual hardware component is damaged. The impact of damage from ICS 
attacks ranges from financial aspects of a business, quality of services, and even the brand 
image of the business. For details of the ICS attacks discussion, refer to (Chapter 6). 
5.8 SUMMARY  
This research outlined in this chapter, part one of a cyber-physical model, which is the cyber 
threat section. It demonstrated the possible threats that could target a physical model and 
outlined the types of attacks, vulnerabilities and consequent impacts. It also briefly linked 
possible physical attacks with cyber-attacks. It is clear that a system of digital solutions that is 
vulnerable to any type of cyber-attack whether it is a physical attack or remote digital attack, 
can easily lead to a complete disruption of services and cause massive damage to the business. 
From the safety PLC scenarios for a gas system shown in this chapter, it is apparent that the 
sheer impact that a cyber-attack can have on an organization can be severe enough to sabotage 
the operational viability of the organization. It can halt production operations of the company, 
cause equipment to be destroyed, and make the business unable to fulfil its contractual 
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responsibilities. In designing a security measure to prevent cyber-attacks, a company must 
consider all possible avenues of attacks including remote digital attacks and physical attacks, 
including the possibility of company insiders being involved in the process of cyber-attack, 
either by accident or by intention. With a basic understanding of both ICS attacks and cyber-
attacks described in this chapter; the next chapter will outline in depth the ICSrank applications 
on   ICS OSINT. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 APPLICATIONS OF ICSRANK  
6.1 INTRODUCTION: 
The aim of this chapter is to apply ICSrank framework on ICS OSINT. The first case study is 
to assess Triconex PLC security. The goal is to demonstrate in depth the main 3 stages of this 
framework: collection, assessment and scoring. This chapter is concerned with ICS devices 
that are not connected to the Internet. The availability of OSINT information about these 
devices are examined under ICSrank. 
The second case study of this chapter is to apply ICSrank framework on Trisis malware. The 
framework is concerned about the risks associated with an ICS network and their impact on a 
physical system. ICSrank is built on the OSINT concept, meaning to analyze risks based on 
available information in OSINT that are related to Trisis.  
The third case study of this chapter is to apply ICSrank on a developed ICS model. This 
research studies the normal operations of a gas cylinder filling system and then the abnormal 
operations and their consequences. This research argues that successful cyber or physical 
attacks on a gas system could result in critical destructive impacts. This research is motivated 
to comprehend and observe the consequences quantitatively as accurately as possible. 
However, it is impossible to test this on a real operational system. Therefore, a simulation 
modelling method has been adopted in this study.  
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6.2 APPLICATIONS OF ICSRANK FRAMEWORK:  
In this section, this research continues using ICSrank framework to assess and rank offline or 
non-Internet ICS devices based on OSINT. The OSINT information “ICS OSINT” in this 
chapter and chapter 4 are the same. The context is different. In chapter 4, ICSrank framework 
was used to assess online ICS devices’ security by analyzing and ranking OSINT information 
relating to that device. The OSINT information is categorized and utilized for attack stage 1 
(See also chapter 5). Stage one or (kill chain stage 1) as explained in chapter 5 is the first stage 
of the attack on ICS devices. What’s interesting is any information that is related to an ICS 
device’s security at this stage. Chapter 4 also explained the methodology of OSINT information 
analysis and assessment.  
This chapter uses the same concepts and methodology of OSINT analysis and 
qualitative/quantitative assessment as in chapter 4. The context is “ICS OSINT” for the 2nd 
stage; meaning assessing OSINT for non-online ICS devices. This information is all about the 
internal details of an ICS system or network. This set of information is normally associated 
with an ICS attack stage 2 (kill chain stage 2). Stage 2 as explained in chapter 5 is the second 
stage of an ICS attack. It’s a very critical stage that requires special knowledge and skills from 
the attacker. OSINT information for stage 2 is very critical for both defenders and threat actors. 
The threat actor’s possession of “ICS OSINT” information can lead to exploitation of ICS 
networks and can result in unwanted physical impacts. Defenders on the other hand can use 
this information for the establishment of proper mitigation and defense techniques.  
However, the same qualitative and quantitative algorithms for assessing stage 2 OSINT 
information is also applied on stage 1 OSINT information in chapter 4. In chapter 4, OSINT 
information were grouped into 7 categories, assessed   using ICSrank algorithms, and ranked 
to get the final risk score for an ICS device. 
6.2.1 Trisis/Triton/HATMAN  
This chapter uses the famous incident – as the main theme to conduct 3 case studies. This 
incident happened in Saudi Arabia [207] when a malware called Triton or TRISIS hit a safety-
instrumented system (SIS). The incident happened in 2017 when an employee accepted a 
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malicious file that carries this malware. The victim was a Saudi oil and gas company. The ICS 
device that was targeted was Triconex PLC from Schneider Electric. It was a 0-day 
vulnerability (a new vulnerability that has never been published) that was exploited in the PLC 
controller. The exploit went undetected because the intrusion detection system or anti-virus 
software did not carry that exploit signature. The attacker’s goal was to replace the logic code 
in that PLC in order to control it remotely.  The exploited firmware allowed the attacker to 
disable the SIS PLC.  Luckily, it failed at some final stage.  The attacker lost control after that 
failure because it already launched an alarm. That failure prevented a crisis for human safety 
and potential economic losses.  
The TRISIS capability could be repeated and replicated on other targets because the tradecraft 
is out on the internet. The attacker only needs to learn about the new target system and network 
infrastructure. That learning curve happened in TRISIS where attackers were inside the 
network undetected for so long before they managed to cause an impact.  
6.3 CASE STUDIES:  
6.3.1 Case study 1 : Triconex PLC security  
This is an application and collection of “ICS OSINT” from real resources. The methodology 
and sources of OSINT analysis and synthesis are already explained in chapter 4. The below 
description is an example of OSINT information which is related to stage 2. The OSINT details 
information about an ICS system, network, threat information and its impact on this industry 
(in this case a gas industry). This information is very critical because an attacker can use this 
information to target new ICS and cause internal damage using similar capabilities such as the 
“TRISIS” malware and how it was applied. There is a potential that this attack can be 
replicated. However, not all ICS targets are the same; homework has to be done to gather 
specific information about the new target. The example below is for illustration purposes only 
and it gives basic clues about “ICS OSINT” and how it looks. There is missing specific 
information about the target as it is unethical to mention here, and it is out of this research 
scope. 
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In chapter 4, this research applied ICSrank framework to online ICS device- Siemens PLC. 
This section is a demonstration of how to apply ICSrank on an offline ICS device, in this case 
Its Triconex PLC. It is worth to mention that in chapter 4, a taxonomy of OSINT was used to 
label specific forms of information/OSINT with the letter V, the purpose of that was to 
distinguish/classify each information source individually. Overall all these Vs fall under the 7 
main categories which are system (S), network (N) details, configuration details (C), defense 
(D), Techniques (T), online surface attack (O) and credentials (P). This can be applied here 
too. 
Stage 1: OSINT collection 
Source 1:  MDudek ICS [5] 
Application in ICSrank: System details (S), Network details (N), Configuration details (C), 
Defense details (D), Techniques and tools (T) and Online surface attack (O). 
This source is really useful and dangerous for providing critical information for researchers 
and attackers too. It’s a hub to start from to learn about Triconex PLC and Trisis malware. 
Below is an explanation of how this source was used in this research.  
Trisis Malware files 
This source has almost all of Trisis malicious files. The source author admitted its dangerous 
to post these files, but his reason was other public sources published those. He added those files 
for research purpose. The following files are the core Trisis files to understand: trilogy.exe and 
library.zip  
 
Trilog.exe is a python compiled file. It is the main malware file and executable. When it is 
executed by a victim it extracts and drops 4 files: script_test.py, library.zip, inject.bin and 
imain.bin. in the targeted Trisiation workstation.  
After execution, script_test.py uses two payloads: inject.bin as a backdoor injector and 
imain.bin as a backdoor.  The script communicates with the device and its protocol using 
crafted libraries available in library.zip. See an illustration image below. 
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Figure 14: How Trisis works [218] 
This library.zip file contains Tristation protocol implementation which were implemented by 
reverse engineering Triconex hardware its software. The attackers were able to obtain those 
resources. Its worth to mention that the device was undocumented (Nozomi), that left the 
attackers to discover everything by their own once they had the device and its software.   
On reflection about Triconex and OSINT. The attackers developed researched system details 
(S) using the available resources. They later also managed to find a target and its network 
details (N) . Then they developed the necessary tools and techniques (T). All knowledge was 
built from scratch and self-effort.  This could happen to any ICS device that is not documented 
or available in OSINT. This technique is called zero-day vulnerability, which means no prior 
vulnerabilities are available. And That’s why it is a good reason to keep a radar on OSINT, 
because attackers are always looking for OSINT knowledge for attractive targets. They also 
learn from OSINT similar and applicable techniques.  
The malware files are an indication of availability of critical OSINT that could be classified 
based on ICSrank as techniques (T) which is the malware itself, system (S) and network (N) 
details which can be extracted as from the files and code inside the malware. This extracted 
information is discussed in the following sections.  
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Malware Detection rules: 
There is a folder in this source that hosts Yara detection rules. These rules were developed by 
ICS-CERT and FireEye Mandiant [219][221]. Those rules can be used for defense purposes to 
detect Trisis/HATMAN files. ICSrank classifies this OSINT in the collection process as 
defense (D) information.  
Source 2: Nozomi Github Tritools [223] 
Application in ICSrank: System details (S), Network details (N), Defense (D), Techniques and 
tools (T) and Online surface attack (O). 
This source is used mainly in this research to obtain the Trisis network packets and to apply 
ICSrank framework on this type of OSINT as explained later in this chapter. This github 
contains two types of tools (T): the packet file and a honeypot. The network packets will be 
examined later in depth in this chapter. That file is important to learn system (S) and network 
(N) details about Triconex and Tristation protocol. Its also critical to study the behavior of 
Trisis malware, thus learn new techniques (T) and expose device and protocol vulnerabilities 
(O). The packet file comes also with a dissector script written in Lua language. This dissector 
is used to show direction of communication, translate function codes, extraction of programs 
and functions and most importantly detection of Triton malware (source). The dissector 
provides useful information for ICSrank; The above usage can help extract knowledge about 
the system (S) and network (N) details, vulnerabilities (O) and defense information (D). The 
script file is used in this research as a companion to learn about the device system, protocol 
and its function codes.  
The other project in this source is the Triconex honeypot. The honeypot is used mainly to 
emulate the behavior the real Triconex PLC for research purposes. It gives insight about system 
(S) and network (N) details. Although it’s very useful to experiment with, however it is out of 
this research scope to cover its details. This could be a done in future studies.  
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Source 3: ICS-Cert  , Dragos and FireEye [219][211][221] 
Application in ICSrank: System details (S), Network details (N), Configuration details (C), 
Defense details (D), Techniques and tools (T) and Online surface attack (O). 
These sources are used through all this chapter to extract OSINT related to Triconex and Trisis. 
These sources are full of technical details and descriptions of Triconex and Trisis. They are 
used as a reference tool to build ICSrank philosophies and concepts, apply this framework on 
Triconex PLC and specially to evaluate this research findings for the following case studies. 
Especially those resources are established organizations in the field of ICS security.  
The following assessment is based on what is available in OSINT. So, this information ranks 
Triconex PLC based on OSINT based on multiple sources by applying ICSrank. However, in 
this research, another case study is illustrated to assess Triconex based on a single source which 
is a pcap file. The research goes in depth analysis of network packets in order to extract OSINT 
information and therefore analyzed using ICSrank.  Based on this research, this kind of 
assessment is never done before; using ICSrank techniques on OSINT in general and applying 
ICSrank on ICS device network traffics in particular.  
Stage 2: OSINT assessment 
In this section, the same technique of chapter 4 is applied here. It starts of gathering related 
OSINT, assessment and analysis and finally scoring the gathered OSINT. This approach is the 
nutshell of ICSrank framework. As mentioned in chapter 4, ICSrank has 7 OSINT categories 
that represent the knowledge. These are System (S) and network details (N), configuration (C), 
(defense (D), Techniques (T), Online (O) and credentials (P). This knowledge is extracted from 
public OSINT. Below is the explanation.  
System details (S):  
Device name: Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon 
Processor: MP860 PowerPC 
Device Model: Triconex 3008 processor modules 
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Firmware Version: 10.0-10.4 
Software name: Tristan Suite 1131 v4.9.0 (build 117) 
Documentation: Available [V11] 
Device Vendor: Schneider Electric 
Score: Insecure 
The system details (S) in the table (number) shows that almost everything is known about the 
Triconex PLC system details. This information is available in public OSINT to everybody. 
Asset owners who have this kind of device should be careful of this. At attacker can study this 
information and learn how to develop his/her own to exploit this device vulnerabilities. 
Documentation section is available in many sources especially the ones that are used in this 
research above. Therefore, to apply ICSrank assessment, all the main categories are available 
in OSINT, therefore this device is labeled insecure in this category. Assessment should be 
carried to other categories as well.  
Network details (N): 
Protocol Name: Tristation 
Protocol Port: 1502 UDP [V14] 
IP address: N/A 
Network Layout: N/A 
Documentation: Available [V11] 
Score: Secure 
The main categories for a network category are protocol name and port, ip address and network 
layout. Only two main categories are known in OSINT, in the assumption that the device is 
offline and is not available online.  The known categories are protocol name and port number 
[V14]. There are also plenty of information about this protocol functionality mentioned in this 
research resources above. However, this kind of information is optional, because an attack 
 Page | 112  
 
could be conducted even if this information is not available. An attacker can learn about this 
detail by experimenting with the device if he has it, or by installing sniffers that listen to an 
ICS traffic like many existed attacks and techniques (mention some of them here). The device 
is not online as assumed; therefore, its IP address is not known. Therefore, no information 
about its network layout is available. A caution for this asset owners, this device is only one 
thread away from being ranked as “insecure” because once its IP address is known, the network 
layout can be discovered in a matter of time. Thus, this device is assessed as medium risk, 
because only one main category is known.  
The knowledge of communications between workstation and Tricon PLC, documentations 
(above) and manufactories’ documentations enables Nozomi team and Trisis attackers to 
extract network and system details by using  reverse engineering methods.  [220] [V11] 
Online surface attack (O):  
Internet presence: N/A 
Vulnerability: ICSA-18-107-02 [V15] 
Score: Insecure 
There is a critical vulnerability advised by ICS-CERT (ICSA-18-107-02) [V15] with a CVSS 
score 9. The vulnerability is Improper Restriction of Operations inside a Memory Buffer. That 
means that an attacker can read and write to memory buffer without restrictions. This 
vulnerability is available ion public OSINT and is therefore this category is classified as 
“insecure”. This category also checks if a device is online. But in this case, it is not.  
Configuration (C):  
Configuration: Run/remote – program [V3] 
Score: insecure 
The device has two modes: “program” mode and “run/remote” mode which should be the 
default mode. In the “run/remote” mode the device cannot be programmed or exploited. 
However, in “Program” mode the device is programable and thus is vulnerable. The recent 
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Trisis attack occurred because the device was in program mode [V3]. It could be learned that 
this category is very critical and what made the attack happens. Without it the attack wouldn’t 
exist. That’s why configurations are very critical in ICS security and that’s one of the key 
philosophies of ICSrank which is to find critical OSINT. The device is therefore classified as 
“Insecure”. 
 
Figure 15: Triconex modes [221] 
Techniques, exploits and tools (T): 
Exploits: Trisis mawlare [V15] 
Malware: Trisis malware 
Proof of concepts: Honeypot 
Tools: Nozmomi tools 
Score: Insecure 
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Based on this research, there were plenty of techniques, exploits and tools that are related to 
this device. This research explores extensively one of the important tools and techniques which 
is the network packets of Trisis malware developed by Nozomi lab. The packets were captured 
and stored in an application programming interface file (API) which is abbreviated as libcap or 
pcap. This file is available in one of the main OSINT resources Github [223]. See above for 
more information about these sources and their application in ICSrank framework. These tools 
are not only important but also critical because they teach the attacker many aspects of the 
device and its protocol as this research explores later. This category is considered in the 
cybersecurity domain very important. Researchers and attackers are always looking for existing 
tools and exploits. They also share this knowledge in OSINT often. The availability of this vast 
knowledge for Triconex PLC makes this category “insecure”.  
Defense and mitigations (D):  
Patching information: N/A 
Mitigations: Available 
Score: Secure 
 Based on OSINT assessment, the defense category is classified as “secure”, because there are 
existing mitigations techniques, advisories and tools offered by vendors and organizations – 
see below.  That would benefit the asset owners to be aware of existing vulnerabilities and be 
able to implement security.  
For example ICS-Cert ,  FireEye offered some guidelines [220] [221]: 
- Always keep the device on run mode and not program mode. Also, addition of alarm 
for program mode when it goes on. 
- Avoid Tristation workstations to connect to a large network 
- Remove Triconex sis to connect to a persistent network 
- Enable Triconex communication modules to enhance protocol security. 
- Isolate safety PLCs in a different network/zone from operational components. 
- Secure safety PLCs physically by locking them in cabinets in secure rooms. 
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- Data media exchange such as CDs or USBs should be scanned before use in computers 
connected to safety networks. 
- Laptops should be scanned and sanitized if they are used to connect to safety networks. 
- Some safety PLC devices have physical key switches to lock a device and thus prevent 
it from being tampered with, it is recommended to activate this feature by default.  
- Allow authentication features for connecting to safety devices and disable unnecessary 
backdoor accounts that are used for maintenance.  
Detection tools that enable asset owners to detect malicious packets in their network were also 
given to public freely. An example is the development of Yara rules [220][219][221] The rules 
are able to detect suspicious files and critical Triconext PLC. Despite patching information – 
an optional category - is not available from Schneider, the device is still secure in this category. 
The reason is because Schneider and others provided guidelines and the main advice was is to 
secure the configurations which would have prevented the attack altogether.  
Stage 3: Triconex PLC score  
Category     Secure? 
System (S)      NO 
Network (N)     Yes 
Configuration (C)    No 
Defense (D)                                                    Yes 
Techniques (T)    No 
Vulnerability (O)    No 
Credentials (P)    N/A 
Number of insecure main categories 1 
Number of insecure optional categories 3 
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Risk Label     Medium 
Risk score                                                      8 / 10 
Looking at the above assessment, System details (S) are known in public OSINT while network 
details (N) are not known about any target like and IP address which represent an ICS device 
or its organization. The other unknown fields such as network structure of a target is not there. 
In short, no target is defined that would make the network category secure. The system details 
of that device are insecure especially for those organizations that use this device. Based on 
ICSrank algorithms in chapter 4, if one main target such as network (N) is secure, the device 
would be classified as “medium risk”. There are obviously insecure optional categories such 
as technique (T), online(O) and configuration. The Triconex PLC discussed in this research 
should be put under monitor by asset owners and researchers, because if any major network 
details are leaked or exposed in search engines such as Shodan, it would be classified as 
“critical” risk.  In the next section, this research explores in depth the behavior of Trisis 
malware by using OSINT information and related sources.   
The risk score for this device is 8/10. As discussed in chapter 4, a medium risk device is scored 
5/10 if it has no insecure optional categories. There are 3 insecure optional categories here, 
therefore for each category, ICSrank increments the risk score by 1. 
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6.3.2 Case study 2: Trisis OSINT 
In this section, a lengthy discussion and analysis of network behavior of Trisis is conducted. 
The network details of the “Malware_exec. pcap”- a real Trisis behavior developed by Nozomi 
is to be put under ICSrank microscope. It is an attempt of this thesis to apply a security 
assessment of the existing malware OSINT which is related to ICS devices.  
Techniques (T) 
There are the techniques (T) that are used in this case study to discover this OSINT knowledge 
– system (S), network (N) and attacker behavior that can be shared. These techniques (T) are a 
set of filters and keywords that could be viewed as a set of skills that were developed, learned 
and harvested during this research process. The techniques and skills that were employed are 
4 tools (T):  
1. Wireshark: is the main platform for this experiment to run the Trisis pcap 
file. It filters specific packets and exports the results to a text file. 
2. A text editor: Used for analysis and text mining the exported text file. 
3.  “Malware_exec. pcap”: the Trisis packets file developed by Nozomi. 
4. “Tristation.lua”: The Wireshark dissector developed by Nozomi. 
The benefit from this OSINT source (pcap file) can be summarized in one word, and it would 
be techniques (T). The file is extensively full of techniques that were performed by Nozomi 
that mimic an attacker. Those techniques (T) can be learned and applied to a similar 
environment – including this PLC and the TS protocol.  
There are the techniques that were used in this case study to discover this OSINT knowledge 
– system, network and attacker behavior and thus can be shared here. These techniques are a 
set of filters and keywords that could be viewed as a set of skills that were developed, learned 
and harvested during this research process. The skills were employed using a variety of tools 
and platforms: Wireshark is the main platform for this experiment. The second tool is a text 
editor. These skills are beneficial to defenders and attackers like if exposed in public.  
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The capture file is quite large. It contains 895 packets. It was difficult to know where to start 
at the beginning to make sense of the traffic. Luckily Nozomi Networks has a blog article [222] 
that describes their analysis tool – aka the dissector that is used in this research [223]. The 
article briefly mentions the “Allocate program” command and how it was used to detect the 
malware. In this research, that command was used to develop the following analysis. 
The communication of packets between the attacker (Nozomi team) and the PLC device were 
analyzed. A common behavior was observed here. A set of commands were issued in particular 
order and time to achieve a particular output and response from the controller. This behavior 
can be observed by identifying the two communication members: the attacker and the 
controller. This could be achieved by identifying their IP addresses and familiarity with source 
and destination fields.  
System and network details (S) (N) can be extracted from this file. This where the attacker is 
trying to gather information about the controller (S) by issuing command 19. The command is 
found in Wireshark by using this filter: 
 ts.ts_cmd == 19  
The response command from the controller is 108 [Get CP status response]. This command 
reveals this information for the attacker ( see figure 16 ) , the Wireshark packet is translated by 
the Dissector script which is written in the figure (17).   
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Figure 16:CP status results 
 
Figure 17:Dissector Script 
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This is one of the most used – 338 times - function performed by the attacker, to the obtain CP 
status or control value. The malicious injector discussed above uses this function to track 
PresetStatus that stores the control value in the controller memory. The controller gives this 
information back to the attacker by issuing this Command 108 labeled as [Get CP status 
response]. This function is used to accomplish 3 tasks [220]: 
- Decide the number of cycles to idle before payload injection takes place. 
- Control the counter to control/track execution progress 
- Debug the controller in case of failure, to get information about the injector 
The above information demonstrates a technique used by the attacker (T) to get information 
from the Triconex. This information shows how this PLC works (S) and how to communicate 
with this device (T) (N). This information is available and valuable in OSINT for researchers 
and attackers. The information also can be exploitable and repeatable for similar devices.  
Based on this research, the following commands were observed to occur frequently by the 
attacker and the controller. Command 65 which is labeled and translated as [Upload program] 
in the Lua script and Wireshark respectively. It was used by the attacker 26 times. Its 
functionality is similar to its label.  Command 162 is labeled [Upload program response] and 
it was the response of the controller 20 times. The other command is 100 and labeled as 
[Command rejected], it was the response by the controller.          
The rejection happened 16 times. After digging Wireshark and the exported text file, this filter 
was used in Wireshark, to find the rejected packets:  
ts.ts_cmd == 100 
The explanation of this rejection according to an ICS-CERT report is that, Triconext allows 
(S) downloading the malicious programs only 3 times. It was a response to upload program 
issued 3 times by an attacker. So, it’s like a repeated cycle until the whole programs are 
downloaded.   After each cycle, the attacker uses the command 19 [Get CP Status] after issuing 
the upload function. That command is issued for the explained reasons above. This is another 
technique (T) that shows how an attacker uses these commands (S) to communicate (N) with 
the controller.  
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A brief statistic for other commands that were found inside the packets is shown in ((Table 12). 
A text mining technique was used to find the following functions. The results of Wireshark 
were customized and exported to a text file for further analysis and OSINT discovery. Those 
functions summarize the main functions that were communicated between the attacker and the 
controller. In addition, the system and network commands that were discussed previously.  
Table 12:name functions statistics 
Upload function ID Counts 
Upload 66 72 
Upload function 163 63 
Start download 1 3 
Download change 
permitted 
102 3 
Allocate program 55 3 
Allocate program 
response 
153 3 
End download change 11 3 
Modification accepted 103 3 
Run program 20 1 
 
It can be concluded that command 55,153,11 and 103 were used 3 times. That’s no coincidence, 
because three were 3 cycles/stages  performed by the attacker to  append the malicious files 
inside the controller [220].  The appending can be traced by issuing the command 55 [Allocate 
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program] (see figure 18). The malware was executed 1 time and, it can be seen above in the 
table about the command 20. 
These statistics is useful OSINT in many aspects;It provides information about important 
commands built-in Triconex (S) and how many times they were communicated (N). And most 
importantly the potential that they pose if they were misused. This could be of enormous value 
for considering defense (D) strategies to prevent misuse of such commands by means of access 
control and detection methods. In the next section, further analysis to identify attacker 
techniques (T) and how these commands were used. Also, a demonstration of how to extract 
OSINT from these malicious packets. 
Based on the analysis of the traffic file using the “Allocate Program” filter as a starting point, 
it was observed two repeated behaviors and scenarios that happened between the attacker and 
the Triconex PLC controller. The 3 packets that contain the “Allocate Program” were packet: 
73,76 and 887. That command was proceeded and followed by specific commands in the 
following order :(see table 13) 
ts.ts_cmd == 55  
 
Figure 18:Allocate program command 
The malware injection process was a result of communication between the attacker and the 
controller, using specific functions back and forth. These commands are built-in the Tristation 
protocol. Their names and corresponding values are described in the dissector file developed 
by Nozomi [223]. The below scenario was communicated using the following functions: 
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Table 13:Common functions 
Command Value 
Start download 1 
Download change permitted 102 
Allocate program 55 
Allocate program response 153 
End download change 11 
Modification accepted 103 
Run program 20 
 
This command  “Allocate program” is used 3 times by the attacker to append the malicious 
files. The attacker sent this command to the controller for execution [218]. The files were 
allocated 3 times successfully by the controller and downloaded. The malicious files modified 
the controller original firmware and finally the final malware file was executed.  This behavior 
based on this research statistics summarizes the whole malware operation (T) and objectives. 
It is worth mentioning that Wireshark has a feature called “Expert Info”[225]. This feature 
keeps tracks of anomalies in the capture file [219]. With the help of dissectors this feature can 
provide extra information about uncommon network behavior. This piece of OSINT can be 
used for defense (D) strategies such as packet detection by recognizing the packet signature or 
structure. In this research, expert info identified the malware packets (see figure 19). Expert 
info can be found using the “Allocate Program” command filter mentioned above or the 
following filter:  
 Page | 124  
 
ts.ts_cmd == 55 &&  _ws.expert 
 
Figure 19:Expert info in WireShark 
The malicious file is detected by the dissector in the below figure (20). The is composed of the 
signature of the malicious file: ffff6038020000442000804e. This part is defined in the dissector 
as “ts.ts_full_program” in the “TriStation.lua” script ( see below ) Then its broken into 3 
smaller programs, which are defined  in the dissector file as “ts.ts_program”. The number of 3 
files explains why each cycle is composed of three downloads as explained previously.  
 
Figure 20:A List of malicious files 
ts_progra = ProtoField.uint32("ts.ts_program", "program", base.HEX)  
ts_full_program  = ProtoField.new ("Programs","ts.ts_full_program”, ftypes.BYTES) 
 
Figure 21:Yara rule 
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Summary report: 
This research started by collecting related OSINT data to Triconex PLC and Trisis maklware. 
However, case study 2 is different than case study 1. Case study 2 is concerned only with 
assessing the Trisis network data “Malware_exec. pcap”, and not with the overall OSINT data 
that were analyzed in case study 1. The resources were analyzed and classified based on 
ICSrank OSINT categories: system (S) and network (N) details, configurations (C), defense 
details (D), techniques (T), online vulnerabilities (O) and credentials. The objective of case 
study 2 is to demonstrate how ICSrank works on individual OSINT resources and how to 
extract, categorize, assess and rank them. Collection and categorization is done in the above 
section. The next step is to assess these categories into secure or insecure.  Here is the 
assessment discussion a summary table of the assessment: 
Trisis security assessment 
Category     Secure 
System details (S)    Yes 
Network details (N)    Yes 
Configuration (C)    Yes 
Defense details (D)    YES 
Techniques (T)    NO 
Vulnerability (O)    NO 
Credentials (P)    Yes 
Number of insecure main categories  N/A 
Number of insecure optional categories 2 
Risk Label     Low 
Risk score     2 
System details (S) and Network details (N) 
 Page | 126  
 
The above information is a result of reverse engineering the Triconex PLC and its protocol 
Tristation. Indeed, they provide critical information about those, both system (S) and network 
details. However, this source “malware_exec. pcap” by itself is secure, here is why.  
To make a system (S) category, based on ICSrank, certain categories such as product name, 
version, firmware version and functionality must be known. In the mentioned source, only 2 
categories are known: product name and functionality. This information if stripped from 
existing related OSINT is not sufficient. The affected product and firmware version must be 
known, to raise a security flag. The OSINT is really rich of functionality information which is 
critical if combined with a known system. Individual sources according to this research are not 
normally enough to label advice. ICSrank is combination of OSINT source to help obtain a 
broader perspective. Sometimes OSINT sources such this one is incomplete by its own and 
looks secure, but if combined with other OSINT it could turn into a lethal weapon, which is 
the case with this data. It’s very similar to the Lego game, it only makes sense if all parts are 
assembled together.  Incomplete system details (S) are labeled therefore as secure.  
The network (N) details are more abundant than system (S) details, because this source is about 
network packets. So, it’s obviously there are plenty of information about main and optional 
information about the protocol. Protocol name and port were available as main categories. The 
IP address and network layout are not available. Optional details such as protocol functionality- 
an optional category is available too. Therefore, this category is classified as secure. Network 
details are similar to the system details in terms of their security. They are critical when other 
sources are combined with them like case 1. 
Configuration (C) 
Although, there was no indication of taking advantage of insecure configuration within the 
data, one can be certain that the whole protocol is insecure by design which is even worse than 
relying on configurations, which Schneider did by implementing operation features such as run 
and program mode. That’s because once the attacker is within the network, he/she has full 
control and freedom. So, this feature (C) is secure based on this OSINT alone, because this 
case study doesn’t contain configuration information.  
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Defense (D) 
The network data in the exported network information is a valuable OSINT information to help 
detect abnormal traffic. That and familiarity of critical functions that an attacker might use is a 
bonus. This OSINT can make Triconex device and Tristation protocol more secure due to those 
OSINT. Thus, the defense and mitigation category (D) is labeled secure.  
Techniques (T) 
This is the most abundant information that were extracted from this data. As discussed above, 
an attack behavior (T) was learned, ranging from common usage of functions to specific ranges 
of filters that were utilized in this research to find this behavior. This OSINT (T) if shared and 
stored in a public database -as this research proposes earlier in this thesis, the research skills 
(T) and insights could be learned by researchers. These skills could also be acquired by 
attackers too.  Availability of this knowledge and skills is twofold. It makes this OSINT 
insecure as it teaches malicious actors’ new information and on the other hand its useful for 
researchers and defenders. This category (T) is labeled as insecure.  
Vulnerability (O) 
Going through the network traffic data, it was observed that are is a critical vulnerability. The 
list of commands above that allowed the attacker to communicate with the controller, interact, 
upload and download files is a serious security issue, because an attacker was given full 
supervisory privileges without out any verification [220]. Therefore, the online surface attack 
category (O)is labeled as insecure. 
Credentials (P) 
There was no finding of any credentials or authentication happening in the network data. This 
category (P) is secure. Although on reflection, this is not a good thing because it demonstrates 
that the device and its protocol is in secure by allowing access and modification for the 
unauthorized.  
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 Trisis score: 
The final step in ICSrank is to rank this OSINT individually. The purpose of this stage is to see 
the level of this OSINT- the network data security. It could be used to rank the device by itself 
or this source alone. As explained this information above this OSINT does not show 
information about specific version, only it targets the device name. From the above analysis , 
and based on ICSrank algorithms in chapter 4 of this thesis, both major categories system (S) 
and network (N) details  are secure, this would classify this OSINT or device in the low security 
level because it has other categories such as techniques (T) and vulnerability (O) as insecure.   
The risk score of this case study is 2/10. Number 2 reflects the number of insecure optional 
categories. Low risks always have positive numerical values as opposed to “none” risky which 
have zero value. 
6.3.3 Case study 3: Gas model  
This is the last case study,its a follow up to the previous 2 case studies in this chapter. This 
research attempts to propose a scenario of what could have been happen if the Trisis Malware 
succeeded. It demonstrates two possible scenarios of attacks on the Triconex PLC. The 
simulation is a proof-of-concept and by no means it represents a real gas plant. However, as 
mentioned earlier and in the appendix the model has been verified with a local gas producing 
company in Kuwait.  
This simulation and its data can be shared to the ICS security community and be available in 
public OSINT. There are many open source models of ICS systems in OSINT that are being 
used by researchers and organizations. These models offer useful knowledge to understand and 
learn about ICS systems.  
In this section, this research applies ICSrank framework on this model and its findings. The 
goal is to explore how models can contribute to OSINT and ICS security.  This is achieved by 
exploring what type of information models provide, how related and beneficial they are and 
what’s their impact on security.  The gas cylinder filling model is used as a case study to answer 
those questions.  
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Based on the attack taxonomy model in chapter 5 (Table 16), this research chooses 2 types - 
out of 6 - ICS attacks to simulate in the gas cylinder filling model. In that model, the focus is 
on studying two physical properties. This case study simulates gas filling system normal and 
abnormal behavior. The abnormal behavior is interpreted as malicious actions performed by an 
attacker.  This research assumes the attacker has established access inside an ICS network using 
the threat model and the scenario that we explained in the previous section (section 6.4.1). The 
attacker has many options for attacks to perform inside the network (Chapter 5). This research 
narrows ICS targets and chooses a safety PLC device that belongs to a gas filling system. Below 
sections are the case study and data generated by this model.  
6.3.3.1 GAS CYLINDER FILLING MODEL [151-160] 
This section describes the use of methodologies in the form of numerical computations, which 
can explain a real physical system for ‘filling a gas cylinder’. The modelling tools will be used 
to analyse the system and simulate various conditions to detect abnormalities possibly caused 
by cyber-attack.   
The mathematical model presents the basic mass balance equations connecting various 
measurements from the online sensors and instruments that are installed in the plant for filling 
a gas cylinder. 
The mass balance equations, which are in the form of ordinary differential equations (ODE’s) 
in the time domain were solved numerically. The ODE’s are solved using the inbuilt solver 
algorithms in MATLAB. The differential equations are written in a standard format to which 
the solver algorithms can be applied.  Details of the basic structure of the code and the system 
will be discussed further in the sections below. Two different scenarios are discussed here to 
study the response system and to build correlations between various measured variables in the 
process.  
The simulation results are presented in the form of charts, tables and graphs. These will 
demonstrate the output of the system to given inputs and random conditions along a time 
period. Details will be provided on creating a block diagram, simplifying it, and creating a final 
structure that includes the mathematical function that would replicate the input-output relations 
in a gas cylinder filling process. 
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In the "Methodology section”, the procedure followed, and the tools used will be demonstrated 
and then the factors affecting the modelling of the system will be explained. The procedure 
followed requires building analytical equations and using Matlab and Simulink to code and 
solve the system equations. The resulting correlations will identify abnormal measurements 
associated with the system and allow comparison with normal operating conditions. This can 
help present the case where the operator can detect the possibility of cyber-attack.  
6.3.3.2 GAS CYLINDER FILLING MODEL DESIGN 
An interview (see appendix B) is conducted with a senior engineer whose employer is a gas 
producer organization that implements ICS technologies. The interview dealt with questions 
such as the real-world risks and impacts of a serious malfunction occurring either intentionally 
(from malicious third parties), or unintentionally from internal errors and malfunctions.  
This Simulink model is based on physical properties given to us in the interview. The physical 
properties of a gas cylinder are mass of a cylinder (empty and full) and cylinder volume.  Other 
properties are filling time and gas flow rate. The goal of our model is to simulate real physical 
aspects of a gas cylinder process. The model and its properties are discussed in the following 
sections.  
6.3.3.3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION & MATHEMATICAL MODEL [151-
160] 
In the following system, the process of filling a cylinder with gas from a certain industry with 
constant pressure and throughput is described. The following diagram gives a brief schematic 
of the gas filling process (appendix A). 
The upstream pressure of the gas filling station is maintained at 17 bar and the filling completes 
when the pressure of the cylinder reaches the required weight. The weight of the cylinder, the 
pressure inside the cylinder as well as the Gas throughput (flowrate) is measured dynamically 
during the filling process. The dimensions of the cylinder, the total mass of the cylinder, 
operating conditions for the filling process has been presented below. 
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6.3.3.4 CYLINDER PROPERTIES 
Mass of empty cylinder (m1) = 16 kg 
Mass of gas (m2) = 12 kg 
Total mass (m = m1 + m2) = 28 kg 
The volume of the cylinder    = 21 m3 
Filling time for cylinder  = 75 seconds 
Flowrate (Qin)  = 45 m3/hr 
Data on the properties of the gas is also vital for calculating the pressure – mass - flowrate 
relationship. Therefore, this information has also been taken into consideration during the 
construction of the model. 
6.3.3.5 GAS PROPERTIES 
Density of the gas (ρ)  = 0.564 kmol/m3 
Molecular weight (M.W) = 22.695 kg/kmol 
Filling temperature (T) = 273 K 
DERIVATION OF THE EQUATION 1 
𝑑𝑚
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (
𝑘𝑔
𝑠
) 
Formula: 
Mass flow rate = Volume flow rate * Density 
Parameter         Unit 
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Mass flow rate: kg/s 
Volume flow rate: m3/s 
Density: kg/m3 
Qin = Volume Flow rate (m3/s) 
ρ1 = Density (kg/m3)  
𝑑𝑚
𝑑𝑡
  = ρ1*Qin Equation 1 
Change the unit of the density 
Density in kg/m3 = (Density in kmol/m3) * (Molecular Weight of the gas 
ρ1 = ρ * MW                                                                                       Equation 2 
 
Put Equation 2 in Equation 1 
𝑑𝑚
𝑑𝑡
  = ρ*Qin*MW Equation 3 
 
DERIVATION OF THE EQUATION 2 
Non Ideal Gas Equation 
PV = ZnRT Equation 3 
P = Pressure of the gas (bar) 
V = Volume of the Cylinder (m3) 
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Z = Compressibility Factor 
n = Number of moles 
R = Universal Gas Constant = 8.314*10-2 bar.m3 mol-1 K-1 
T = Temperature of the Gas (K) 
𝑃 =
𝑍 𝑛 𝑅𝑇
𝑉 
 
 
n = mass of the gas/Molecular mass of the gas = m/M 
𝑃 =
𝑍 𝑚𝑅𝑇
𝑉∗𝑀𝑊 
                                                                                                                      Equation 4 
Density(kg/m3) = mass of gas(kg)/Volume of the cylinder(V) 
ρ1 = m/V (Put it in Equation 5) 
𝑃 =
𝑍 ρ1𝑅𝑇
𝑀𝑊 
 
Equation 6 
 
DERIVATION OF EQUATION 3 
Van der walls equation of a state for real gas 
(P + a/V2m) *(Vm – b) = RT Equation 7 
 
P = Pressure of the gas, bar 
a = measure of attraction b/w the gas molecule, bar (m3)2/(kmole)2 
Vm = Molar Volume, m3/kmole 
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b = It is a accounts for the volume occupied by the gas molecules, which decreases the available 
open volume 
R = Universal Gas Constant, bar.m3 kmol-1 K-1 
T = Temperature of the Gas, K 
Assumption 
Molar volume Vm is large, b becomes negligible in comparison with Vm 
Vm – b ~ Vm 
(P + a/V2m) *(Vm ) = RT Equation 8 
 
(PVm/RT) + (a/VmRT) = 1 Equation 9 
 
Z = PVm/RT Equation 10 
 
Z = Compressibility Factor 
 
Put Equation 10 in Equation 9 
Z + (a/VmRT) = 1 
Z = 1 - (a/VmRT) Equation 11 
 
Rearranging Equation 8 
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Vm = RT/ (P + a/V2m) 
 
Equation 12 
Put Equation 12 in Equation 11 
Z = 1 – a*(P + a/V2m)/(RT)2 
Z = 1 – P*a/(RT)2 – a2/(VmRT)2 
Molar Volume = 1/ ρ 
Z = 1 – P*a/(RT)2 – (ρ2 a2)/(VmRT)2                                                                           Equation 13 
a = 9.385 bar (m3)2/(kmol)2 (reference)   
R = 8.314 bar.m3. kmol-1. K-1 
T = 273 K 
Z = 1 – P/54.89 – 0.0544 
Z = 0.9456 - P/54.89                                                                                                    Equation 14 
DERIVATION OF EQUATION 4 
From Equation 6 
𝑃 =
𝑍 ρ1𝑅𝑇
𝑀𝑊 
 
Put Equation 14 in Equation 6 
P = (0.9456 - P/54.89) * ρ1 *R*T/MW 
After putting all the values 
ρ1 = 54.88*(P)/ (51.9 – P)                                                                                   Equation 15 
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DERIVATION OF EQUATION 5 
𝑃 =
𝑍 ∗  m ∗ 𝑅 ∗ 𝑇
𝑉 ∗ 𝑀𝑊 
 
Put Equation 14 in above equation 
𝑃 =
 (0.9456 −  P/54.89 ) ∗  m ∗ 𝑅 ∗ 𝑇
𝑉 ∗ 𝑀𝑊 
 
 
P = 
 0.9456  ∗ m∗𝑅∗𝑇
𝑉∗𝑀𝑊 
 - 
 P ∗ m∗𝑅∗𝑇
54.89∗𝑉∗𝑀𝑊 
 
 P ∗ 𝑉∗𝑀𝑊
m∗𝑅∗𝑇 
 + 
 P 
54.89
 = 0.9456 
P⌊
1
54.89
+
𝑉 𝑀.𝑊
𝑅 𝑇 𝑚
⌋ = 0.9456 
𝑃 = 0.9456 ∗ ⌊
1
54.89
+
𝑉 𝑀.𝑊
𝑅 𝑇 𝑚
⌋
−1
                                                                                  Equation 16 
 
The filling time for a single cylinder is fixed at 75 seconds (See cylinder properties above). 
Therefore, the simulation time for one filling cycle is chosen to be the same. 
The equations presented in this section take the inputs for cylinder dimensions and the gas 
properties from the user and can predict the total mass of the cylinder at the end of a single 
filling cycle and the pressure of the cylinder. The combination of differential and algebraic 
equations presented in this section is numerically solved using the Runge-Kutta method. The 
solver algorithm is implemented in MATLAB to give the predicted values of the above-
mentioned output. 
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6.3.3.6 MODEL CODE REVIEW 
In this section, the MATLAB script used to code the equations explained in the above section 
and the conditional loops used to find the relations between different variables, are discussed. 
The section also contains the code used to plot the relations between the cylinder pressure, the 
mass of the cylinder and the flow rate of the gas in the cylinder. The complete code is presented 
in the Appendix. (Appendix A) 
The model code contains 3 sections.   
MAIN.m 
This section begins with the data on the cylinder dimensions, gas properties and other 
operational parameters such as filling cycle. It is followed by two loops of 20 steps each where 
the gas flowrate and the filling time are changed from -10% to 10% of the range of correct 
operational values. For each value in this range, the correct function file (cylinder_cal_time.m 
and cylinder_cal_flow.m) is called, which contains the algorithm to calculate the total mass 
and the final pressure for a resulting filling cycle.  
This file also presents the code to plot the graphs based on the results obtained from the 
simulation. 
cylinder_cal_flow.m 
This function file accepts the gas flow rate as input and directs it towards the ODE 45 solver. 
The filling time, in this case, is fixed at 75 seconds since the only variable in this part of the 
code is flowrate. The solver generates the dynamic values of the mass in the cylinder with time.  
The values of the mass inside the cylinder at the end of a single filling time is selected and is 
assigned to the final mass of the cylinder. In the next step, the resulting pressure in the cylinder 
is calculated by writing the pressure – mass relation presented in Equation 5. 
cylinder_cal_time.m 
This function file accepts the filling cycle time as an input and activates the ODE 45 solver. 
The gas flow rate, in this case, is fixed at 45 (m3/hr) since the only variable in this part of the 
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code is the filling time. The solver generates the dynamic values of the mass in the cylinder 
with time.  This code acts in a somewhat similar sequence as the previous code by selecting 
the value of the mass inside the cylinder at the end of single filling time. In the next step, the 
resulting pressure in the cylinder is calculated by writing the pressure – mass relation presented 
in Equation 5. 
mass_cal.m 
In this section the differential eq. 1 is coded.  This file gives the rate of change of mass at every 
time step. The ‘ODE45 solver’ to generate time-varying dynamic values of the mass inside the 
cylinder uses this value. 
6.3.3.7 GAS MODEL EVALUATION 
In the course of this thesis, a gas cylinder filling model has been developed and analysed:  the 
gas cylinder model. Below, a brief explanation of our evaluation methodology is provided. 
An interview was conducted with a Kuwaiti national gas company: Kuwait Oil Tanker 
Company (KOTC). In the interview, the model was demonstrated, and they gave approximate 
values for important variables such as gas flow, pressure, temperature and density, cylinder 
weights and other values. Their advice on possible critical and physical impacts, whenever 
there is an alteration of the gas attributes was followed.  This interview aided this study for the 
purpose of evaluation and making the gas cylinder model closely resemble a real gas plant in 
Kuwait. The full interview is available in Appendix B.  
 
6.3.3.8 GAS MODEL ATTACK TYPES: 
The mathematical model has been proven as a precise replication of the real process of the ‘gas 
cylinder filling system’. This model can provide an exact correlation between the pressure, gas 
flow rate and the filling time. The physical scenario of an external attack on the measuring/ 
monitoring system can be simulated by changing one of the parameters described above and 
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how these variations can be detected by comparing the values to the model’s predicted values. 
Two types of attacks are simulated  as follows: 
• Random variations: This is random changes in a system state. If an attacker happens 
to make sudden changes in the filling time for instance, to increase the filling time at 
1 instance and then suddenly decrease at every filling cycle. A random variable is an 
easier form of attack and chances of detecting them are easier. 
• Systematic increase: A systematic increase is when the filling cycle time is changed 
in a single direction over a larger period of time. This sort of attack is difficult to 
detect. Since the gradual increase would often go undetected until the physical effect 
can be noticed.  
6.3.3.9 CHANGING INFLOW 
In this section, two conditions are simulated where the attacker could provide  
• Random variations 
• Systematic increase  
These variations were provided in the gas flow rate filling the cylinder. This case is simulated 
in the code by providing a dummy inflow variable. The results from the simulation with the 
dummy inflow variables are compared with the pressure vs flow rate correlations obtained from 
the model described above. From the results presented in Figure 25 it can be inferred that in 
the case of an external influence where the gas inflow rate is being changed or tampered with, 
the output pressure in the cylinder can help to detect the event. 
 Page | 140  
 
 
Figure 22:Detecting abnormality in flowrate (left) random variation (right) gradual increase 
 
6.3.3.10 CHANGING FILLING TIME 
A similar exercise was repeated, but in this case the variations were provided for the ‘filling 
time’ in the cylinder.  The following two conditions were simulated where the attacker could 
provide:  
• Random variation. 
• Systematic increase 
in the filling time. When the filling time is reduced the underfilling of the cylinder would result 
in a lower final pressure. Increasing the final pressure could result in a higher end pressure, 
which if allowed unchecked would result in a rupture. These two cases were simulated in 
MATLAB and the output pressure was compared with the values generated from the pressure 
vs time correlation graphs presented in the model above. From the plots presented in Figure 
26, it would be possible to observe the presence of an abnormality in the measurements. 
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Figure 23:: Detecting abnormality in filling time (left) random variation (right) gradual decrease 
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6.3.3.11 APPLICATION OF ICSRANK ON RESEARCH CONCEPTS 
[GAS MODEL] (R) 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the sub-categories inside each main category are flexible. Meaning 
they are customizable according to researchers and organization’s needs. The reason is because 
sometimes new categories come out, some categories are removed or disappear and also 
security is subjective, meaning not all organization view security in the same lens.  There are 
thousands of research concepts, tools and ideas. They include lots of information to be 
classified and assessed. Many of this information don’t or can’t fit into the proposed 
subcategories within the categories. Therefore, it’s not practical to ignore this information or 
squeeze them into improper categorization. 
Due to that, this research proposes a customizable system (S) and network (N) details to fit ICS 
devices, systems and ideas that are not commercial or industrial- being used in real industries. 
This type of categorizations includes research ideas, proof of concept, simulations tools and 
techniques. This would improve the OSINT value for the ICS security community and would 
indeed affect the security score of real ICS devices in the market. The aim of this thesis is to 
appreciate all kinds of knowledge in this field and to prove that this knowledge is of value to 
ICS security. This research adopts this concept and demonstrates below how this could be 
achieved. This kind of OSINT is labelled with a letter “R” to indicate that it’s a research 
OSINT. 
Stage 1: OSINT collection 
The OSINT here is theoretical and conceptual. Therefore, the subcategories are filled based on 
the model specifications and assumptions. At this stage, listing of available OSINTs is 
mentioned. The later section discusses what to do with OSINT and its implication on security.  
System details (S): 
System name: Gas cylinder filling model 
System details: Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) , see section (6.2.2) for more details about 
properties, pressure, flow rate, temperature and mass . 
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System functionality: The model is produced using mathematical equations. These equations 
are translated to a Simulink code 
System data: The data is generated in graphs. 
Industry domain: gas  
Network details (N): 
Network is modelled in Simulink  
Network medium is assumed to be achieved via internet and then to a local network. The 
simulation is based on the threat model of Trisis malware in chapter 5 and early chapter 6.  
Configuration (C) 
Based on the Trisis threat model, the device was on a program mode.  
Defence (D) 
It is easier to detect random variation attacks than Systematic attacks. Therefore, this defensive 
(D) technique could be added to OSINT categories.  
Technique (T) 
Method of attacks on Triconex PLC: 
• Change inflow 
• Change filling time 
Impact: Both attacks were done either systematically or by a random variation method. The 
systematic method causes more damage. 
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Vulnerability (O): 
Based on the Trisis malware scenarios, in chapter 6 case study 1 and 2. There is a vulnerability: 
ICSA-18-107-02. This vulnerability allows an attacker to exploit and modify the memory 
buffer without restrictions.  
Credential (P) 
No available information. It doesn’t exist for the Trisis incident. 
Stage 2: OSINT assessment 
Category / Secure 
System (S): No 
Network (N): Yes 
Configuration (C): Yes 
Defence (D): Yes 
Technique (T): No 
Vulnerability (O):NO 
Credentials: N/A 
System details (S):  
There is a wealth of system (S) details that were collected from the gas cylinder model. This 
information could be added to OSINT for research purposes. This OSINT can enable asset 
owners of gas plants or researchers to understand gas filling operation by going through models 
and simulations. This is beneficial for those who have not yet own real gas facilities and are 
curious to learn or even build their own simulations. On the attacker perspective, this 
knowledge can help him/her get this knowledge too, because most cyber attackers don’t know 
about physical systems such as gas plants.  In addition, this information could be added to any 
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ICS device that belongs to this industrial domain for assessment purposes, which can be taken 
into account especially this model has been validated by a real gas company during this 
research.  This information as labelled as insecure.  
Network details (N): 
There isn’t much explained in this model alone about the network. However, it only 
demonstrates the variables mechanism. For example, what happens if a given variable such as 
a pressure change. This behaviour can implement by a researcher or an attacker based on the 
targeted ICS device and protocol. Therefore, this information can be of a value if the device 
and protocol are learned, like the Trisis incident. The attacker knew the system and the protocol, 
and it would be a bonus if he/she understood the basics of a gas properties that are explained 
in this model. Therefore, this category alone is labelled as secure. 
Configuration details (C): 
The model here hasn’t got any information about this category. However, it was mentioned in 
the collection process that is based on real incident. So, if this perspective is taken into 
consideration. An attacker or a researcher may be able to look for default configurations that 
enable him/her to manipulate similar gas types. This category is labelled as secure. 
Defence details (D): 
The model demonstrates that systematic changes in gas properties is difficult to detect while 
the random variation are detectable. That give insights to prepare for these attacks and 
implement suitable mitigations strategies. This category is labelled as secure because of the 
availability of detection mechanisms that were observed in the model 
Techniques (T): 
A demonstration in depth of two types of attacks in the gas model and their impact on physical 
gas properties. These techniques can be applied to similar gas types and properties. Asset 
owners can benefit from these techniques and can guard against misbehaviour. Attackers on 
the other hand can harness this knowledge and build more sophisticated attacks. This category 
is labelled as insecure 
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Vulnerability (O):  
This model demonstrates how to manipulate gas physical properties; therefore, it shows 
possible weaknesses (O) if applied on a real ICS device related to a gas industry. Like the above 
techniques, this makes this category insecure 
Credentials (P): 
No information was available in this category. This category is secure. 
Stage 3:  ICSrank scoring and conclusion: 
This gas model based on the assessment earlier, has 1 main insecure category and 2 optional 
insecure optional categories. Based on ICSrank algorithms, this OSINT is labelled as a medium 
risk. The risk score is 7/10. Medium risks are scored 5/10. (see chapter 4). The extra insecure 
optional categories raise that figure up. This OSINT informs real physical properties of 
Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG). The information as stated above can be included with any ICS 
devices assessment within a gas industry.  There is an applicable OSINT information in ICS 
security. To understand ICS security, an understanding of industrial systems is required. The 
gas industry is widely established in the world and according to this research, these mechanical 
aspects are real. Therefore, it is important to understand these physical aspects together with 
the cyber aspects. This section is a contribution in this area. This study proves that research 
and theoretical concept should be included in the security assessment of ICS systems and 
shared online among ICS communities, to build a solid OSINT knowledge.  
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6.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
ICSrank framework fills many of the gaps that many metrics systems lack in ICS (See 
CHAPTER 2). The one major concept or a drawback discussed in chapter 2, that this research 
aims to develop in this thesis is the accuracy of a device security level. What is meant by 
accuracy: the 7 ICS OSINT categories that have information about an ICS device security listed 
in section 6.3.1. They provide all together – when accurately combined - a good probability of 
risk occurrence (likelihood), thus making risk scoring more accurate. Unlike traditional IT risk 
assessment methods, where they depend mostly on time probability, which is risky [32]. In ICS 
security assessment, one cannot depend on probability. It can cause serious issues for an 
organization. For example, suppose a PLC has a critical vulnerability (maybe linked to a gas 
pipe), but because it is not a common vulnerability to be exploited, it was ranked as low based 
on occurrence probability. This can lead to flagging this vulnerability as non-critical and not 
important to patch. The priority level here is problematic [32] because if this PLC is critical for 
production and other processes, a disaster could happen if an attacker finds out about it and 
manages to exploit it.       
The theoretical and practical usage of ICSrank methodology above can give significant 
knowledge about the security of a device. It can give a prediction of the level of security risk. 
When making a decision, the above information/framework can help estimate the risk value by 
considering ICS OSINT information and the calculation of risk score. Apparently, nobody 
knows or can obtain all the information listed in ICS OSINT. It all depends on who is doing 
the assessment and what is available on the public web. If an asset owner is doing it, there will 
be a more accurate estimation than if it is done by an external entity. Therefore, we suggest a 
methodology such as a public database of ICS OSINT information (See chapter 8). The idea 
of this suggestion is that this database collects information about existing ICS vulnerabilities 
and could be shared and edited in public, which could improve the accuracy of scoring risks 
and ICS security (see chapter 8).  
The 1st and 2nd case studies; Triconex PLC and Trisis OSINT respectively, were presented to 
examine related OSINT.  It was shown, that threat risk level could be estimated based on 
ICSrank algorithms. The results proved that ICS devices are affected by OSINT when it comes 
to OSINT security. It was observed in case study 2, OSINT risk level was low, because that 
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information was evaluated without a context. However, when it was combined with another 
OSINT for a given device such as Case 1, it raised the overall OSINT risk level to medium 
with a value close to high risk. This shows that risk scores that focus on one source of 
information without considering other factors- OSINT, are limited and non-informative about 
the actual risk.  This argument was proven too in Chapter 4 findings for the Siemens PLC.  
The 3rd case study demonstrated the value of considering research projects as a source of 
OSINT information. The risk value for that case was medium which indicates that this 
information can benefit the security of ICS devices and their OSINT. On the contrary, that 
argument was raised to not undervalue of research tools and information. Above is a gas 
cylinder filling system was developed for modelling the operation to replicate the process that 
occurs during the filling of a gas cylinder. The preliminary test of the model has shown that the 
basic relationships between various input and output variables have been met that validate the 
functioning of the model.   
The research in this chapter, has provided a novel methodology to analyse and view OSINT 
information. There are 3 types of OSINT information: comprehensive, partial and conceptual. 
The comprehensive information is covered in case study 1, partial information in case study 2 
and conceptual or research information in case study 3.  The outcome of this contributes to ICS 
security assessment by improving risk accuracy of existed vulnerabilities. It also enables to 
extract more informative data about an ICS device and its risk. It also takes a whole approach 
that uses multi OSINT sources. ICSrank also assess and ranks individual.  Even individual 
sources are treated differently than most of traditional metrics (already explained in chapter 4 
and chapter 6). The ICSrank scoring methodology is not just built on mathematical equations 
or individual risk/vulnerability factors, on the contrary ICSrank adopts a more comprehensive 
framework that considers a multi-dimensional approach. It considers relative and critical 
information that are categorized, assessed and ranked based on algorithms that were based and 
built on established security frameworks and best practices. This chapter ends this research. 
The following is the last chapter and includes the thesis conclusion and future directions.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION: 
Critical infrastructures are being pushed towards automation and smart technology. Special 
search engines find ICS devices. ICS devices are exposed online more than ever. Even hidden 
devices deep within networks are found and targeted. That’s mainly because the wealth of 
information in OSINT created new and sophisticated threats. The need to make sense of 
scattered information is necessary. Furthermore, the need to know what to do with it and how 
to view it. This chapter summarizes this research by presenting a general conclusion of research 
findings and future directions.  
7.2  FUTURE DIRECTIONS: 
• Development of an ICS Database: This database can fill a significant gap in the ICS 
security industry. Asset owners, policymakers, researchers and governments can use 
and contribute to this database. The database will have the following features: 
1. Improved collection process: This research is limited to few sources and is not 
automated. The proposed database will apply ICSrank framework throughout the 3 
stages. It has a wider range of resources. It uses crawlers and API to collect data 
from the Internet. Categorization should have improved mining techniques and 
classification algorithms – preferably AI algorithms. There will be implemented 
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automation techniques to filter out raw data from search sources and store it as 
ICSrank categories. 
2. Improved assessment process: The assessment process is done manually here and 
should be automated in the future database. The process should be intelligent 
enough to make decision and classify data as secure or not.  
3. Improved ranking process: ICSrank scoring should be automated. Its algorithms 
will be implemented using a web programming langue that is capable to identify 
labels and categories and to make decisions. 
4. Implementation of an update mechanism that updates the database regularly, its 
categories, and risk label for stored devices and information. 
• Increase the research scope of ICSrank, applications and case studies. The finding can 
be included in the proposed ICS database above:  
1.  Include new types of OSINT information such as analysing google images and its 
security impact on ICS security. It could be achieved by implementing proven 
machine learning methods such as image recognition. 
2. More research should be done on a wider variety of ICS devices and sectors as the 
scope of ICS devices for this research was limited. Another limitation of this 
research is that the methodology that was used throughout was not designed to 
address exploration in the gas sector in a thorough yet intensive manner.  
3. Application of ICSrank on existing ICS malwares. The aim is to build and extract 
new knowledge and insights. 
4. Analysis of  more examples of CVSS-ranked vulnerabilities and devices and 
compare it with ICSrank framework. The research should include the usage of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches.  
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7.3 GENERAL CONCLUSION: 
As the world becomes more interconnected, companies and governments will become more 
reliant than ever on the internet. However, this increased interconnectivity has brought an 
increased need for infrastructure cybersecurity. Both criminals and hostile governments are 
more than capable of launching crippling attacks on critical infrastructure such as power grids, 
telecommunications networks, and even electoral ballot counting systems. Both corporations 
and policymakers alike are calling for additional cyber-security infrastructure. 
The motivation behind this research was to continue where previous researchers left off. We 
wanted to map out a taxonomy of cyber-attacks, cybersecurity vulnerabilities etc. and create a 
quantified scoring system to better gauge how vulnerable physical devices are against cyber-
attacks. This would allow us to better identify weaknesses and prescribe solutions to future 
cyber-attack scenarios. This study was designed to acquire a better understanding of common 
cyber-security vulnerabilities and attacks using OSINT sources and pre-existing research from 
past infrastructure cybersecurity research. We wanted to demonstrate how certain cyber-attack 
vulnerabilities and impacts on physical devices are linked by using a gas pipeline and gas 
cylinder as a model. 
After simulating “what-if” cyber-attack scenarios on our gas cylinder-filling model, we 
concluded that more interconnected systems are vulnerable to attacks. Furthermore, we 
analysed that the criticality of vulnerability in physical devices is also an important factor to 
consider. If a government or company does not follow certain cyber-security best practices, 
then the vulnerability of physical devices becomes more pronounced and the impact of cyber-
attacks intensifies.  
Industrial Control Systems are a ubiquitous part of managing physical sites in energy 
infrastructure. Therefore, discussing and addressing the inherent vulnerability of ICS is 
important to reduce infrastructure vulnerability. In this research, human ignorance is a critical 
factor when assessing cybersecurity vulnerability. This is because most cyber-attacks happen 
when the victim is caught unawares because they do not know the common vulnerabilities in 
cybersecurity infrastructure or the best practices in minimizing the risk of a cyber-attack. 
Therefore, any solution for increasing the security of energy infrastructure will require raising 
awareness of common security vulnerabilities. 
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The increased proliferation of OSINT sources such as Google, Shodan or social media has 
exacerbated the vulnerability of ICS against cyber-attacks. Attackers have access to a wealth 
of knowledge on a company or government’s energy infrastructure, allowing them to exploit 
easily any vulnerability present in ICS devices. OSINT has also led to the rise of other methods 
of cyber-attacks such as phishing that allows malicious actors to access sensitive data on 
individuals and firms. 
There is a call to use OSINT constructively to improve the security of critical infrastructure. 
This thesis contributes to knowledge by the introduction of a novel framework to view OSINT 
information that is related to ICS devices.  The broader view of multi factors that affect a device 
security instead of a single factor is favourable, informative and accurate. A dynamic update 
of information approach is better than static approach. ICSrank is built on the above 
philosophy. Instead of relying on mathematical equations alone which are not built on rational 
ground like most metrics today, ICSrank builds its ground from open sources and relies on 
context. That doesn’t mean single sources are not useful, it means they should be handled as a 
complement to other information. In ICSrank, dynamic means no information are obsolete. It 
also means adding of new information or even removing it. This can affect the risk level and 
keep up to date with new information. This approach is more favourable than relying on 
inaccurate and irrelevant information. The categorization in ICSrank is also flexible to adjust 
with certain sources as demonstrated in ch6 and also to suit the organization needs.  
The abundance of information in the Internet makes it difficult to keep up with it, make sense 
of or use in cybersecurity. There must be an established direction by figuring out what 
information to look for and preferably where.  Categorization of information helps in this 
direction. Established databases and source provide wealth of critical information to choose 
from. Familiarity of cyber security basics for IT in general and OT in specific is a key factor. 
ICSrank categories is built upon knowledge of essential security information for ics devices. 
ICSrank is composed of 7 categories that make sense of this wealth of information. Those 
categories are applicable to ICS devices both online and offline. Every category has 
subcategories as they a treated like an assessment check list.  
The ability to assess and analyse information is a must in security practices. For example, how 
to make sense of it and what to do with it. In order to make precautions and implement defences, 
information must be put in context. Information in the Internet can be of value or no value at 
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all. It Can affect security, or it can’t. ICSrank classifies information into major and optional 
information. An information is of value if it has certain and compulsory data in it. ICSrank 
evaluates information as valid, if certain criteria are met. Then it classifies this information as 
secure or insecure. Some information is missing and is labelled as non-available accordingly   
In order to make decisions on available information in the Internet easier, it has to be processed. 
ICSrank processes this information into well informing data. The goal is to evaluate the data 
risk level. Numerical values are not important like in most existed metrics. In ICSrank, the 
value is in the meaning of output and its practicality. The concept here in ICSrank is common 
sense, the more sensitive information is available, the more issues and possibly higher chances 
of threats could happen. ICSrank is built on this concept. There is core information that are 
essential to know about and protect with regard to an ICS device. Other types of information 
are a bonus and can increase the likelihood of risk occurrence and threat attractiveness. ICSrank 
score indicates what is critically known about a device and what’s its position in being an 
attractive to a threat. Knowing this position is vital to establish security controls, because 
ICSrank guides what to focus on. It gives also an indication of future risks.  
This research offers a security solution in critical infrastructure. It opens doors to many aspects 
of security practices. Taking action should be based on real and good data. Many solutions lack 
efficiency, because they were not built on accurate information. Wrong or inaccurate 
information leads to   wrong assessment and therefore leads to wrong output. This research is 
a step in the direction towards obtaining, viewing and evaluating the right information with 
ICSrank lenses.  
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 APPENDIX  
APPENDIX A: MATLAB CODE 
a. MAIN.m 
 
clear all 
clc 
 
global V Qin0 rho MW R T time0 
 
%% VARIABLES USED IN THE SYSTEM 
V = 0.937; %volume of the cylinder (m3) 
rho=0.564; %density of the gas (kmol/m3) 
R=8.3151*10^-2; %Gas constant (bar. m3/kmol. K) 
T=378; %temperature (Kelvin) 
MW=22.695; %molecular weight of the Gas (kg/kmol) 
Qin0=45/3600; %flowrate of the gas (m3/sec) 
time0=75; %filling time 
 
 
%% CHANGES IN GAS FLOWRATE 
for i=1:20 
    Q_in(i)=Qin0*(0.9+i/100); 
y_flow(: i)=cylinder_cal_flow(Q_in(i)); 
end 
 
 
%% CHANGES IN FILLING TIME 
%change in filling time 
fori=1:20 
    time(i)=time0*(0.9+i/100); 
y_time(:,i)=cylinder_cal_time(time(i)); 
end 
 
 
%% Plotting Graphs Case I 
%Mass vs Flow 
plot (Q_in*3600, y_flow(1,:),'-'); 
xlabel ('Gas Flowrate (m3/hr)') % x-axis label 
ylabel ('Mass (kg)') % y-axis label 
xlim ([41 49.5]) 
ylim ([26.9 29.5]) 
 
%Presure vs Flow 
plot (Q_in*3600, y_flow(2,:),'-'); 
xlabel ('Mass (m3/hr)') % x-axis label 
ylabel ('Pressure (bar)') % y-axis label 
xlim ([41 49.5]) 
ylim ([15.49 18.6]) 
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%Mass vs Pressure 
plot (y_flow(1, :),y_flow(2,:),'-'); 
xlabel ('Mass (m3/hr)') % x-axis label 
ylabel ('Pressure (bar)') % y-axis label 
xlim ([26.9 29.5]) 
ylim ([15.49 18.6]) 
 
 
%% Plotting Graphs Case II 
%Mass vs Flow 
plot (Q_in*3600, y_time(1,:),'-'); 
xlabel ('Gas Flowrate (m3/hr)') % x-axis label 
ylabel ('Mass (kg)') % y-axis label 
xlim ([41 49.5]) 
ylim ([26.9 29.5]) 
 
%Presure vs Flow 
plot (Q_in*3600, y_time(2,:),'-'); 
xlabel ('Mass (m3/hr)') % x-axis label 
ylabel ('Pressure (bar)') % y-axis label 
xlim ([41 49.5]) 
ylim ([15.49 18.6]) 
 
%Mass vs Pressure 
plot (y_flow(1, :),y_time(2,:),'-'); 
xlabel ('Mass (m3/hr)') % x-axis label 
ylabel ('Pressure (bar)') % y-axis label 
xlim ([26.9 29.5]) 
ylim ([15.49 18.6]) 
 
b. cylinder_cal_flow.m 
 
function y0 = cylinder_cal_flow(x) 
global V MW R T Qin time0 
 
Qin=x; 
X0=16; %initial weight of the cylinder 
[t, x] =ode45('mass_cal’, [0 time0], X0); 
 
W=x(end,1); %weight of the cylinder after 75 seconds 
 
%CALCULATE THE PRESSURE 
P=0.9716*((V*MW)/(R*T*(W-16)) +(105.26^-1)) ^-1; 
 
y0=[W;P]; 
 
c. cylinder_cal_time.m 
 
function y0 = cylinder_cal_time(x) 
global V MW R T  
 
X0=16; %initial weight of the cylinder 
time=x; %filling time 
[t,x]=ode45('mass_cal',[0 time], X0); 
 
W=x(end,1); %weight of the cylinder after 75 seconds 
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%CALCULATE THE PRESSURE 
P=0.9716*((V*MW)/(R*T*(W-16)) +(105.26^-1)) ^-1; 
 
y0=[W;P]; 
 
 
d. mass_cal.m 
functiondydt = mass_cal(t, x) 
 
global Qin rho MW 
 
dydt=Qin*rho*MW; 
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